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1
Introduction
The high U.S. unemployment rates brought on by the recent reces
sion have refocused the attention of policymakers on the plight of dis
placed workers workers whose job losses result from layoffs and
plant closings associated with economic restructuring. The causes of
such restructuring are varied and include shifts in product demand,
changes in technology, or even poor management. Although the econ
omy as a whole benefits when restructuring occurs, most would agree
that some costs are imposed on the workers who lose their jobs. There
is, however, a substantial range of opinion about the magnitude of
those costs. Some view displacement as a temporary setback from
which workers easily recover, while others believe it to be nearly cata
strophic, causing large, permanent reductions in workers' earnings. In
this monograph we add to the existing literature by more precisely esti
mating the magnitude and temporal pattern of the earnings losses of
displaced workers.1
In addition to economic restructuring, changes in public policy may
also lead to worker dislocation. Concern over that possibility has been
prominent in the debate over the free-trade agreement with Canada and
Mexico.2 It is clear that consumers will benefit from such an agree
ment. But, some workers are likely to lose their jobs as a result of
increased competition. Likewise, controversies over environmental
protection often involve similar trade-offs. The benefits associated
with protecting the spotted owls in Pacific Northwest forests,3 the
salmon in Washington State rivers,4 and the snaildarter in Tennessee
waterways all come at the cost of lost jobs. As with economic restruc
turing, society as a whole may benefit from such public policies, but
costs are imposed on the workers who lose their jobs.
There are two reasons why policymakers are interested in the mag
nitude of losses suffered by workers. First, whether they actually will
want to intervene in the economy may depend on the magnitude of
losses borne by displaced workers. Such considerations are especially
likely to arise when policymakers undertake interventions to protect

2 Introduction

the environment In such instances, it is often not clear whether the
benefits of their actions exceed the costs. A second reason for such
interest in the losses of displaced workers is that even when, as in most
cases of proposed trade liberalization, society derives net benefits from
the intervention, policymakers may want to compensate those who are
displaced. They may want to provide this compensation because they
believe that "fairness" requires it or because they believe that compen
sating displaced workers is the only politically feasible way to bring
about change.6

1.1 Policies to Aid Displaced Workers
Policymakers have, in fact, long recognized that dislocation may be
costly and have attempted to ameliorate the losses of displaced work
ers through a series of federally funded programs that have provided
these workers with both cash and retraining services. In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the concern was primarily with workers whose joblessness resulted from automation. The Area Redevelopment Act of
1959 provided training and relocation assistance to such workers. That
legislation was followed by the Manpower Development and Training
Act of 1962 which provided expanded classroom and on-the-job train
ing opportunities to displaced workers. In the 1970s, concern shifted
from the effects of automation to those of foreign competition. As a
result, in 1974 Congress relaxed eligibility requirements for Trade
Adjustment Assistance under the Trade Act (Leigh 1990, pp. 92-94).
Those changes allowed the Secretary of Labor to authorize compensa
tion for large numbers of workers who had lost their jobs as a result of
import competition rather than explicit trade liberalizations.
More recently, policymakers' attention has been drawn to what are
perceived to be the special problems experienced by workers displaced
from the manufacturing sector a sector that experienced a permanent
employment loss of approximately 1.5 million net jobs during the
1980s (Economic Report of the President 1991: 334, table B-43). The
high unemployment rates experienced by such job losses are largely
due to substantially longer unemployment spells (Murphy and Topel
1987, pp. 24-26). Evidence indicating that prime-age males were hav-

Introduction 3

ing difficulty adjusting to their job losses was an important consider
ation in Congress* decision to include a job training component in the
TAA program and to expand services under the Job Training Partner
ship Act of 1982 with the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjust
ment Assistance Act of 1988 (Leigh 1990: 93-94). As a result of that
legislation, during fiscal year 1991, the federal government spent
nearly $1 billion specifically to aid displaced workers (U.S. Office of
Management and Budget 1991).
As we discuss more fully in subsequent chapters, the most effective
mix of cash subsidies, retraining opportunities, and job search assis
tance depends critically on such factors as the relative importance of
unemployment in determining displaced worker losses and whether the
displaced are likely to find work similar to their former jobs. The
research presented in this monograph is intended to shed light on these
questions and thus to aid in the formulation of cost effective assistance
programs. We also investigate whether the special concern for dis
placed manufacturing workers is warranted by the uniqueness of their
experiences.

1.2 Why Job Loss May Be Costly in the Long Run
Clearly, job loss adversely affects workers in the short term if they
are forced into unemployment while searching for a new job. However,
longer term losses can only result from displacement if workers' earn
ings with their former employers exceeded what they could have
earned with other potential employers. There are several reasons why
workers could have received such earnings premiums on their former
jobs. First, firm and industry earnings premiums may result when jobs
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. A great deal of evi
dence indicates that unionization raises workers' wages (Lewis 1986,
pp. 9, 125-28). Further, unionized firms may find it profitable to main
tain relative wage differentials between various classes of workers and
thus may respond to the unionization of one segment of their work
force by paying wage premiums to all their employees (Hirsch and
Addison 1986). Similarly, these earnings premiums may become
industrywide when the industry's nonunion firms, fearing unionization,
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respond to collective bargaining settlements of rivals by raising their
own workers' pay. Therefore, the earnings loss associated with worker
separations depends partially on the magnitude of the union wage gap
and on whether displaced workers are able to find new jobs in similarly
unionized industries.
Earnings premiums may also arise in competitive (nonunion) labor
markets if workers have skills that enhance their productivity with
their current employer, but are less valued by other potential employ
ers. For instance, both firms and workers may desire long-term
employment relationships in order to recoup investments in skills that
are specific to the firms. The most effective mechanism for assuring the
continuance of such relationships is for the firm to pay workers more
than they would receive elsewhere (Becker 1975). Moreover, paying
earnings premiums may be profitable even when workers have not
acquired their specialized skills on the job. Some employees' skills
may simply be well matched to a particular employer. In this case, the
resulting earnings premiums reflect the considerable costs incurred
both by the firm when recruiting and evaluating new employees and by
workers when seeking appropriate employment (Jovanovic 1979).
A third reason why earnings premiums may exist is that productiv
ity of workers may depend directly on their pay. For instance, earnings
premiums may induce employees to work harder and may discourage
them from quitting. In this case, it is profitable for firms to offer premi
ums as long as their costs are offset by increased productivity. How
ever, offering premiums cannot always be profitable. Otherwise, all
firms would attempt to pay them and there would be no premiums. Cir
cumstances that make paying premiums attractive include those
involving teamwork and those where monitoring workers' perfor
mance is difficult. When workers who earn premiums lose their jobs as
a result of restructuring, they are likely to either have to take a new job
where earnings premia are not paid or wait in a long queue for a job
similar to their old one. In either case they will suffer earnings
declines.8
A final reason why job loss may result in substantial earnings reduc
tions is the prevalence in certain sectors of the labor market of employ
ment practices that preclude lateral entry. That is, in order to induce
employees to work hard and make the necessary investments to
enhance their productivity, certain kinds of firms may commit them-
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selves to a promotion-from-within policy. Under such a system, new
hires always start in entry-level positions, and those who perform well
move into higher paying jobs. Should the successful workers be dis
placed by economic restructuring and subsequently accept employ
ment with a similar firm, they will begin in jobs farther down the
promotion ladder. This effective demotion is likely to be associated
with earnings losses (Lazear 1981).
Each of the foregoing reasons for why workers may receive earn
ings premiums implies that workers displaced as a result of economic
restructuring or public policy changes may experience earnings losses
even after finding new employment. These theories do not, however,
provide much guidance about the magnitude of the resulting losses. In
addition, they differ in their implications for how long these losses
might last. In some cases, such as when the earnings declines result
from lost union premiums, they will be permanent. In other cases, such
as when the declines result from terminating a good worker-firm
match, they may diminish with time. These possibilities indicate that it
is important to study how the magnitude of those losses vary with time
following workers' separations.

1.3 This Study's Objectives and Findings

In this monograph, we examine the magnitude and temporal pattern
of earnings losses suffered by a group of experienced workers who
separated from their firms in the early and mid-1980s. We estimate
these losses by comparing workers' postdisplacement earnings to their
expected earnings had they not been displaced. We also examine how
earnings losses depend on various characteristics of the workers and
their former employers.
This study is distinguished from others that have examined similar
questions by its use of a newly available data set derived from the
administrative records of the State of Pennsylvania. This data set con
tains the quarterly earnings histories of a large number of workers cov
ering the period 1974 through 1986 merged with employment
information about their firms. These data have several advantages over
those used in previous studies. First, because our sample is larger than
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others that have been used to examine the losses of displaced workers,
we are able to obtain estimates for more narrowly defined groups of
workers and thus are better able to determine the characteristics of
workers most severely affected by job loss. Second, because the earn
ings histories stretch over a longer period of time than those used in
previous studies, we are able to learn more about the long-term conse
quences of job loss. The longer panel also allows us to observe the
earnings of displaced workers well before their separations and thus
greatly improves our ability to forecast what their earnings would have
been had they not been displaced. Third, because we have data on
workers' firms, we can examine how the costs of displacement depend
on their firm's economic health. And finally, because we also have a
large sample of workers who were not displaced during the 1980s, we
can construct comparison groups that improve our estimates of how
the earnings of displaced workers would have grown in the absence of
job loss.
There are, of course, also some disadvantages associated with our
use of administrative data. First, we do not know for certain whether a
particular separation was a layoff, a discharge for cause, or a quit. The
latter two classes of worker separations do not reflect the effects of the
economic restructuring that we wish to study, and it is unlikely that
they have the same consequences for workers' subsequent earnings.
As indicated by the literature, however, quits and discharges for cause
decline sharply as tenure with the firm increases (Mincer and
Jovanovic 1981). Thus, because we limit our analysis to workers with
six or more years of tenure, our sample of separations should consist
largely of involuntary layoffs. Moreover, with our data it is possible to
identify groups of workers leaving firms experiencing large employ
ment declines. Such separations almost certainly are the result of eco
nomic restructuring.10
A second disadvantage of our use of administrative data is that we
possess only limited demographic information on the workers we
study. Our sample is selected so that we know workers' gender and
year of birth. However, we do not have access to such standard human
capital measures as years of education, nor do we know workers' occu
pations. Because we rely completely on estimation techniques that
exploit our data's longitudinal nature, this lack of demographic infor
mation does not lead to any bias in our estimates of the average losses
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suffered by displaced workers. However, lack of data does prevent us
from analyzing how earnings losses depend on factors such as educa
tion and occupation. Similarly, our lack of a measure of hours worked
prevents us from studying how displacement separately affects hours
of work and wages.
Like other worker dislocation studies, our findings indicate that
experienced workers incur substantial earnings losses immediately
after they separate from their firms. Much of this initial loss results
from increased unemployment. We also show, however, that these
losses are generally shared by workers in all demographic groups and
most industrial sectors, and more important, that they persist for sev
eral years after displacement. Even in the fifth year following separa
tions, we estimate that annual losses of displaced workers average
more than $6,500, an amount equal to more than 25 percent of their
predisplacement earnings. During the first six years following their job
losses, we estimate that their discounted earnings losses totaled
$41,000. That estimate holds for both older and younger workers, var
ies only modestly for workers displaced from different industries, and
is only slightly lower for women.
Moreover, we find that the earnings of displaced workers begin to
diverge from their expected levels two to three years before they leave
their firms. This divergence appears to result from reduced hours, cuts
in real wages, and increased temporary layoffs in the period before per
manent separations. Temporary layoffs, in particular, account for a sig
nificant fraction of predisplacement earnings declines. We argue below
that these losses likely result from firms' responses to economic
restructuring or to policy changes, and therefore they should be
included as part of the costs of worker dislocation. When we include
their preseparation losses as well as a reasonable estimate of their
losses more than five years after separation, the present value of their
losses rises to approximately $80,000.
One implication of our findings is that existing government pro
grams do not, and probably cannot, compensate for more than a small
portion of displaced workers' losses. One reason for this is that most of
the losses accumulate after they are reemployed, and unemployment
insurance benefits, the main form of assistance for displaced workers,
do not cover such losses. A second reason that the effectiveness of
existing programs is limited is that earnings losses are large even when
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displaced workers find new jobs in their old industries. As we argue
below, this suggests that existing employment and training programs,
including job search assistance, though they might be cost effective,
cannot entirely eliminate experienced workers' losses. Another impli
cation of our findings is that, instead of bolstering existing programs, it
may be more efficient to assist displaced workers by introducing an
income or earnings subsidy.
The remainder of this monograph proceeds as follows: In chapter 2,
we review the previous literature on dislocation, with special emphasis
on the empirical methods used in these studies and on the evidence of
long-term effects of displacement. In chapter 3, we introduce our lon
gitudinal data on Pennsylvania workers and identify several issues
associated with estimating earnings losses. In chapter 4, we discuss the
statistical methodologies underlying our formal estimates of earnings
losses. In chapter 5, we present estimates of the earnings losses
incurred by all experienced workers separating from their firms during
the early and mid-1980s. In chapter 6, we restrict our focus to workers
leaving firms experiencing closings and mass layoffs and show how
earnings losses depend on the economic health of workers' former
firms, on their former industry, on local labor market conditions, and
on whether they found new jobs in their old industrial sectors. Chapter
7 summarizes our findings and discusses their implications for public
policy.
NOTES
1. As noted, there is some difference of opinion on this issue. On the one hand, Michael
Boskin, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers under President Bush, has
asserted that the overwhelming bulk of people laid off during the most recent recession would
eventually find jobs that pay something close to their former wages (Chicago Tribune, September
29, 1991, p. 2). On the other hand, reflecting on debates over policies to aid the jobless, Rudy
Kuzel, currently President of United Auto Workers Local 72 in Kenosha, Wisconsin, remarked
that, "They cut people's throat in this country and then they argue about what size Band-Aid to
apply" (Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1991, p. IS). We suspect that such fundamental disagree
ment over the seriousness of job loss underlies much debate over appropriate public policy.
2. See, for example, James Carville, "Help Those Whom NAFTA Will Hurt," Washington
Post, July 25, 1993, Section C, p. 7; Elaine S. Povich, "Trade Pact Conditions," Chicago Tribune,
April 30, 1991, Business Section, pp. 1-5; and D. Corn, "Harkin's Bid," The Nation, July 29August 5, 1991, p. 158. A similar debate occurred when the free-trade agreement with Canada
was ratified. See New York Times, June 27, 1988, Section D, p. 10; and New York Times, January
3,1988, Section A, p. 12.
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3. For instance, in the case of the spotted owls, the costs of preserving their habitat is borne
disproportionately by workers in the lumber industry. See "Ginton Pledges 'Balanced' Solution
to Forest Policy Crisis in 2 Months," Washington Post, May 13, 1993, Section 1, p. 2; and "U.S.:
Saving Rare Owl Would Cost 40,000 Jobs," Chicago Tribune, April 30,1991, Section 1, p. 14.
4. See New York Times, April 1,1991, Section A, p. 1; and Watt Street Journal, May 16,1991,
Section A, p. 16.
5. See Science, February 23,1979, p. 730; and Time, October 8,1979, p. 105.
6. See Owen and Braeutigam (1978) for a discussion of the possibility that without some
mechanism for compensating those who are hurt by regulatory change, all such change would be
blocked; and see Cordes and Weisbrod (1979) for evidence that increasing levels of compensation
to those who are adversely affected can increase the rate at which public highway building
projects are undertaken.
7. See President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy (1962).
8. For alternative versions of this basic model, see Stiglitz (1974); Akerlof (1982); and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
9. See McLaughlin (1991).
10. Indeed, our data probably allow us to identify displaced workers more accurately than data
sets such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced Workers Survey, which relies on worker
self-reports and is, therefore, subject to recall biases and perhaps to misreporting due to the stigma
associated with being discharged for cause. See Topel (1990).

2
Evidence from Earlier Studies
of the
Costs of Worker Dislocation
Our study of the costs of worker dislocation builds on a substantial
body of earlier research. The primary aim of this chapter is to describe
the methodology and findings from earlier worker dislocation studies.
While many of those studies focused primarily on issues beyond the
scope of this monograph, they often directly or indirectly examined the
earnings costs of dislocated worker job losses and the factors that made
those losses costly. Our survey is not comprehensive, but instead
reflects our interest in (1) the long-run effect of worker dislocation on
earnings, and (2) the different strategies used to estimate the costs of
worker dislocation, especially how those estimates depend on the
choice of a comparison group and on the availability of a long predisplacement earnings history. We do not summarize every study of
worker displacement; instead, we limit our survey to research that
characterizes the methodology and findings from a broader set of stud
ies.
The chapter is divided into six sections. In section 2.1, we briefly
comment on findings from the many case studies of the effects of plant
closings on displaced workers. In section 2.2, we survey the findings
and methodologies used in a series of studies sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB).
The purpose, data, and methodology of the studies were often similar
to our own. Accordingly, our review of them is relatively extensive. In
section 2.3, we summarize the evidence on earnings losses of displaced
workers derived from the Displaced Workers Survey (t)WS). In sec
tion 2.4, we assess recent studies that examine the relationship between
earnings losses and predisplacement tenure of workers. In section 2.5,
we examine the merits of using cross-sectional versus longitudinal data
when estimating the costs of worker dislocation. Finally, some con
cluding remarks follow in section 2.6.
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2.1 Lessons From Case Studies
Surveys such as that by Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman (1981) provide
a comprehensive examination of case studies of how plant closings
affect the subsequent earnings of workers. These studies usually exam
ine the losses experienced by unionized workers when their plants shut
down in already depressed areas. Among the best-known studies are
those of dislocated workers in the meat packing and auto industries,
but other studies examine the effects of dislocation on primarily female
workforces from the textile and electronic assembly industries and on
workers from firms in defense-related industries. Most often these case
studies have found that displaced workers incurred long periods of joblessness following their displacements. They also have found that earn
ings losses were greatest for older, unionized, high-wage, blue-collar
men, and for those residing in areas where their entire industry was in
decline or areas with relatively isolated labor markets.
For our purposes, these case studies suffer from several shortcom
ings. Among their principal deficiencies is that they typically charac
terize "worst-case" scenarios. The plants studied were chosen because
it was believed that the earnings losses would be large. Therefore, the
workers studied may not be representative of the population of dislo
cated workers, many of whom left firms or plants that remained open.
Another shortcoming of these studies is that they were based on inter
views only a year or two after worker separations. As a result, little was
learned about long-term earnings losses of workers following their dis
placements.

2.2 Studies of Trade-Impacted Workers
Concern about the costs of job loss stemming from heightened for
eign competition prompted ILAB to sponsor a series of studies that
dealt in part with the costs of worker dislocation. Several of those stud
ies focused on workers who received Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA).1 Other studies examined the costs of declining demand on
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workers in trade-sensitive manufacturing industries who did not neces
sarily receive TAA.
The characteristics of workers in the ILAB studies often differed
from those in subsequent studies using the Displaced Workers Survey
because ILAB was concerned about both permanent job loss and tem
porary job loss followed by recall to the same employer. Under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, TAA recipients had to demonstrate that
their layoffs resulted from the lifting of import restrictions, but they did
not need to show that their job loss was permanent. The Trade Act of
1974 relaxed those eligibility requirements so that unemployed work
ers had only to show that imports contributed to their layoffs. In addi
tion, the Act increased both the maximum potential duration of
unemployment insurance (UI) payments and the levels of those pay
ments.
Prior to the 1974 legislative changes, few workers received TAA.
Those who did were predominantly from plants that closed in the rela
tively low-wage footwear, textiles, and electronic assembly industries.
Accordingly, in comparing the characteristics of TAA recipients to
other job losers, Neumann (1978b) noted that "(a) broad generalization
would be that trade-impacted workers were older, less educated, semi
skilled or unskilled, and had a lot of years on the job. It is precisely
such workers who could be expected to have a difficult time finding
another job." By contrast, workers who received TAA under the 1974
Act included younger unemployed workers from the high-wage steel
and auto industries, 85 percent of whom were ultimately recalled.2
Neumann (1978b) found evidence of substantial earnings losses as
measured by the difference between displaced TAA recipients' postand predisplacement earnings. In particular, he found from a survey of
pre-1974 TAA recipients that both males and females experienced
losses approaching 25 percent of their former earnings. For purposes of
assessing the long-term effects of displacement, this study's primary
shortcomings were that it did not use a comparison group of nondisplaced workers and it did not control for the time between the date of a
worker's job loss and the interview date. As a result, it was impossible
to infer how actual postdisplacement earnings compared to what they
would have been in the absence of displacement and whether the sub
stantial earnings reductions observed were permanent or temporary.
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Corson and Nicholson's (1981) study of post-1974 TAA recipients
addressed the principal deficiencies associated with Neumann's study.
Although they did not use a comparison group, they adjusted their
earnings loss estimates to account for the earnings growth that workers
might have received had they not lost their job. They made that adjust
ment by using the relationship between earnings growth and tenure in
predisplacement jobs.3 They found this adjustment increased men's
earnings losses by 20 percent, but added little to their estimates of
women's losses. Overall, Corson and Nicholson found that most post1974 TAA recipients were recalled, but those who were not recalled
had large earnings losses. During the first two years following separa
tion, permanently displaced male and female TAA recipients had earn
ings losses ranging from 30 to 50 percent. Even in the third year
following their layoff, this group's earnings losses still averaged more
than 10 percent ($3,100 in 1978 dollars) annually.
In an effort to expand its knowledge of the costs of worker displace
ment, ILAB sponsored an in-depth study of the steel industry. The steel
industry was an important case study of the relationship between trade
liberalization and worker dislocation for several reasons. First, at the
time this geographically concentrated industry was experiencing
strong import competition; second, its workers enjoyed wages among
the highest of any U.S. industry; third, its workforce had relatively lit
tle formal education; and finally, it enforced rigid internal promotion
policies for most blue-collar jobs. These factors all suggested that
worker displacement would be associated with substantial earnings
losses.
This study resembled earlier case studies in its focus on a worst-case
scenario, but differed sharply from those studies in its use of a large
administrative data set and in its econometric methodology. In his
study of displacement costs, Jacobson (1977) used the earnings records
from the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Longitudinal
Employer/Employee Data (LEED) file. These data provided informa
tion on the age, race, sex, firm, and earnings histories of 24,000 steel
workers covering the years 1957 through 1971. As a result, the study
used a much larger sample with substantially longer earnings histories
than the ones used by either Neumann or Corson and Nicholson.
Jacobson measured earnings losses as the difference between the
actual earnings of displaced workers and their predicted earnings had
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they not lost their job. He computed their predicted earnings by using a
comparison group of nondisplaced steel workers. Using this group of
workers, he was able to predict how the earnings of displaced workers
would have grown had they remained employed in the steel industry.
His procedure represented an improvement over Corson and Nicholson's experience adjustment, because it explicitly took into account
how contemporaneous economic conditions affected the rate of earn
ings growth of nondisplaced workers.4
From his empirical analysis, Jacobson concluded that dislocated
steel workers suffered large and long-lasting earnings reductions, and
that both younger and older workers experienced these losses. For
workers with three or more years of tenure, earnings averaged 65 per
cent less than would otherwise have been expected over the first two
years following displacement, and 45 percent less over the third
through fifth years. In addition, he also found the following: (1) Initial
losses were especially large due to unemployment; (2) the frequency of
unemployment fell after two years, but earnings losses remained large;
and (3) the characteristics of the local labor market at the time of dis
placement had an important effect on the short- and long-term losses.
Subsequent ILAB studies examined the costs of displacement
among a broader set of industries. In one study, Jacobson (1978) used
the LEED data to examine how these costs varied among workers dis
placed from 11 industries ranging from automobiles to women's cloth
ing. As shown by table 2.1, he found that earnings losses varied
considerably among industries. For workers displaced from the auto
mobile, steel, and meat packing industries, losses from the third
through the sixth year averaged approximately 15 percent. By contrast,
for displaced electronics and women's clothing workers, earnings
losses averaged less than 5 percent.
One potential shortcoming of the LEED data that is shared by the
Pennsylvania data used in our study is that the file identifies job
changes, but not the reasons for those changes. Jacobson limited his
displacement loss estimates to workers in counties where industry
employment had declined. Nevertheless, some of the separators in
Jacobson's sample may not have been displaced, but instead may have
quit their previous job or been dismissed for cause. Jacobson estimated
the rate of normal attrition by examining the separation rates of indus
tries in counties where employment was not declining. When attrition
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is high, job leavers are more likely to have quit to take higher paying
jobs. In contrast, when attrition is low, a larger share of job leavers may
have departed due to health or other personal problems. For our pur
poses, therefore, another important finding in Jacobson's study was
that earnings losses from displacement were the largest for workers
from industries with low attrition. That finding is consistent with the
contention that workers in these industries have many job-specific
skills and receive wage premiums.5
In principle, failure to differentiate between quits and involuntary
layoffs could seriously bias downward the estimates of earnings losses.
In the course of his analysis, Jacobson found that attrition was most
common among younger workers and workers near retirement age.
But, attrition was relatively rare among high-tenure, prime-age work
ers. In high-wage industries, the rate for these workers averaged only
between 1 and 2 percent a year. Because of the similarity between our
Pennsylvania data and the LEED file, these findings influenced us to
limit our study to high-tenure, prime-age workers.
Holen et al. (1981) used another approach to address the problem
that administrative earnings data do not distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary separations. They used Social Security administrative
records for a sample of 9,500 workers who left 42 plants that closed in
1971 or 1972. Although their study focused on plant closings, and only
analyzed the experiences of workers from a few plants, there was no
doubt that workers in their sample were dislocated. One potential
drawback of their study is that they did not use a comparison group of
nondisplaced workers from firms that did not close. Instead, like Corson and Nicholson, they used preseparation earnings growth to esti
mate what these workers' earnings would have been had they not been
displaced. As did Corson and Nicholson, they found that this adjust
ment was small for women but substantial for men, especially for
younger men.
Like Jacobson, Holen et al. found that prime-age men and women
experienced especially large earnings losses during the two years fol
lowing their plants' closings. However, in the subsequent three years,
earnings losses were still large, averaging 15 percent per year for
workers displaced from automobile, chemical, and glass firms. In
roughly half the cases studied, however, losses became negligible or
even became gains. Only among workers displaced from automobile

Table 2.1 Earnings Losses of Displaced Prime-Age Male Workers as Reported by Jacobson and Holen et al.
Average
Average annual percentage loss
predisplacement
''Eleven-industry study"8
"Plant closing study"0
earnings of
sample (1980
First
Subsequent
First
Subsequent
dollars)
Industry
two years
four years
two years
three years
1. Automobiles
$15,918
43.4
15.6
24.1
14.6
—
—
2. Steel
15,175
12.6
43.6
—
—
3. Meat packing
14,133
18.1
23.9
—
—
4. Aerospace
18,947
14.8
23.6
5. Petrochemicals
18,498
12.5
12.4
16.4
15.9
—
—
6. Flat glass
16,291
12.2
16.3
—
—
7. Men's clothing
17,327
21.3
8.7
—
—
8. Women's clothing
12,406
2.1
13.3
9. Electronic components
17,433
4.1
0.2
8.3
10.1
-1.9
10. Shoes
12,285
1.5
11.3
11.3
—
-0.9
—
11. Rubber footwear
15,322
32.2
-2.7
—
—
12. Toys
12,406
16.1
-7.2
—
—
13. TV receivers
0.7
15,605

14. Cotton weaving

10,779

7.4

-11.4

7.6

a. Jacobson (1978) Loss estimates for industries 1-5 statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Negative sign indicates gains,
b. Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981).

5.2
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and chemicals firms did large losses persist throughout the sample
period.6
Finally, one ILAB study addressed the question of earnings losses
among displaced nonmanufacturing workers. In a study of displace
ment costs in two labor markets experiencing large employment
declines, Jacobson (1984) found that losses during the first two years
following displacement were large in both manufacturing and highwage service industries such as finance, education, and health. Sub
stantial losses persisted in manufacturing, education, and health ser
vices. These results indicate that even workers in non-trade-sensitive
industries may be adversely affected by job loss. The results also indi
cate that low attrition was associated with large losses across sectors,
reinforcing his earlier conclusion for manufacturing industries. Finally,
predisplacement earnings and losses were substantially greater in
almost every industry in Buffalo than in Providence. This result sug
gests that local labor market conditions are of considerable importance
in assessing the likely magnitude of displaced worker earnings losses.
Taken together, the ILAB studies indicate that both men and women
displaced from a variety of industries experienced significant earnings
losses. However, the evidence also indicates that in some industries
displacement need not be associated with large losses for the average
displaced worker. Although most studies found substantial losses
through the first two years, the findings on long-term losses are mixed,
with some studies finding evidence of recovery in subsequent years.
Workers seem most adversely affected if they were displaced from
trade-sensitive durable goods industries where attrition rates were low.

2.3 Studies Using the Dislocated Worker Surveys

The ILAB-sponsored studies differed from the more recent disloca
tion literature. Because ILAB needed information to make decisions
about modifying trade barriers on specific goods, there was a natural
tendency to focus on how losses varied among industries rather than
how they varied among different demographic groups. That interest in
turn shaped the selection of data sets that were well-suited to study
losses in particular industries. The LEED data and other administrative
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data sets provided researchers with exceptionally large samples of job
separators' earnings histories. These samples permitted disaggregated
industry analysis of the long-term costs of worker dislocation.
The ILAB data sets were, however, less than ideal for analyzing
how losses varied according to worker characteristics, such as educa
tion, occupation, ethnicity, or marital status. Another problem with the
data used in ILAB studies was that they were expensive to assemble.
The U.S. Department of Labor incurred large expenses in developing
several unique data sets. This expense was most obvious for the TAA
surveys used by Neumann (1978a, 1978b) and by Corson and Nicholson (1981), and for the SSA data used in Holen and her colleagues'
plant closing study. In addition, passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
made subsequent use of SSA data expensive and cumbersome by pre
cluding dissemination of individual work histories.
The ILAB-sponsored studies showed that worker dislocation was
often associated with substantial earnings losses. However, because
these studies focused on the experiences of TAA recipients or of work
ers from particular industries or cities, little was known about how
often workers were displaced. Accordingly, the Bureau of Labor Statis
tics designed the Displaced Worker Survey to count all workers who
lost a job between 1979 and 1983.
Although the 1984 DWS and subsequent surveys also were expen
sive to conduct, they became public use data sets that researchers uti
lized in numerous studies. As a result, these studies have not only
addressed the particular questions posed by policymakers, but also
have examined more theoretical topics of interest to academic
researchers. Among the questions of key interest to both groups has
been (1) the characteristics of displaced workers; (2) the reemployment
prospects and earnings losses of displaced workers; and (3) the factors
that make job loss costly. In addition, academic researchers have
extensively examined the link between the returns to job tenure and
earnings losses.
Flaim and Seghal (1985) used the DWS to provide a clearer picture
of the number and characteristics of displaced workers. The January
1984 version of this survey revealed that 13.9 million adult workers
had lost a job between 1979 and 1983 because of "plant closings,
employers going out of business, or layoffs from which they were not
recalled." Flaim and Seghal argue that most of these job losers did not
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conform to the "general consensus as to who is and who is not a dis
placed worker." Such workers are generally regarded as having "spent
many years in relatively high-paying jobs." The authors note that only
5.1 million of these workers had been employed three or more years at
the time of their job loss (Flaim and Seghal 1985, p. 4).
As shown by table 2.2, these displaced workers were substantially
more likely to have been males employed in manufacturing, in the
Midwest, and in semiskilled and unskilled occupations than the rest of
the labor force. Notably, only 60 percent of these workers were
employed in January 1984. These employment rates were slightly
lower among manufacturing, female, and unskilled workers, whereas
the rates were higher among males, managers, and service workers.
Among those reemployed at the survey date, Flaim and Seghal
found that earnings losses, as measured by the difference between their
post- and predisplacement weekly earnings, varied considerably
depending on their predisplacement industry. Losses of workers in
durable goods averaged more than 20 percent. By contrast, the losses
of workers in nondurable goods averaged less than 4 percent. These
findings were consistent with those in some of the ILAB studies.
There are several reasons why it is difficult to interpret Flaim and
Seghal's earnings loss estimates. First, as in Neumann's (1978b) TAA
study, these estimates do not take into account the amount of time
between job separations and the survey date. We have no way of know
ing, therefore, whether these losses represent long-term setbacks. Sec
ond, the estimates are not adjusted for inflation. Because inflation was
at a postwar high during the period, the real earnings losses may be
substantially larger than indicated by the nominal losses. Finally, the
figures do not account for how the earnings of those workers would
have grown had they not lost their former job. Indeed, one shortcoming
of many DWS studies is that they lack a comparison group to compute
this growth.
Kosters (1986) addressed two of these issues by controlling for
workers' year of displacement and the inflation rate. His main finding
was that long-term losses among respondents in the DWS averaged
about 20 percent in durable manufacturing and mining, but only about
7 percent in the other major industry groups. This finding led him to
conclude that"... the costs of displacement apparently did not take the
form of major widespread reductions in earnings. Instead, the main

Table 22 Characteristics of Displaced Workers; 1984 DWS Respondents with Three or More Years of Tenure
Percent of DWS
Percent of DWS
respondents
respondents
Percent of total
unemployed on
Percent of
employed on
displaced
survey date
survey date
Characteristic
labor force

Sex
Male
Female
Race/Ethnicity8
Black
Hispanic
White
Industry
Manufacturing
Other goods producing
Transportation, communications,
public utilities
Trade and services
Occupation
Managers/professionals
Technical, sales, support
Services
Precision craft and repair

56
44

65
35

64
53

27
23

9
5
88

12
6
86

42
52
63

41
34
23

20
10

49
13

60
59

26
27

7
63

7
31

58
64

27
21

23
31
14
12

14
23
5
20

75
61
51
62

17
21
24
26

Characteristic
Operators and laborers
Region
New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Percent of total
labor force
16
6
15
17
8
17
6
11
5
15

Percent of
displaced
36
5
16
24
8
13
7
10
4
13

Percent of DWS
respondents
employed on
survey date
55
66
54
51
65
69
55
71
70
60

Percent of DWS
respondents
unemployed on
survey date
32
18
28
33
23
18
30
18
16
27

SOURCES: Column 1: Handbook of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Bulletin 2217, June 1985, tables 2, 8, 15,18,19, and 43; pp. 8, 9, 26,
27,41,42,49-55, and 96. Columns 2-4: Flaim and Seghal (1985), tables 1,2,3, and 4; pp. 4, 5,7, and 8.
a. Categories are not mutually exclusive.
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impact on economic well-being seems to have been some unemploy
ment for most workers, extended periods of unemployment for a con
siderable portion of displaced workers, and eventually withdrawal
from the work force of only a relatively small component" (p. 276).
Kosters' conclusions were generally consistent with those of Podgursky and Swaim (1987), who emphasize that a "substantial minority
of workers experienced large and enduring losses" (pp. 21, 27). More
than 30 percent of the reemployed full-time blue-collar workers and
nearly 25 percent of reemployed full-time white-collar and service
workers received wages that were more than 25 percent below their
predisplacement levels.
As with many other DWS-based studies, a shortcoming of Kosters'
study is that he did not use a comparison group. As seen in some of the
ILAB studies, without a comparison group pre- versus postdisplacement earnings comparisons tend to substantially underestimate those
losses for younger workers, whose real wages tend to grow rapidly
with experience. Similarly, such comparisons tend to overestimate the
losses for older workers whose real wages sometimes decline with
experience.
Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989) conducted one of the few DWS stud
ies that attempted to use a comparison group when measuring earnings
losses. Their methodology differed from that used in many of the
ILAB studies, because they drew their sample of nondisplaced workers
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). However, the CPS data do
not usually contain measures of respondents' tenure or previous wages.
As a result, Seitchik and Zornitsky could not measure how earnings of
these workers grew over time. Instead, they measured the costs of dis
placement as the regression adjusted difference between displaced and
nondisplaced workers' wages. This regression adjustment took into
account several differences between the two groups' characteristics,
besides displacement status, that might cause their wages to differ.
Using this strategy, Seitchik and Zornitsky found that, on average,
wages of displaced workers were 19 percent lower than those of their
nondisplaced counterparts. However, the size of this gap depended on
how long it had been since workers had lost their job. In the first year
following a job loss, wages were nearly 30 percent less than those of
nondisplaced workers. But by the fifth year after job loss, the gap had
dropped to about 10 percent. This result suggests that earnings of dis-
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placed workers approach what they would have been had the worker
not been displaced, not just that earnings approach their prejob loss
levels. Indeed, as Kosters assumed, the findings of Seitchik and Zornitsky suggest that most workers had large initial losses that greatly
diminished over time.7 Finally, because their findings were similar to
other DWS studies, their results suggest that when measuring long-run
effects of displacement, it may not matter whether researchers use a
comparison group.8
The accuracy of these conclusions is in doubt because of two key
shortcomings in Seitchik and Zornitsky's study. First, their analysis
used both low- and high-tenure displaced workers. Unlike Flaim and
Seghal, they did not define displaced workers as job losers with three
or more years of tenure. It might be the case that the recovery is com
plete for low-tenure workers, while high-tenure workers are left with
large permanent declines. Indeed, Topel (1990, pp. 197, 205) found
that long-term losses were as large as 40 percent for persons with 20 or
more years of tenure. As a result, because Seitchik and Zornitsky did
not control for tenure at the time of job loss, we cannot tell whether
this hypothesis explains their findings.9
The more important potential problem with Seitchik and Zornitsky's
empirical strategy is that the estimated wage losses may confound the
consequences of worker displacement with differences between unob
served characteristics of displaced and nondisplaced workers. Their
regression adjustment took into account only observable differences
between these groups' characteristics. However, besides differences
between observable characteristics, differences in hard-to-quantify
characteristics such as quality of education or motivation might also
cause wages of the two groups to be different.
One way to test whether the inability to control for unobserved char
acteristics affects Seitchik and Zornitsky's displacement cost estimates
would be to compare the regression-adjusted predisplacement wages
of displaced workers to those of a sample of nondisplaced workers.
This sample of nondisplaced workers would not be the same as the one
used in the postdisplacement period, but would include persons from
several previous CPS files. Therefore, this test requires only several
cross-sectional data sets and not longitudinal data. If there are no dif
ferences between displaced and nondisplaced workers' regressionadjusted predisplacement earnings, the regression-adjusted difference
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between the groups' postdisplacement earnings might reasonably rep
resent the costs of displacement.
Although in principle this strategy can help validate Seitchik and
Zornitsky's methodology, a recent study by Di la Rica (1992) indicates
that in practice it may not be successful. When she compared the
regression-adjusted predisplacement wages of the 1986 DWS respon
dents to those of a comparison group drawn from the CPS, she found
that the displaced workers' wages were lower. This predisplacement
wage gap is consistent with the notion that wages of displaced workers
decline during the periods leading up to their job losses. However, it is
also consistent with the view that displaced and nondisplaced workers
have different unobserved characteristics and that these differences
account for the gap between their postdisplacement wages. Under
either interpretation, Seitchik and Zornitsky's methodology cannot be
validated with the DWS predisplacement wage data.
Madden (1988) developed an alternative comparison group for her
DWS study by constructing longitudinal data from the CPS files.
Because some respondents to the January 1984 CPS also responded to
the January 1983 survey, she was able to construct a sample of dis
placed and nondisplaced workers whose wages she observed in 1983
and 1984. 10 She could compare the wage change of those displaced
during that period to that of comparable nondisplaced workers. An
advantage of this approach is that it explicitly takes into account how
earnings of displaced workers would have grown had they not been
displaced. Further, by comparing differences in wage growth between
the two groups, the approach implicitly takes into account fixed unobservable characteristics that might affect workers' wages.
As Swaim and Podgursky (1991) note in their critique of Madden's
study, average wage loss estimates rise by as much as 50 percent when
a comparison group is used in the analysis. 11 They observe, however,
that several problems with Madden's strategy make it difficult in prac
tice to determine how important it is to use a comparison group when
estimating earnings losses. Among the most important problems is
Madden's small sample size. After matching the CPS in successive
years, she was left with only 143 displaced males and 65 displaced
females. Further, she was only able to examine the wage effects of dis
placement for workers who had been displaced for less than one year,
when differences might be greatest anyway. Finally, many of the work-
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ers dislocated in the year closest to the interview date may have been
recalled subsequently. Thus, that sample is not representative of work
ers certain to be permanently displaced. As a result of these problems,
matched-CPS samples are not likely to lead to improved studies of
worker displacement.

2.4 Earnings Losses and the Returns to Tenure

Much academic research on displacement has examined whether
human capital theory can account for the observed earnings reductions
following dislocation. Those studies usually compare the estimated
returns to tenure and to experience (age minus years of education
minus 6) before and after workers involuntarily separate from jobs.
The underlying assumption in these studies is that tenure measures
specific skills that are not easily transferred from one job to the next,
whereas experience measures general skills that workers take with
them when they separate from their firms.
The advantage of these assumptions is that they yield a relatively
straightforward way of predicting the magnitude of displacement costs.
As Hamermesh (1987) and others have argued, when workers involun
tarily separate from their firms they lose the returns from tenure. Thus,
it is predicted that their starting wages on their new job should depend
only on years of experience, education, and other non-firm-specific
characteristics. This framework yields a relatively simple way to com
pute earnings losses associated with displacement. To see how to make
these calculations, consider the following wage equation:
(2.1) log(w/) = x$ + 0.018*tenure - 0.0004*tenure squared,
where log(w/) denotes a worker's natural log wages, Xj denotes years
of experience and other non-firm-specific characteristics, and tenure
refers to years of service at the firm (see Hamermesh 1987, p. 63).
Based on the foregoing assumptions, the predicted starting wage for
workers who involuntarily separate from their firms is jc/p. Therefore,
workers' wage losses simply depend on their tenure. Based on equa
tion (2.1), we predict that the wages of a worker with 10 years often-
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lire would decline by 14 percent, whereas for a worker with 20 years of
tenure they would decline by 20 percent. 12
The advantage of this approach is that estimates of displacement's
cost may be derived from studies of the returns to tenure on the job.
While the magnitude of these returns is not yet completely settled,
other studies provide policymakers with estimates of these returns that
are of similar magnitude to that given in equation (2.1). For example,
Topel (1991) finds in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that
10 years of tenure is associated with a 25 percent increase in wages.
Therefore, he would predict that when such workers are displaced,
their wages would be 25 percent lower on their postdisplacement jobs.
Most important, if researchers and policymakers can estimate displace
ment costs from existing research, they do not require costly and spe
cialized surveys or data sets such as the DWS or LEED.
As appealing as the foregoing approach may be, it is likely to pro
duce misleading estimates of the costs of displacement when using a
cross-sectional data set like the DWS. This finding does not refute the
human capital framework, but instead indicates the difficulties sur
rounding attempts to estimate the returns to tenure and to predict who
is likely to be displaced. Addison and Portugal (1989) and others argue
that unobserved characteristics are correlated with tenure. This relation
implies that high-tenure workers earn more- than low-tenure workers,
in part because they have more general skills. Indeed, they found that
tenure on a worker's predisplacement job is associated with higher
earnings on the postdisplacement job.
Addison and Portugal concluded that their "empirical results
together provide a strong indictment of approaches that, in computing
earnings losses, focus on estimates of the loss of firm-specific human
capital investments obtained from the coefficient on tenure in a predis
placement wage equation. While there may indeed be significant losses
associated with yet to be fully depreciated specific training investments
(some hint as to which may be provided by the strongly negative coef
ficients associated with change in industry and occupation), the extent
of such losses cannot be gauged from the tenure coefficient since the
latter compounds a number of different effects" (p. 297). The upshot of
Addison and Portugal's study was that in order to estimate the losses
associated with worker displacement, researchers require information
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on workers' job changes, including their earnings before and after job
loss.
Kletzer (1990) used the empirical framework just described to gen
erate separate estimates of the effects of tenure and experience on the
earnings and earnings losses of displaced blue- and white-collar men
and women. As shown by table 2.3, prior to dislocation, the returns to
tenure were larger for white-collar than for blue-collar workers and
larger for women than for men. At the same time, the returns to experi
ence (as proxied by age) were larger for white-collar workers and men
than they were for blue-collar workers and women. These findings
were generally consistent with those in the existing human capital liter
ature.
Like Addison and Portugal, Kletzer also found that predislocation
tenure remained an important determinant of postdisplacement earn
ings. More significant, however, she found that the importance of predisplacement tenure varied considerably among the groups studied. As
shown by table 2.3, blue-collar men's and white-collar women's earn
ings rose only one-half as fast with predisplacement tenure after dislo
cation as they had prior to dislocation. By contrast, the effect of tenure
on earnings was much more similar in the two periods for blue-collar
women and white-collar men.
As shown by rows 5 and 6 of table 2.3, the foregoing findings imply
that for some groups earnings losses vary substantially with predis
placement tenure, while for other groups tenure is not an important
determinant of earnings losses. Kletzer's estimates imply that a bluecollar man displaced after 15 years of service has losses that are 13
percent larger than those of a similar worker displaced after only five
years on the job. However, a blue-collar woman with 15 years of ser
vice has losses that are actually 2 percent less than her counterpart with
five years of tenure.
These findings for blue-collar women indicate how poor an indica
tor estimates of the returns to predisplacement tenure may be for pre
dicting the costs of worker dislocation. As shown in rows 3 and 4 of
table 2.3, this group had the largest returns to tenure. Yet, as suggested
in rows 1 and 2, these women were able to transport most of the skills
associated with that tenure to their new job. Therefore, tenure was a
poor predictor of their earnings losses.
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Table 23 The Effect of Predisplacement Tenure on Earnings:
Coefficients on Tenure from Earnings Regressions
Blue-collar
White-collar
Effect on log earnings
Men
Women
Men
Women

Postdisplacement
earnings
Predisplacement tenure
Predisplacement tenure
squared/ 100
Predisplacement earnings
Predisplacement tenure
Predisplacement tenure
squared/100
Difference between
postdisplacement and
Predisplacement
earnings
Predisplacement tenure
Predisplacement tenure
squared/100

.016

.028

.020

.022

-.077

-.103

-.075

-.098

.030

.032

.026

.039

-.080

-.072

-.071

-.135

-.014

-.004

-.008

-.017

.003

-.031

-.004

.037

SOURCE: Kletzer (1991), tables 3-6 and A-l, pp. 116-19,129.
NOTE: The figures in the table are the coefficients on tenure and tenure squared in predisplacement job from a regression of log weekly earnings on individual characteristics. Other indepen
dent variables include age, education, race, marital status, occupation, industry, and part-time
status.
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Taken together, the DWS studies usually point to larger earnings
losses as predisplacement tenure increases. Kletzer's (1991) study
makes clear, however, that there are important exceptions to this find
ing. As indicated by table 2.3, even among men this finding depends on
whether we are examining the experience of blue-collar or white-collar
males. This caveat is important for our empirical work in the following
chapters. We are inclined to believe that because we focus our analysis
on the experiences of high-tenure displaced workers, the losses we
observe are larger than for the average worker who involuntarily loses
his or her job. But, as Kletzer's study indicates, we cannot be sure that
some groups of workers with less tenure do not have losses that are just
as large.
The findings from the DWS studies on the relationship between
experience and earnings losses are somewhat more clear-cut than those
on the relationship between tenure and earnings losses. On the whole,
the findings suggest that as long as we compare workers with similar
years of service on their predisplacement job, earnings losses will rise
only modestly with years of experience or age. For example, Topel
finds that men's earnings losses rise by 1/2 percent for each year of
prior labor market experience (1990, table 8, p. 203). Likewise,
Kletzer's estimates of male wage losses are comparable to Topel's
(1991, tables 3-6, pp. 116-19, and appendix A-l, p. 129). The earnings
losses for workers with similar years of service are about 10 percent
age points larger for displaced 50-year-olds than they are for displaced
30-year-olds. Among women the differences in losses are smaller than
among men, with some evidence that older white-collar women have
smaller earnings losses than do their younger counterparts. Finally,
Addison and Portugal use a richer empirical specification and find that
once they control for tenure, there is little evidence that displaced
men's earnings losses vary significantly with years of experience,
except for those workers over 50. 13
2.5 The Advantages of Using Longitudinal Data

The foregoing DWS studies have several shortcomings that can
potentially be addressed with longitudinal data sets such as the PSID or
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those based on administrative records. First, the DWS data on layoffs
and predisplacement wages are from retrospective interviews. In con
trast, longitudinal data is collected by survey takers revisiting the
household each period. Therefore, longitudinal data are less likely to
be tainted by recall bias, in which workers either forget past layoffs or
report that the layoff occurred more recently than the actual date. Topel
(1990) finds evidence that respondents in the CPS tended to forget
events far in the past, especially those that likely involved small wage
losses. As a result, data sets like the DWS "will substantially under
state the total amount of worker displacement that actually occurred
over the period in question and also will misestimate the timing of
events" (p. 190).
A second shortcoming of DWS-based studies is that as with any
cross-sectional data set, it is difficult to distinguish between the longterm effects of displacement and the effects of being displaced during
poor economic conditions. For example, in the 1984 DWS, workers
displaced five years before the survey were displaced in 1979. How
ever, there is no way to know whether long-term estimates of wage
losses result (1) from displacement, (2) from the consequences of
being displaced in 1979, or (3) from deteriorating economic conditions
that caused average earnings levels to decline. By contrast, Topel's
study using the PSID employs a panel of workers displaced between
1968 and 1985. As a result, he can distinguish between the effects of
changing labor market conditions and of elapsed time since displace
ment.
The importance of these issues is heightened because findings based
on the PSID appear to differ from those based on the DWS. Topel
found in both the DWS and the PSID that four years after their dis
placements, blue-collar manufacturing workers had wages 20 percent
below their predisplacement levels. But, among nonmanufacturing
workers, losses were much larger among workers in the DWS than
those in the PSID. More important, his findings on the importance of
tenure and experience differed substantially between the two data sets.
In the DWS he found, as had others, that predisplacement tenure was a
better predictor of losses than was experience. However, when he used
the PSID, he found that the losses did not rise even modestly with ten
ure, yet rose dramatically with years of labor market experience.
According to his PSID estimates, a 50-year-old displaced blue-collar
worker's losses were approximately 33 percent larger than the losses
for a comparable 30-year-old (Topel 1990, p. 203). This finding is puz-
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zling. As Topel noted, "it would seem that the duration of employment
with a single firm is a better indicator of the degree of specialization in
a worker's skills. Yet tenure has no long-run effect (on losses) in the
(PSID) data, while total market experience does" (Topel 1990, pp. 2046).
A third shortcoming of DWS-based studies is that they often fail to
employ a comparison group. Further, as we observed above, even
when they use a comparison group it is usually under less than ideal
circumstances. By contrast, studies based on a data set like the PSID
may use the earnings histories of nondisplaced workers to estimate
how earnings of displaced workers would have grown had they not lost
their job. In one such study Ruhm (1991b) finds that workers displaced
between 1971 and 1975 experience long-term wage losses that amount
to between 11 and 14 percent of their expected earnings (pp. 174-75).
Ruhm argues that these losses depend on the use of a comparison
group, because displaced workers "missed out entirely on the 8.4 per
cent real wage gain obtained by the control group over the same
period" (Ruhm 1991a, pp. 320-21).
To see how important the use of a comparison group may be to stud
ies of the cost of worker dislocation, consider Topel's analysis of dis
placed workers from the PSID. He did not use a comparison group of
nondisplaced workers to measure how earnings of displaced workers
might have grown had they not lost their job. Without a comparison
group, he found that earnings losses as measured by the difference
between post- and predisplacement earnings did not vary by tenure.
But because nondisplaced workers with low tenure are likely to have
faster earnings growth than are high-tenure workers, those low-tenure
workers might have "missed out" on some substantial earnings growth.
As a result, had Topel used a comparison group he might have found a
counterintuitive negative relationship between tenure and earnings
losses.
A final shortcoming of DWS-based studies is that they use reported
"usual" weekly earnings of workers at the time of job loss. However, if
wages and hours decline in the periods prior to displacement, DWS
measures of earnings losses will understate the losses associated with
the events that lead to job separations. For example, if the initial
response of firms to changing economic conditions or policies is to
reduce hours or real wages, earnings and wages will fall prior to job
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loss. As we argue in subsequent chapters, these earnings declines rep
resent a significant portion of displaced worker earnings losses.
Indeed, Ruhm (1991b), using the PSID, finds that the losses during
these years may amount to as much as 60 percent of the long-term
losses of workers (pp. 169,175-76).
Despite the merits of using longitudinal data sets such as the PSID
to estimate the costs of worker dislocation, there are also some draw
backs. First, the sample sizes of the PSID or the National Longitudinal
Surveys are relatively small. Topel notes that "only 1400 displacement
'events' are derivable from the panel, and of these only 120 involve
long-term jobs that lasted ten years or more" (1990, p. 184). A second
drawback is that people drop out of the sample with time. If those who
leave the sample are more likely to have been displaced, estimates of
losses are likely to be biased. A third drawback is that the PSID does
not distinguish between layoff and discharges for cause. A worker who
has been fired would be expected to have lower subsequent earnings,
but for reasons that are different from those of a worker laid off for
economic reasons. Finally, even in data sets like the PSID, displace
ment events and earnings are self-reported. While the problems with
self-reporting are likely to be less severe in surveys where respondents
are interviewed repeatedly than in surveys like the DWS, errors may
arise that would not appear in data sets that use administrative records.

2.6 Summary
The previous literature provides abundant evidence that worker dis
placement leads to substantial earnings losses. This literature consis
tently reports increased frequencies of unemployment and
corresponding large earnings losses during the two years following job
separations. There is also consensus on the importance of some worker
characteristics in determining the magnitude of these losses. For exam
ple, most studies find that gender is not a very important predictor of
earnings losses, as neither men nor women are immune to repercus
sions of displacement. At the same time, these studies find that
depressed local labor market conditions increase workers' losses.
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There is less consensus in the literature about whether these losses
persist and how important are age, tenure on the predisplacement job,
and former industry in determining the size of the losses. Some studies
report long-term losses averaging 15 to 20 percent per year or more,
while others argue that the long-term losses are substantially smaller.
Some studies argue that these losses are limited to workers from tradesensitive durable goods industries, while others find more widespread
losses. Finally, some studies assert that tenure is an important predictor
of worker losses, while others find that tenure is only modestly impor
tant and instead that age has a larger impact on their subsequent earn
ings.
In light of the different methodological approaches and data sets that
have been used in the literature, the lack of consensus surrounding
some questions on the earnings impact of worker displacement is not
surprising. The main problem, of course, is that none of the data sets
used in these analyses have been ideal, and that data deficiencies have
in large part dictated methodological approaches seen in the literature.
The LEED or SSA administrative data have long earnings histories and
information on their industry, but little information on workers charac
teristics. The DWS provides the clearest picture of displaced worker
characteristics, but has limited earnings histories and is plagued by
respondent recall bias. The PSID has both long earnings histories and
abundant information on worker characteristics, but the sample size of
displaced workers is relatively small, especially the numbers of hightenure job losers.
Although the data used in our study are by no means ideal, one pur
pose of this monograph is to show how state administrative data can
contribute to the literature on worker dislocation. The long quarterly
earnings histories available for large numbers of workers enables us to
generate a clearer picture of the temporal pattern of earnings losses and
to evaluate a wider variety of alternative hypotheses, besides job
losses, that might account for the lower earnings experienced by dis
placed workers. In the following chapter we show how state adminis
trative data can be prepared and used in an analysis of the costs of
worker dislocation.
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NOTES
1. Currently, eligibility for extended UI benefits under TAA requires meeting a three-part test:
(1) employment in the worker's plant and industry must have fallen absolutely, (2) a petition must
be filed and certified by the Department of Labor that the importation of goods that directly com
pete with that plant's production was at least partly responsible for the decline, and (3) the certi
fied worker must have entered training (or received a waiver) prior to the 13th week of
unemployment
2. A disturbing finding from studies of the post-1974 TAA program was the large percentage
of TAA recipients who were subsequently recalled to their former jobs. Because these workers
were recalled, they experienced small earnings losses. The high recall rates and relatively short
durations of unemployment differed sharply from the experiences of the pre-1974 TAA recipients.
These results troubled policymakers because the legitimacy of the TAA program rested largely on
the view that trade-impacted workers were absorbing unusually high costs and therefore merited
special attention. As a result of the evidence that many TAA recipients were better off than work
ers whose displacement did not result from trade, Congress reduced TAA to the level of regular
UI benefits.
3. To be more precise, they estimated the earnings growth that would have occurred by using
the coefficients from a regression of predisplacement earnings on tenure. In the absence of dis
placement, they estimated that men's earnings would have grown by nearly 10 percent, and wom
en's by less than 5 percent.
4. Operationally, he regressed both displaced and nondisplaced workers' earnings on age, ten
ure, race, and several years of predisplacement earnings. Those controls for prior earnings cap
tured the effect of unobserved fixed characteristics on current earnings. Finally, to measure the
earnings effect of displacement, he included a dummy variable indicating whether the worker had
been displaced.
5. Jacobson also attempted to measure the change in earnings for workers who left jobs for
nondisplacement-related reasons by comparing industry-specific earnings levels of workers in
counties where industry employment rose or remained constant to counties where employment
fell. The results showed that after a year or two, earnings changes were similar to those of dis
placed workers. This suggests that where attrition was low, few workers left to attain higher
wages. Rather, voluntary leavers departed for noneconomic factors. At the same time, where attri
tion was high both displaced workers and other job leavers obtained similar jobs in the long run.
6. Holen et al. found that losses were frequently greater in percentage terms in the short run
and more persistent for women than men. Women appeared to return to work more slowly than
men, and had a greater likelihood of accepting part-time or part-year employment. Holen et al.
also made a major effort to deal with problems stemming from the high incidence with which
women left the labor force entirely. Difficulties in accurately measuring labor force status with
administrative data influenced our decision to focus our study on workers who showed strong
labor force attachment.
7. Analyses using SSA data showed substantial recoveries as well. But SSA-based studies
examined annual earnings, not weekly earnings. The recovery of annual earnings is likely to be
sharp because unemployment, which is especially great initially, is included in that measure.
8. Podgursky and Swaim (1987, p. 19) experimented with a similar strategy and found that
median losses were "somewhat larger" when they used a comparison group.
9. Even though Seitchik and Zornitsky did not observe the tenure of their nondisplaced work
ers, they still could have examined its effects on the losses of displaced workers. One simple strat
egy would have been to follow Flaim and Seghal's definition and define displaced workers with
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less than three years of tenure as low-tenure workers and those with three or more years of tenure
as high-tenure workers. They then could have compared the regression-adjusted wages of these
two groups to those of the nondisplaced workers. This strategy does not resolve the methodologi
cal concerns discussed below.
10. Because the Bureau of the Census altered the household codes in 1985, it is impossible to
construct such a matched sample of displaced and nondisplaced workers from the 1986 DWS.
However, matches are possible for the 1988 and 1990 surveys.
11. See Madden (1988, table 2, pp. 102-3). For reemployed males, Madden finds that postdisplacement 1984 wages are 9.5 percent below predisplacement wages. However, nondisplaced
workers' wages grew by 4.3 percent between 1983 and 1984. Swaim and Podgursky (1991) assert
that these percentages cannot be compared, because displaced workers' 1983 wages are not their
January 1983 wages but their 1983 wages just prior to displacement.
12. We derive the 14 percent figure from ([0.018*10 - 0.0004* 100]* 100%) and the 20 percent
figure from ([0.018*20 - 0.0004*400]* 100%).
13. See Addison and Portugal (1989, pp. 288-89). Instead of examining the relationship
between earnings losses and age, as did Topel, they examined the relationship between earnings
losses and three linear splines for age. Their age categories were 20-35 years, 36-50 years, and 5165 years.

3
The Use of Administrative Data
in the Study
of Worker Dislocation
In our introductory chapter, we argued that there are several rea
sons why earnings might decline when dislocated workers lose their
jobs. In chapter 2, we reviewed a considerable literature indicating
that involuntary job loss is costly. That literature indicates that at least
during the first few years following job loss, earnings and wage rates
remain significantly below their former levels. Still, disagreement con
tinues about the magnitude and persistence of these losses. In this
monograph, we show how state administrative records can contribute
to the displacement literature by revealing the temporal pattern of dis
placed workers' earnings losses. In particular, because these data
include long earnings histories for a large number of workers, they
are well suited to estimating the long-term costs of worker dislocation
and the rate at which earnings recover after workers secure new
employment.
Accordingly, in this chapter we describe both the advantageous and
disadvantageous features of our administrative data and highlight
some of the conceptual problems that arise when using such data to
estimate the cost of worker dislocation. In section 3.1, we explain
how we constructed our sample and comment on some of its
strengths and weaknesses. In section 3.2, we motivate our decision to
focus on workers who demonstrated a high degree of attachment to
the Pennsylvania wage and salary work force. In section 3.3, we com
pare the characteristics of our sample of separators to those of work
ers from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) and the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Finally, in section 3.4, we discuss some of
the potential statistical problems that arise when we use our adminis
trative data and conventional estimators to estimate earnings losses of
displaced workers.
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3.1 The Pennsylvania Data
The statistical framework developed for this study applies gener
ally to the problem of estimating earnings losses associated with
worker dislocation. However, the empirical work reported here is lim
ited to estimation of the losses suffered by displaced workers from
Pennsylvania. We have restricted our attention to those workers in
order to take advantage of an unusual data set that we have con
structed by combining information from administrative sources on
Pennsylvania workers and their firms. These sources provide us with
a large sample of quarterly earnings histories extending from 1974
through 1986.
Although we cannot guarantee that our findings on earnings losses
of displaced Pennsylvania workers are representative of all displaced
worker experiences, it is worth noting that Pennsylvania is a large
state with a diverse industrial base. Further, during the 1980s, the
period covered by this study, the economic performance of the eastern
half of the state was considerably different from that of the western
half of the state. The state's southeastern section shared in the mid1980s growth with the other middle Atlantic states and New England,
while many areas in the western sections were mired in the double
digit unemployment rates that were common in states bordering the
Great Lakes.1
3.1.1 Constructing the Data
We constructed our longitudinal sample from state UI tax reports
and ES202 reports of Pennsylvania firms that employed 50 or more
workers in 1979. The UI tax records contain quarterly wage and sal
ary reports from all Pennsylvania wage and salary sources.2 We
aggregated these reports to obtain the total quarterly earnings for a 5
percent sample of Pennsylvania workers.3 For each calendar year, we
designated the worker's principal employer as the firm from which he
or she received the most earnings. We also retained the fraction of a
worker's quarterly earnings paid by the principal employer. These
earnings data should be relatively free of the kind of measurement
error that plagues survey data. Because the state requires accurate and
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timely information to calculate firms' UI taxes and worker's benefits,
it cross-checks the UI tax reports against earlier reports and federal
corporate tax returns.
ES202 reports of firms provide information about their employ
ment levels.4 The state uses this information to calculate tax rates, par
ticularly in multiplant firms. We created our longitudinal file by
merging the information on quarterly earnings of workers with the
ES202 records of their principal employers for each year. For each
worker in the sample, we have information on quarterly earnings and,
for each calendar year, the principal employer, SIC industry, location,
and average employment during the last, current, and following years.
Using that information we constructed employees' years of service
with their employer back to 1974.
3.1.2 Identifying Job Changes
As we noted in chapter 2, the only way we can tell whether dis
placements are a major setback to workers' careers is by analyzing
data on actual job changes. Therefore, a key element of our analysis
is accurately tracking job separations from individual firms. Both the
UI tax reports and ES202 data include Employer Identification Num
bers (EIN) of firms. In principle, we can identify job changes by
changes in the principal employers' EIN numbers. Unfortunately, in
practice actual job changes are more difficult to identify. In several
years, more than 5 percent of total employment was in firms where
employees remained with a firm whose EIN number changed.
Because firm EIN change is common, failure to correct for EIN
changes would result in many bogus job changes. Indeed, had we not
eliminated these bogus job changes, they would be the primary
source of movement of workers between employers within the same
4-digit SIC industry.
Any change in a firm's legal structure triggers an EIN change. The
four main sources of EIN changes are listed below in order of their
frequency.
1. Reorganizations where a firm switches from one EIN to another
2. Takeovers and acquisitions where one firm switches to the EIN
of a preexisting firm
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3. Mergers where two or more firms switch to a new EIN
4. Spin-offs and divestitures where one firm continues to use its old
EIN, but a portion of the firm begins to use a new EIN.
Because Pennsylvania wants to prevent firms from "running away"
from their UI experience-rated tax rates, all EIN changes are tracked
in successor-predecessor files. With these files in hand, we used a
complex matching procedure to reassign the firms that changed,
except for spin-offs, to the EIN used by the firm (or its successors) at
the end of the sample period. Using a single EIN for each family of
related firms ensures that workers who change EINs are actually
changing firms. Of course, some workers may have moved between
firms that at some other time were joined, but this must have been a
rare occurrence. In addition, using a single EIN permitted employ
ment changes to be accurately measured in years surrounding EIN
changes. Because firms sometimes change their corporate structure
when they reduce their workforces, these procedures were particu
larly crucial when we later created a subsample of workers who sepa
rated from firms that engaged in mass layoffs.
Unfortunately, accounting for recorded EIN changes would not nec
essarily capture all bogus job changes. In rare instances an EIN
change might occur when a firm ceased operations and, without a for
mal sale, another firm acquired the plant and began operations with
many of the same workers. To detect the occurrence of any such
restarts and to check the accuracy of the successor-predecessor file,
we isolated all EIN changes for which more than one worker in our
sample moved from an old EIN to the same new EIN. Next, we
checked whether the old EIN continued in use, or whether all workers
reporting under the old EIN shifted to the new EIN. These checks
demonstrated that the successor-predecessor file was accurate in link
ing old and new EINs, but was inaccurate when dating or distinguish
ing among the four types of EIN changes. In addition, we found no
definite cases of restarts and less than 50 cases where the evidence
that a restart occurred was ambiguous. (The ambiguity arose because
the starting date and ending dates for EIN numbers on the ES202
forms were inaccurate.)
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3.1.3 Dating Worker Separations
In order to investigate the temporal pattern of earnings losses asso
ciated with worker dislocation, we also had to identify the quarters in
which employees separated from their firms. Our administrative data
included two pieces of information that we could use to identify sepa
ration dates. First, a change in the principal employer's EIN number
from one year to the next was taken as an indication that the worker
had separated from the firm during one of the two years. Second,
changes in the percentages of quarterly earnings received from a
given year's principal employer signaled whether a job transition
might have occurred during a particular quarter.
To date the precise quarter of separation, we determined the last
quarter that the worker received earnings from the old principal
employer. When this quarter was in the last year in which the old
employer was still the principal employer, the quarter of separation
was the last quarter of positive earnings from that firm. For example,
if during the last year with the old principal employer, the worker
received earnings from the old employer in the third, but not the
fourth quarter, we designated the third quarter as the quarter of separa
tion. However, when the employee received 100 percent of fourth
quarter earnings from the old principal employer, the separation quar
ter was the last quarter of the following year in which the employee
received earnings from sources other than the new principal employer
(unless there were quarters of zero earnings). For example, if the
worker received all of his or her earnings from the new principal
employer in the second but not the first quarter, we designated the
first quarter as the quarter of separation.
In most instances the foregoing procedure precisely dates the sepa
ration. But there appear to be two exceptional cases: first, when the
employee has another wage or salary job besides the job with the old
principal employer; and second, when the old principal employer
grants the employee severance pay after displacement. Both of those
exceptions may cause us to date the separation after it actually
occurred. As a result of our dating procedure, some earnings may
falsely appear to decline during the quarters prior to displacement.
We investigate the potential importance of this possibility in chapter 5.
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3.1.4 Addressing the Shortcomings of State
Administrative Records
Despite our efforts, our administrative data set has two principal
disadvantages compared with other data sets used in the displacement
literature. First, the only available demographic characteristics of
workers are year of birth, sex, and tenure with their firms since 1974.
By comparison, other data sets, such as the DWS or the PSID,
include a wider array of characteristics—among them educational
attainments, occupations, and marital or union status. The reason we
even have information on age and sex is that the State of Pennsylva
nia obtained these data in 1976 from the Social Security Administra
tion (SSA).5 As a result, we have these demographics only for persons
employed in that year in wage and salary jobs for whom the SSA
could match the state's records to their own records of last names and
Social Security numbers. Therefore, unlike other dislocation studies,
we cannot learn how workers' losses vary by their educational attain
ments, occupation, or marital or union status. However, we do not
view this lack of demographics as an important shortcoming of our
analysis. As we show in chapters 5 and 6, we can still provide an
extensive picture on how their losses vary with time according to sex,
age, industry, and region of the state.
A second disadvantage of our data is they do not directly identify
whether job separations are quits, discharges for cause, or layoffs due
to economic difficulties of firms. As a result, our displaced worker
sample may include some workers who left their former jobs because
they either quit or were discharged for cause. This second shortcom
ing is clearly more important than the first Although other data sets
do not distinguish between discharges for cause and layoffs, they do
try to distinguish between quits and layoffs. They are right to do this
because the literature indicates that quits and layoffs represent
employment separations under different economic circumstances
(e.g., McLaughlin 1991). One thing that these differing circumstances
entail is that persons who quit their jobs are less likely to experience
earnings losses than persons who are laid off. Because, in effect, we
mix displaced workers with those who quit their jobs, our earnings
loss estimates may tend to understate the costs of worker dislocation.
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The importance of not being able to distinguish between quits and
layoffs is reduced in our study because it focuses on the experiences
of high-tenure, prime-age displaced workers. In chapters 5 and 6, we
examine the earnings histories of workers who were born between
1930 and 1959 and who had the same principal employer from 1974
through the end of 1979 before separating from their firms between
1980 and 1986. Because our sample includes only persons who
worked for the same firm during the 1970s, they all had six or more
years of tenure when they separated from their firms. Further, because
every one in the sample was born after 1930, none of the separators
was near normal retirement age. These workers are much less likely
than low-tenure workers or older workers to leave their firms voluntar
ily.
Despite the stated shortcomings, our administrative data have sev
eral advantages over other data sets used in the dislocation literature.
These advantages derive from the large sample of 13-year quarterly
earnings histories and from the merging of these histories to informa
tion about firms. The sample that we analyze in chapters 5 and 6 of
high-tenure separators who remain attached to Pennsylvania's work
force includes over 9,507 persons who separated from 2,484 different
firms. By comparison to other longitudinal data sets, the number of
observations in this sample is approximately the same as the number
of household heads in the PSID and far exceeds the number of "dis
placed" workers in that data set. In addition, we also have a sample of
nearly 14,000 similarly tenured nondisplaced workers whose earnings
we can use to identify the likely path that earnings of displaced work
ers might have taken had they not lost their jobs.
Besides its large size, our data set also includes information on
firms, such as their employment levels and changes, their geographi
cal location, and their 4-digit SIC industry. One benefit of this infor
mation is that we do not have to rely on retrospective interviews to
determine when workers separated from their firms and how much
they "usually" made prior to their separations. In the DWS, respon
dents were asked about job losses that had occurred as long as five
years prior to their interviews. In our study, we rely on quarterly tax
reports of firms to identify job changes.
Another benefit of knowing employment levels of firms is that we
can identify individuals who separated from firms that have expert-
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enced a substantial reduction in their workforces or even a complete
closing. These workers are less likely than other job separators to be
leaving because they quit or as a result of their own poor job perfor
mance. In chapter 6 we examine the earnings histories of a subsample
of workers who separated from firms whose employment had fallen
by more than 30 percent from its 1970s levels. Yet despite this sample
restriction we are still left with a sample of 6,435 workers separating
from 1,537 different firms.
3.2 Choosing Among Alternative Samples of Separators

Relatively simple tabulations of the Pennsylvania data indicate that
displaced workers experience substantial long-term earnings losses.
Figure 3.1 shows that the earnings6 of a subset of our sample of hightenure workers—those who separated from their firms during the first
quarter of 1982—fell sharply after they left their former firms.7 More
important, in 1986, four years after their separations, these workers'
earnings were still nearly $4,000 per quarter less than employees with
similar tenure who remained at their firms. It is unlikely that the postseparation earnings differences result from preexisting differences
between the productivity and skills of the two groups. As the figure
indicates, during the mid-1970s, the earnings of workers who subse
quently separated from their firms were nearly the same as for those
who stayed at their firms.
The earnings losses depicted in figure 3.1 correspond to declines of
well over 50 percent of the affected workers' predisplacement earn
ings and could easily be described as catastrophic. However, caution
is needed in interpreting those results. Figure 3.2 shows, for each
quarter, the fraction of workers in the two groups who have positive
earnings from Pennsylvania wage and salary employment. Evidently,
the fraction of separators with positive earnings drops dramatically
after they leave their former firms and remains at low levels for the
rest of the sample period.8 Unfortunately, it is not possible to deter
mine from state administrative records whether workers without Penn
sylvania earnings are genuinely unemployed, have retired, have
become self-employed, have moved out of the state, or are working
under another Social Security number.
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Figure 3.1 Quarterly Earnings (1987$) of Workers Separating in
Quarter 82.1 and Workers Staying Through Quarter 86.IV
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Figure 3.2 Quarterly Employment Rates of Workers Separating in
Quarter 82.1 and Workers Staying Through Quarter 86.IV
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Our inability to distinguish among these possible reasons for a
worker having zero quarterly earnings complicates our analysis of dis
placed worker earnings losses. Among those workers who are unem
ployed, a record with zero earnings is accurate. However, when we
assume that the other groups have or would have zero earnings, we
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clearly overstate the losses associated with displacement. For exam
ple, if retired persons reentered the labor market, most would find
jobs. Similarly, the self-employed, those who left the state, and those
working under a different Social Security number probably have posi
tive earnings.
In order to mitigate the problems associated with earnings records
of these workers, we have chosen to further restrict our analyses to
workers who demonstrate a high degree of attachment to the Pennsyl
vania wage and salary workforce.9 Specifically, we require that work
ers have positive earnings in every calendar year between 1974 and
1986. This restriction clearly resolves the interpretative difficulties
associated with persons who leave the state following their job losses.
But it does exclude from our sample all workers who were unem
ployed continuously for two or more years following their displace
ments.10 Figure 3.3 shows how the earnings of this high-attachment
group of workers evolve after they separate from their firms in the
first quarter of 1982. As the figure shows, this groups' 1986 earnings
were $2,000 per quarter, or 20 percent below those of workers who
stayed with their firms through the end of 1986. While still very sig
nificant, that earnings difference is only half the size of the earnings
difference for the full sample of workers separating in the first quarter
of 1982.
Figure 3.3 Quarterly Earnings (1987$) of High-Attachment Workers
Separating in Quarter 82.1 and Workers Staying Through
Quarter 86.IV
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3.3 The Representativeness of Our Sample
We recognize that because of the way we constructed our sample,
our empirical findings on displaced worker earnings losses may not
be representative of the losses experienced by workers without high
labor force attachment or by those displaced workers who left Penn
sylvania. However, a comparison between the characteristics of our
sample and those of workers never having positive wage or salary
earnings in Pennsylvania after they separate from their firms suggests
that the two samples are similar and thus that sample selection biases
may be small. As shown by column 1 of table 3.1, 26 percent of our
sample of high-attachment workers were females, 69 percent sepa
rated from manufacturing jobs, and 61 percent had preseparation earn
ings exceeding $350 (1985 dollars) per week. By comparison, as
shown by column 3, workers who never had positive wage or salary
earnings in Pennsylvania after separating from their firms were only
slightly more likely to be females or earn more than $500 per week.
This evidence about the characteristics of workers who leave our
sample does alleviate one concern about our earnings loss estimates.
In principle, it is possible that these workers are more able than other
separators and that the reason they have no Pennsylvania earnings
after they separate is that they have moved to other states where their
earnings in their new firms are comparable to those in their old firms.
The foregoing findings indicate that separators excluded from our
sample have skills similar to workers in our sample. Whether or not
these persons were more or less likely to be adversely affected by dis
placement is hard to say. The excluded sample contains more women,
who typically have lower mobility rates following their job losses.
But it also contains more workers who have high earnings. Such highskill workers usually have higher mobility rates. Nevertheless, we
believe that among these persons are workers who likely suffered
greater losses than the group we study in the remainder of this mono
graph. For example, we find larger long-term losses when we relax
our restriction requiring every person in our sample to have earnings
in each calendar year to simply requiring that they have positive earn
ings in at least one calendar year following their separations.
Equally important as concerns about the fate of workers who leave
our sample are concerns about how representative our sample is of

Table 3.1 Worker Characteristics in Pennsylvania Administrative Data, Displaced Worker Survey, and Current
Population Survey Samples
Characteristic
Age & gender
Average age
Percent female
Preseparation industry
Manufacturing
Other goods
Transportation, communications
Other services
Weekly wages (1985 dollars)
prior to separation
Less than $237
$237-5350
$3514500
More than $500

Pennsylvania Administrative Records
Mass layoff
Dropout
All separators separators
separators
(1)
(2)
(3)

Displaced Workers Survey
All full-time High-tenure
respondents respondents
(4)
-

CPS

(5)

1986
(6)
-

41.8
26%

41.8
23%

43.3
29%

34%

40.5
27%

40%

69%
3
6
21

76%
4
5
15

66%
3
8
23

48%
13
8
32

56%
13
10
22

31%
8
8
52

16
23
33
28

16
22
34
29

17
21
30
32

30
27
22
21

16
22
29
32

25
25
25
25

NOTES: The table reports characteristics for the following groups of workers: (1) Pennsylvania workers with wage or salary earnings in each calendar
year from 1974 through 1986, who were born between 1930 and 1959, and who had worked continuously with the same firm since at least 1974 before
separating from those firms between 1980 and 1986; (2) Same as (1) except includes only workers separating from firms that had experienced large
employment reductions; (3) Same as (1) except workers who never had positive Pennsylvania wage and salary earnings after their separations; (4) DWS
respondents displaced from full-time jobs between 1981 and 1986; (5) DWS respondents born between 1930 and 1959, who had six or more years tenure
when they were displaced between 1981 and 1986; (6) Full-time workers who responded to the January 1986 Current Population Survey. Weekly wages
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displaced workers nationwide. The most striking difference between
our sample of separators and respondents to the DWS or the CPS is
the smaller percentage of workers in our sample who were females
and the larger percentage who separated from manufacturing jobs. As
shown in column 4 of table 3.1, females and manufacturing workers
accounted for 34 percent and 48 percent, respectively, of the 1986
DWS respondents displaced from full-time jobs. As shown in column
6,40 percent of the January 1986 CPS respondents were females, and
31 percent were employed in manufacturing. Further, the predisplacement earnings of DWS respondents were significantly lower than
either the earnings of all CPS respondents or of workers in our sam
ple.
It is, of course, no surprise that characteristics of displaced work
ers differ from the workforce as a whole. Flaim and Seghal (1985)
and others have reported such differences using the DWS. What is
less clear is why the characteristics of workers in our sample differ
from those of displaced workers in the DWS. One reason is that Penn
sylvania has a greater share of large primary and fabricated metals
firms than other states and that these firms experienced large employ
ment declines during the 1980s. When we exclude workers from
these firms, the percentage of workers in the resulting sample who
separated from manufacturing firms declines modestly from 69 to 63
percent.
A more important reason that characteristics of displaced workers
in our sample differ from the DWS is that it consists only of persons
with six or more years of tenure. When we exclude persons from the
DWS who report that they had fewer that 6 years of tenure when they
lost their jobs or were born before 1930, we find that the characteris
tics of workers in the resulting DWS sample are more similar to our
sample of high-attachment separators. As shown by column 5 of table
3.1, 27 percent of the high-tenure 1986 DWS respondents were
females, 56 percent lost jobs from the manufacturing sector, and 61
percent earned more than $350 per week on their predisplacement job.
Another striking difference between worker characteristics in the
Pennsylvania and DWS samples is the percentages of high-tenure
workers displaced from other goods-producing jobs. Further analysis
indicated that most of these persons were employed in the construc
tion industry. The relatively large fraction of high-tenure displaced
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workers from the construction industry surprised us because that
industry is typically characterized by short-term employment relation
ships. We have no explanation for the differences between this per
centage in the two samples other than to observe that we did not find
such large numbers of high-tenure displaced construction workers in
our administrative data. Nonetheless, the similarity between the char
acteristics of high-tenure DWS respondents and our sample of separa
tors suggests that it may be reasonable to infer that our findings
reflect the experiences of high-tenure, prime-age displaced workers
generally.11
3.4 Estimates Based on Conventional Earnings Loss Estimators
We have shown that estimates of the costs borne by dislocated
workers depend on how we interpret their subsequent labor force
attachment. The large size of our sample of separators, the long earn
ings histories, and the sample of nondisplaced workers in our adminis
trative data also allow us to explore the sensitivity of earnings loss
estimates to various assumptions about the time series patterns of
worker earnings. For example, we find that our estimates of the earn
ings losses experienced by the sample of separators whose earnings
were depicted in figures 3.1 and 3.3 depend on our interpretation of
their predisplacement earnings losses and on estimates of how much
their earnings would have grown had they not lost their jobs.
To underscore the potential importance of these issues when using
administrative data and to motivate our development of a more for
mal statistical model of earnings losses in chapter 4, we analyze the
1986 annual earnings losses of the workers who separated from their
firms during the first quarter of 1982. Our estimates are based on two
different estimators of displaced worker earnings losses that have
been employed in the displacement literature. The first estimator is
simply the average difference between postdisplacement and predis
placement earnings of displaced workers. This "pre-post" estimator is
similar to that often used in the DWS studies. The second estimator is
the difference between age-adjusted earnings growth of displaced and
nondisplaced workers. This "difference in differences" estimator,
which is borrowed from the program evaluation literature,12 has been
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used in some of the ILAB studies.13 It explicitly takes into account the
earnings growth that displaced workers would have experienced had
they remained with their firms. In addition, besides its explicit con
trols for age differences, this estimator also implicitly controls for dif
ferences between workers' fixed characteristics such as their sex,
race, or schooling.
To see how the "pre-post" and "difference in differences" estima
tors differ from each other, consider the following model of worker
earnings:

(3.1)

yit = <x. + Y, + *l-,P + J>l-,6 + e,,.

In equation (3.1), yit is worker i's earnings in period V, oq represents
worker's unmeasured fixed characteristics; y, represents economywide earnings changes; xit is a quadratic in age; Dit equals 1 if the
worker separated from his or her firm in year s and t> s and equals
zero otherwise; and eit is a serially uncorrelated error. 14 According to
(3.1) workers' earnings may differ because their measured or unmea
sured characteristics differ or because their separation statuses differ.
This ambiguity is a particularly important concern in studies that esti
mate earnings losses by comparing postdisplacement earnings of dis
placed and nondisplaced workers (e.g., Seitchik and Zornitsky 1989).
As (3.1) indicates, these estimates may be biased if displaced workers
had unmeasured characteristics that made them more likely to have
low earnings. If this is the case, the differences between postdisplace
ment earnings of displaced and nondisplaced workers confound the
effects of displacement and the differences between their unmeasured
characteristics.
We can eliminate the foregoing ambiguity by calculating the differ
ence between current (time t) earnings and earnings in a year (s - k)
prior to displacement:

<3-2> yit -yis -k = (Y,- Vft) + (*/r-**
In equation (3.2), earnings growth depends on economywide or
sectorwide changes, age, and whether the employee had been dis-
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placed. The dependence of growth in worker earnings on these factors
underscores the potential shortcoming of "pre-post" estimates. Such
estimates treat the difference between post- and predisplacement earn
ings as having resulted from job loss. However, according to (3.2)
this presumption is unlikely to be correct Earnings of displaced work
ers may be changing because the economy is changing or because
they are older and have more labor market experience.
The different determinants of their earnings growth underscore the
value to a study of worker dislocation of a comparison group made up
of nondisplaced workers. The comparison group's earnings growth
identifies the coefficients for the first two terms in equation (3.2). This
strategy allows displaced worker earnings histories to identify the
effect of displacement. Therefore, given the equation (3.1) earnings
model, the difference between earnings growth (adjusted for age) of
displaced workers and the comparison group is an unbiased estimate
of the costs of worker dislocation.
These points are made more concretely in table 3.2, where we
present alternative estimates of the earnings losses incurred by work
ers who separated from their firms during the first quarter of 1982.
This set of estimates also indicates how loss estimates depend on postseparation attachment to the wage and salary workforce. Indeed, as
shown by Panel A of table 3.2, "pre-post" estimates of workers' earn
ings losses depend to a substantial degree on their subsequent labor
force attachment. Earnings of displaced workers were $9,191 lower in
1986 than in 1981, one year prior to their separations. When we limit
our sample of separators to workers with wage or salary earnings dur
ing 1986, the earnings drop falls to $3,389. Finally, when we limit our
sample of separators to displaced workers with wage or salary earn
ings in every calendar year—about one-half of the displaced—the
annual earnings loss falls to only $2,483. Thus, when we focus only
on workers who remain highly attached to the Pennsylvania wage and
salary workforce, the estimated earnings losses are only one-fourth as
large as the apparent losses for the full sample of separators.
Turning to the comparison group-based estimates in the last col
umn of Panel B, we find that they are larger than the corresponding
"pre-post" estimates. These larger loss estimates reflect the earnings
growth experienced by similarly aged workers who remained
employed at their firms. As shown by the last row in Panel B of table
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3.2, the "difference in differences" estimate of the high-attachment
sample's annual earnings losses is $5,030 compared with the "prepost" estimate of only $2,483. The simple "pre-post" estimates under
state the costs of worker dislocation because the comparison group's
earnings grew modestly between 1981 and 1986. That earnings
growth suggests that had displaced workers remained with their old
employers their earnings also would have grown substantially.
The other columns in table 3.2 indicate that even the "difference in
differences" estimates may be misleading. One problem is that the
estimates vary depending on the predisplacement year, s - k. As
shown in the last row of the table, the estimated earnings losses for
the sample of separators who remained attached to Pennsylvania's
wage and salary workforce range from $5,030 when using 1981 as
the predisplacement base year to $6,528 when using 1980 as the pre
displacement base year. Although this variability may not be surpris
ing given the standard errors associated with the estimates, the main
reason that our estimates vary depending on which year we use as the
predisplacement year is that displaced worker earnings grow more
slowly or even decline in the years prior to displacement. This pattern
is seen more clearly in the behavior of the "pre-post" estimates in
Panel A. For example, the 1986 earnings of high-attachment separa
tors are $4,287 below their 1979 levels, but only $2,483 below their
1981 levels. This decline could result because the events that lead to
worker separations cause their earnings to grow more slowly or even
decline before their displacements.
We also can observe the foregoing problem with the "difference in
differences" estimates in figure 3.3. The figure shows that the earn
ings of separators actually began to diverge from those of the stayers
several quarters before they left their firms. One explanation for that
divergence is that firms initially respond to adverse economic condi
tions by reducing employee hours, temporarily laying off segments of
their workforce, and cutting real wages. That explanation suggests
that displaced workers experience earnings losses prior to their job
losses as a result of the same forces that ultimately lead to their sepa
rations. In this sense, the preseparation earnings declines are a part of
the displacement effect that we are trying to measure.
An alternative explanation for the divergence between the earnings
patterns of separators and nondisplaced workers suggests that the "dif-
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ference in differences" estimates in the last row of table 3.2 are biased
no matter which preseparation year we use. This explanation is based
on the evidence in column 3 of Panel B, which shows that between
1974 and 1979, age-adjusted earnings of separators usually grew
more slowly than those of nondisplaced workers. For example, the
earnings of separators who remained attached to the Pennsylvania
wage or salary workforce grew by $1,517 less than the earnings of
those who stayed with their firms through 1986. Therefore, simple
"difference in differences" estimates are likely to be biased if employ
ers select for displacement those employees with more slowly grow
ing or even declining productivity. This second explanation implies
that some of the postdisplacement earnings gap between separators
and nondisplaced workers would have existed even if these employ
ees had not been displaced and their firms had not experienced eco
nomic difficulties.
The reason we require a more complex estimator than our simple
"difference in differences" estimator is that our long earnings histo
ries make clear that worker earnings are inconsistent with the model
described in equation (3.1). If earnings are generated as in (3.1), earn
ings growth (adjusted for age) should be the same for the separators
and nondisplaced workers in the years prior to displacement. This
specification does not allow for differences between predisplacement
earnings growth of displaced and nondisplaced workers to depend on
anything other than differences in their ages. But, during the predis
placement period, we find that age-adjusted earnings of separators
grew more slowly than those of their nondisplaced counterparts.
Accordingly, this evidence suggests that worker earnings are better
summarized by an alternative model. In this formulation, earnings
also depend on an individual-specific deterministic trend, co,f. Equa
tion (3.1) now becomes:

(3.3)

yit = a. + oy+y, + xit$ + D,.,8 + e,,.

After differencing (3.3) using predisplacement earnings, yis . k, the
potential bias associated with the "difference in differences" estimator
becomes clear:

<3-4>

-- = ®c- *

Table 32 1986 Earnings Losses for Nonagricultural Workers Displaced in 1982;!
1979
Number of
1979-1974 1986-1978 1986-1979 1986-1980 1986-1981
earnings
observations
Panel A: Differences Between Pre- and Postdisplacement Earnings
$-10,934
$-9,191
$-12,020
$-11,873
$2,154
425
$22,862
All displaced workers
(638)
(632)
(659)
(328)
(668)
(492)
260
Displaced workers with
-3,389
-4,967
-5,690
-5,450
1,931
23,412
(703)
(722)
(717)
(446)
(733)
(635)
1986 earnings
188
Displaced workers with
^,287
-4,094
-2,483
1,825
-4,145
24,927
(745)
(786)
(795)
(573)
(773)
(698)
1974-1986 earnings
Growth
Earnings
'
Stayers
and
Workers'
Panel B: Differences Between Displaced
$-13,376
$-13,242
$-11,591
$-13,287
$-980
All displaced workers
(428)
(468)
(448)
(472)
(330)
Displaced workers with
-5,818
-7,061
-7,301
-1,232
-6,883
(537)
(589)
(564)
(421)
(594)
1986 earnings
Displaced workers with
-5,030
-5,675
-6,528
-5,594
-1,517
(662)
(726)
(696)
(521)
(732)
1974-1986 earnings
NOTE: Estimates based on a 5 percent sample of all Pennsylvania nonmanufacturing employees with eight or more years of tenure in their firm when dis
placed in 1982. In Panel B, the estimates control for a quadratic in age. The stayers sample includes 8,232 manufacturing employees with eight or more
years of tenure in 1982 who stayed with their firms through 1986. Average earnings for stayers in 1979 was $26,284. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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The earnings growth of those employees who stayed with their
firms cannot identify both differences in individual, co/, and aggre
gate, Yr - Yy_fc, earnings growth. Therefore, earnings growth differences
between separators and stayers partly reflects differences that would
have existed even if no separation had occurred. One way to account
for individual earnings growth differences is to use the differences
between displaced and nondisplaced worker earnings growth from
1974-1979 to estimate what the differences in their earnings growth
would have been between 1979 and 1986 had there been no separa
tions from their firms. Such "second difference in differences" esti
mates are approximately 20 percent lower than the estimates shown
in Panel B.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined how state administrative records could be
used in studies of worker dislocation. Such records have long earn
ings histories free from the response biases that may arise in inter
view data. Moreover, we have shown that valuable information about
job changes is available from administrative records, but must be con
structed with considerable care. In addition, studies that use such data
must confront the problems that these records do not explicitly distin
guish between quits and layoffs and do not record the earnings of per
sons who have left the state. In this chapter we argued that for
samples of high-tenure workers these problems are likely to be less
important.
Our preliminary analysis of a subsample of separators indicated
that when high-tenure workers separate from their firms, they experi
ence substantial earnings reductions. In the long term, these earnings
losses may amount to approximately $4,000 to $5,000 per year, or
between 20 and 25 percent below what average earnings would have
been in the absence of displacement. However, because our adminis
trative data provide long earnings histories, we are able to identify
several difficulties associated with this finding. When developing our
formal statistical model of displaced worker earnings losses in chap
ter 4, we take these difficulties explicitly into account. Our empirical
analyses in chapters 5 and 6 indicate that how we treat these issues
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has a substantial effect on the magnitude of displaced workers' longterm earnings losses.
NOTES
1. See Employment and Earnings, U.S. Department of Labor, various issues; and Jacobson
(1988).
2. Employers report their employees total earnings. Unlike Social Security earnings data,
these data are not top coded. For our own data processing convenience, we have top coded earn
ings over $100,000 per quarter. We also obtained information on the workers' receipt of unem
ployment insurance benefits and TAA payments by quarter.
3. The sample is based on the last two digits of workers' Social Security numbers.
4. The reports actually identify employment levels of individual establishments. However, the
coding schemes vary from year to year and we thus have not been able to make use of data on
employment trends of workers' establishments.
5. Although we have less demographic information on workers than we would like, we are
fortunate to have as much as we do. Pennsylvania was one of the few states to obtain demographic
information from the Social Security Administration before concern for privacy caused them to
stop supplying such information on individuals.
6. Unless stated otherwise, all dollar figures in this monograph have been deflated by the Con
sumer Price Index and are given in 1987 dollars.
7. Both the displaced and nondisplaced workers had eight or more years of service with their
firms as of the first quarter of 1982.
8. In figure 3.2, the upward spike in the employment rate at the quarter of separation is a con
sequence of the way separations are dated; all workers had to have positive earnings in their quar
ters of separation—otherwise we would have dated their separations one quarter earlier.
9. In the future we hope to obtain data indicating whether workers have positive earnings any
where in the United States. This information would provide a better picture of the labor market
activity of workers with zero reported earnings.
10. Some workers are also excluded if they were unemployed for more than one year follow
ing their displacements. An example of such workers are those displaced during the fourth quar
ter, who have no earnings during the entire subsequent year. However, some workers unemployed
for more than one and one-half years following their job losses would be included in the sample if
they were displaced during the first or second quarter and did not find a job until the third or
fourth quarter of the following year.
11. Interestingly, because Pennsylvania workers are paid only modestly more than all U.S.
workers, differences in local wages probably do not explain the pay differences observed in table
3.1. In 1980, production and supervisory workers in manufacturing earned $384 (1985 dollars)
per week in Pennsylvania compared with $376 (198S dollars) per week in the U.S. (see Employ
ment, Hours, and Earnings, States and Area, 1939-82 Volume II: New Hampshire-Wyoming.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bulletin 1370-17, p. 710, January 1984; 1991 Economic Report of the
President, tables B-44, B-58, pp. 336, 351). We converted 1980 dollars to 1985 dollars by multi
plying the 1980 figures by 1.306.
12. For examples of these models see Ashenfelter (1978), Bassi (1984), Ashenfelter and Card
(1985), Heckman and Robb (1985), LaLonde (1986), Card and Sullivan (1988).
13. Ruhm (1991a) employs a similar technique.
14. Model (3.1) implies that any earnings losses after separation are permanent. Because we
are comparing only one postdisplacement year, 1986, to several predisplacement years, 1978 to
1981, that assumption has no impact on the results in table 3.1. We relax this assumption in chap
ter 4 when we consider models that allow the displacement effects to vary over time.

Econometric Issues
in the Estimation
of Earnings Losses
In chapter 3, we examined the earnings histories of experienced
workers who were displaced in the first quarter of 1982 and similar
workers who remained with their firms through the end of 1986. We
noted that the significant differences between the earnings histories of
those two groups strongly suggested that displacement led to large
losses in earnings. We also noted a number of issues likely to affect
estimates of those losses. In this chapter we discuss these issues more
fully and present our strategy for summarizing the evidence on the
magnitude of displaced worker earnings losses. We begin by specify
ing more precisely the definition of earnings loss used in this mono
graph. Next we present our basic estimation strategy. This is followed
by a discussion of possible statistical biases that might, under certain
circumstances, affect our estimates. Finally, we show how the basic
estimation strategy can be extended to allow estimates to depend on
various characteristics of workers and their firms.
4.1 The Meaning of Earnings Losses Due to Displacement
Figure 4.1 summarizes the qualitative characteristics of displaced
and nondisplaced worker earnings histories. As suggested in chapter
3, earnings of displaced workers rise until two to three years prior to
their separations from their firms. Then, during the years immediately
prior to their separations (D-C in figure 4.1), their earnings begin to
decline. When they actually lose their jobs, their earnings fall sharply
(C in figure 4.1). Finally, their earnings recover at a modest rate dur
ing the years following their separations. In contrast, the earnings of
similar workers who were not displaced continue to grow over the
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entire time period (D-B in figure 4.1)—suggesting that had displaced
workers not lost their jobs, their earnings also would have grown.
Figure 4.1 Stylized Earnings Histories of Displaced Worker and Similar
Nondisplaced Worker
Earnings
Nondisplaced Worker

B

Displaced Worker

Time
Displacement

The stylized earnings histories depicted in figure 4.1 can be used
to illustrate several possible definitions of the earnings loss due to
displacement. One definition is the simple difference between postdisplacement earnings and earnings immediately prior to displacement
(A-C in figure 4.1). A second possibility is the difference between
postdisplacement earnings and earnings several years prior to dis
placement (A-D in figure 4.1). A third possibility is the difference
between postdisplacement earnings and the earnings workers would
have received had they not been displaced (A-B in figure 4.1). The
latter amount depends on the earnings of nondisplaced workers in a
comparison group. That group might include nondisplaced workers
who had similar earnings histories and characteristics to the dis
placed workers before the events that led to their displacement
began. Our analysis of 1982 separators in chapter 3 indicated that
these definitions yielded substantially different estimates of earnings
losses. Thus, the estimated magnitude of displaced worker earnings
losses clearly turns on the rationale for adopting one definition over
the others.
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As noted in chapter 2, much of the previous dislocation literature
adopted (often implicitly) the first earnings loss definition. Studies
using the DWS had little choice but to employ this simple "pre-post"
definition because the DWS does not include a comparison group of
nondisplaced workers and even for displaced workers includes infor
mation only on earnings immediately prior to displacement. However,
earnings declines that occur prior to worker separations are just as
injurious as declines that occur after they actually leave their
employer. Similarly, the loss of earnings growth that they would other
wise have expected is just as significant in any welfare calculation as
an actual drop in earnings. Accordingly, for the purposes of under
standing the link between a firm's success and the well-being of its
employees or for determining the amount of compensation necessary
to make adversely affected workers indifferent to policy changes, the
third definition is the most meaningful.
Simply put, we wish to compare the typical displaced worker's
actual earnings with what they would have been in the hypothetical
case in which the worker was not displaced. This definition of the loss
is not, however, sufficiently precise. In particular, it does not fully
specify the meaning of "not being displaced." One possibility would
be to compare actual earnings with those that could have expected
had the worker not been displaced at the particular date of separation.
If we let yit denote the earnings of worker j at date t and let Dis = 1 if
worker i was displaced at date s (and D^ - 0 otherwise) then this defi
nition of the loss would lead us to estimate the quantity
(4.1)

E(yit \Dis =V)- E(yit \ D* = 0).

This definition does not rule out the possibility that worker i was
displaced at some time other than date s. Instead of this definition,
however, we prefer a stronger definition of not being displaced. Not
only do we require nondisplaced workers to remain at their firms at
date s, but at all other dates in our sampling frame. Therefore, we
attempt to estimate the quantity
(4.2)

E(yn \Dis~l)- E(yit \ Div = 0 for all v).
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Because the alternative to displacement in (4.2) rules out displace
ment at any time in the future in addition to displacement at date s,
the losses calculated this way should be larger than those implied by
(4.1).1
Relative to the definition in equation (4.1), the quantity in equation
(4.2) is a cleaner measure of the importance of job loss to a worker's
career. In particular, measure (4.1) partially depends on how workers
who are displaced at a given date fare relative to workers displaced
shortly before or after that date. Such a comparison is not likely to be
the one that most interests policymakers. An additional advantage of
(4.2) over (4.1) is that it compares job losers at different dates to a
common standard. This simplifies the interpretation of several of our
results. Finally, the quantity (4.1) can be calculated from (4.2) if we
have additional information on how Prob(D/v = IID^ = 0) varies with
v and s. Thus obtaining estimates of (4.2) can be viewed as a useful
preliminary step in the estimation of (4.1).2
Even specification (4.2) is insufficiently precise to describe the
problem we are attempting to address. Besides whether a worker was
displaced, the magnitudes of both expectations in (4.2) depend on the
additional information on which we condition. We can write (4.2)
more precisely if, in addition to displacement status, we condition on
the information set, /,-,
(4.3)

E<yit I Dfr = 1, /,) - E(yit IDJV = 0 for all v, 1}.

The information set /,• in equation (4.3) includes worker characteris
tics, but it also has a temporal dimension that potentially has an
important effect on our earnings loss definitions. To see how this
effect arises let //, denote information about worker i that is available
at time t. One possible definition of earnings losses would set // in
equation (4.3) equal to 7^.
(4.4)

E(yit I a* « 1, /*) - E(yit I Div = 0 for all v, 7*).

In equation (4.4), the expected loss at time t depends on the infor
mation available at the time of separation. Thus (4.4) denotes the
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change in earnings expectation that occurs at the time workers are
displaced.
Our view, however, is that the earnings loss definition given in
equation (4.4) captures only part of the adverse effects associated
with displacement. By the time the reduction in force actually occurs,
the declining firm's fortunes may have been at least partially evident
for some time. Indeed, we have already seen in chapter 3 that the earn
ings of displaced workers begin to decline around three years prior to
their separations. Therefore, it seems very likely that their expected
future earnings would also have begun to decline. In general, if the
forces of structural change work over a significant period of time so
that the firm's fortunes are continually eroding, workers' expected
earnings may have largely absorbed the effects of that structural
change by the time they leave their firms. In that case, employee sep
arations might not reveal much additional information about their
future earnings prospects, and as a result the loss corresponding to
equation (4.4) would be relatively small.
Because earnings may absorb the adverse effects of structural
change prior to worker displacements, it is important to estimate
expected earnings prior to these changes. Therefore, we choose to
focus on the more comprehensive definition of earnings losses that
compares earnings of displaced workers to the earnings that they
expected to receive at some date p periods prior to their separations.
More formally, we estimate
(4.5)

E(yit I Dfr = 1,1^) - E(yit I Div = 0 for all v, /*_,),

where p is sufficiently large that the events that eventually lead to dis
placement have not begun at time s - p. The quantity (4.5) is the
change in expected earnings, if, at time s - p, it was revealed that the
worker would be displaced at date s rather than being able to keep his
or her job indefinitely. When structural changes take a significant
amount of time to unfold, it is necessary that s - p precede those
changes in order to capture displacement's full effects on earnings.
Before we can implement the foregoing definition we need to spec
ify the variables in the information set I^.p. These variables should be
determinants of earnings whether or not workers are displaced. We
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clearly want to control as best we can for the standard demographic
variables that influence earnings.3 Our data allow us to go even fur
ther, because they allow us to condition on the industries and even on
the firms that displaced workers were attached to before they lost
their jobs.4 However, the problem with such controls is that even
workers who are fortunate enough to retain their jobs with firms that
layoff other workers may experience some earnings losses. An expres
sion like
(4.6)

E(yit I Dfy = 1, i employed by firm/at s - p)
- E(yit I Div = 0 for all v, i employed by firm/at s - p\

does not capture the full impact of the events that led to displacement,
because it captures only the effects specifically associated with job
loss.
Our preferred definition of displaced worker earnings losses limits
Iis-p to general characteristics of a worker and his or her firm that are
known at date s - p to affect earnings. This definition does not mean
that no firm characteristics should be included in the set of variables
that determine expected earnings. For instance, suppose it is widely
known that workers in larger firms have earnings that rise more rap
idly than those in smaller firms. In that case, it is appropriate to base
conditional earnings forecasts on the size of the firm that the worker
was employed in at date s - p. We argue, however, that expected earn
ings, in the event that workers are able to keep their jobs, should not
be lowered by the knowledge that workers similar to themselves are
going to be laid off.
We do not believe that policymakers concerned with the ramifica
tions of potential policy interventions in areas such as international
trade and environmental protection would be comforted to learn that
workers who would lose their jobs would suffer no greater earnings
losses than the workers who remained with the affected firms if, in
fact, the earnings of both groups would be devastated. Likewise, in
attempting to understand the importance of workers' attachment to
particular firms, we need to see variation in outcomes of similar work
ers in different firms. Thus our preferred definition of the earnings
loss due to displacement is that given by equation (4.5) where IIS.P is
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limited to characteristics of a worker and his or her firm that would, at
date s - p, be thought to affect earnings.
In order to make clear the empirical importance of including or
excluding firm controls, we report estimates based on both measures
in chapters 5 and 6. We do so for two reasons. First, we believe the
difference between equations (4.5) and (4.6) sheds some light on the
interpretation of the estimated earnings losses. Second, that difference
can serve as an indirect indicator of the losses imposed by structural
change on workers who retain their jobs.5
4.2 Basic Statistical Model

In addition to the problem of defining earnings losses, we also
have the statistical problem of estimating those losses. To estimate
these losses we specify a statistical model that exploits the principal
strengths of our data—its large sample size and its long time span—to
obtain a very detailed picture of the pattern of earnings losses both
across time and across workers. We identify the displacement effect
with a subset of the model's parameters that captures the varied
effects that this event can have on earnings histories. In our specifica
tion, the effect of displacement on earnings depends on the length of
time since the separation date. For instance, immediately after dis
placement, unemployment is likely to be a significant source of earn
ings losses. But, in the long run, less earnings losses are more likely
to depend on the amount of specific human capital possessed by work
ers before their displacements and the rate at which they accumulate
new capital after displacement.
Understanding the temporal pattern of earnings losses is important
for at least two reasons. First, the aggregate loss borne by displaced
workers depends on the effect of displacement on their earnings for
the entire rest of their careers. Because we are able to follow the tem
poral pattern of earnings losses for over six years after displacement,
we can reasonably assess the speed with which earnings recover and
thus estimate the cumulative loss associated with displacement. Sec
ond, the potential for various policy measures to compensate workers
for job loss occasioned by freer trade or tighter environmental protec
tion depends critically on when they incur these losses. If displace-
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ment reduces earnings for a relatively short period following
separation as a result of unemployment, then programs that provide
supplemental unemployment benefits may adequately compensate dis
placed workers. If, however, the drop in earnings is long term, persist
ing even after workers find stable employment, then such programs
alone will not be enough.
Besides the temporal pattern being important, there is also ample
reason to believe that earnings losses depend on characteristics of the
affected workers such as their sex, age, or former firm's industry. For
instance, the various factors discussed in chapter 1 that may lead to
earnings premia for workers are likely to be more important in some
industries than others. Similarly, a displaced worker's ability and
inclination to make new investments in human capital likely depend
on age and possibly on sex. An understanding of the dependence of
earnings losses on worker characteristics would be valuable to policymakers for at least two reasons. First, those concerned with the conse
quences of a policy intervention that adversely affects a particular
group would want to know the probable size of the losses that would
be suffered by that specific group rather than by the average worker.
Second, if the time pattern of losses is known to differ across groups
of workers in a specific manner, it may be possible to tailor different
compensation schemes to different groups of affected workers.
Unfortunately, our twin goals of allowing for a flexible pattern of
loss estimates over time and for dependence of estimates on worker
characteristics conflict to a certain extent. For instance, the estimates
underlying figure 3.3 in chapter 3 are relatively successful in display
ing the intertemporal pattern of earnings losses. However, they do not
show how losses vary across groups of workers. Simply splitting the
sample of experienced workers who underlie those estimates (those
displaced in the first quarter of 1982) into subgroups of workers
defined by characteristics such as age, sex, and industry is not feasi
ble. Even with the large data set that we are employing, the resulting
subgroups would be too small to produce statistically reliable esti
mates.
In order to allow for variation of the estimates across both time and
worker characteristics, it is necessary to pool information from vari
ous cohorts of displaced workers. A convenient way to do this is to
introduce a set of dummy variables, each of which is one a particular
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number of quarters before or after a worker is displaced and zero oth
erwise. In particular, let Dkit = 1 if, in period f, worker i had been dis
placed k quarters earlier.6 Alternatively, Dkit = 1 if worker i was
displaced in quarter t - k. By restricting attention to these dummy vari
ables, we formalize the idea that, for example, a worker displaced in
1982 was in much the same position in 1985 as a worker displaced in
1981 was in 1984.
The basic statistical specification on which we base the estimates
presented below assumes that a worker's earnings at a given date
depend on displacement through the above set of dummy variables
and on some additional controls:
(4.7)

yir = a.

The complete set of dummy variables, D^j k = -m, -(m-1), . . ., 0, 1,
2, ... represents the event of displacement. In particular, &t is the
effect of displacement on a worker's earnings k quarters following its
occurrence, or if k is negative, Ifl quarters prior to job loss. The
remainder of the variables in (4.7) were included in an attempt to con
trol for other general factors that influence earnings. The vector xit
consists of observed, time-varying characteristics of the worker. In
this study, these are limited to age, age squared, sex, and interactions
of these variables. The y/'s, which are the coefficients on a set of
dummy variables for each quarter in the sample period, capture the
general time pattern of earnings in the economy. Specification (4.7)
also allows for the existence of permanent differences across workers
in observed and unobserved characteristics. The impact of such fixed
factors is summarized for each worker by the coefficient a/. For exam
ple, more highly educated or more highly motivated workers who con
sistently earn more than other workers have high values of a/. In
particular, it is important to note that, given the presence in (4.7) of
the worker-specific fixed effect, a/, additional information on charac
teristics such as completed years of education that do not change over
time are of no value; the effects of such variables are completely sum
marized by the fixed effects. Finally, the error term, e/r, in specifica-

68 Econometric Issues in the Estimation of Earnings Losses

tion (4.7) is assumed to be of constant variance and to be uncorrelated
across individuals and time.
The specification discussed in chapter 3 is a special case of (4.7)
where 8^ = 0 for all k < 0 and fy = 8 for all k > 0. Specification (4.7)
allows displacement's effects on earnings to be felt up to m quarters
prior to separation and for those effects to quickly disappear or, alter
natively, to persist indefinitely. By freeing up the specification to
allow the effects of displacement to vary over time, we achieve one of
the goals set out above—that of allowing in a flexible way for a com
plex temporal pattern of loss and recovery. In section 4.4 we discuss
how our second goal—allowing for flexibility across workers—can
be achieved, but first we consider some issues relating to the specifica
tion that can be more clearly appreciated without those additional
complications.
As noted above, expression (4.5) is our preferred definition of the
earnings loss due to displacement. It compares the expected earnings
at time t of an individual who was displaced at time s with those of a
worker who was never displaced. In terms of our statistical model
equation (4.7), at time t, a worker who is displaced at time s has
D*.~ s = 1 and all other displacement dummies equal to zero. In con
trast, a worker who is never displaced will have all of the displace
ment dummies equal to zero. Thus the two terms making up the
quantity (4.5) can be expressed as
(4.8)

E(yit I D* = 1, I^p) = 8,_, + £(a, + yt + xit$ + e,-, I D* = 1, 7^)

and
(4.9)

E(yit I Div = 0 for all v, 7^) = £(<x, + y, + xjVp
+ e(,IDlV = Oforallv,/iy_/,).

As we noted in section 4.1, the most appropriate information set,
Iis.p, includes general characteristics of the worker known at time s p to be determinants of present and future earnings. In terms of the
variables included in specification (4.7), these include a/ and %
which are, respectively, permanent characteristics of a worker and
time-varying variables whose path would be known at time s - p.
Thus, E(Ui \Dis =\, I^.) = £(oc,- 1 Div = 0 for all v, I^.) = a,- and sim-
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ilarly £(%p I D* = 1, lti.p) = £(*/rp I DJV = 0 for all v, Iti.p) = *,$.
The realization of 7, will not be known at time s - p. But, we argued
above that when assessing the effects of displacement, it was inappro
priate to include variables in I^.p that, when combined with informa
tion on whether a particular worker was displaced, would provide
information about the earnings of other workers. Thus, for the appro
priate information set, E( y, I D^ = 1, I^.p) - E( y/ 1 Div = 0 for all v,
lis.p). This last fact, combined with our assumption about the error
term in model (4.7), implies that the desired quantity, (4.5), reduces to
5,_j, the coefficient on the dummy variable for being t-s quarters after
displacement.
Given our assumption that the error term in (4.7) is of constant
variance and independent across observations, and given our unwill
ingness to assume, for instance, that a,- is uncorrelated with the D*r
the most efficient way to estimate equation (4.7) is by ordinary least
squares with the a,- treated as the coefficients of dummy variables for
the corresponding individual.7 As is widely known, this estimator can
be calculated in a computationally tractable manner, by first "sweep
ing out" the individual specific dummy variables, that is, by replacing
all other variables with their deviations from worker-specific means.
If we denote the mean of worker i"s earnings by y. and similarly for
other variables, then
(4.10)

and

Least squares applied to (4.11) yields the same estimates of its
parameters as least squares applied to (4.7) but is computationally
tractable because the oc/'s have been eliminated.
Even estimation of (4.11) can be somewhat burdensome since
there are a relatively large number of both the y/'s (52, or one for each
quarter) and 8^'s (48, or one for each number of quarters relative to
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displacement between 20 quarters before displacement and 27 quar
ters after displacement) and the sample size is large (roughly
1,500,000 worker-quarter observations). The computations can, how
ever, be reduced somewhat more by computing the estimates in two
steps. Specifically, for the subsample of workers who are never dis
placed, (4.7) reduces to
(4.12)

y^a. + Yj + jgS + e.,.

Consistent estimates of p and the y/s can be obtained by estimating
(4.12) using only the data on the workers who were never displaced.
Denote these estimates by |3 and y,. Then yit = y/r~Yr -*,-,P is a
consistent estimate of a,- + 2^?/^ + ei/ for displaced workers. Thus
we can consistently estimate the parameters of primary interest, the
&Ys, by applying least squares to
(4.13)
v

yit
•7 » = <x.+
i k^-m
, Y
*-i

Relative to those obtained by least squares estimation of (4.11),
estimates obtained from (4.13)8 are less efficient and the estimated
standard errors produced by standard software are probably optimistic
in that they do not take account of the fact that p and the yr 's are only
estimates. However, we have found the estimates and their standard
errors produced using (4.13) to be extremely close to those derived
from (4. II).9
Implicit in our discussion of the estimation (4.7) is that it is estima
ble. However, it is clear that (4.7) will not be identified unless we
have data on at least some displaced workers more than m quarters
prior to their displacement. In particular, if we did not have such data
then it would not be possible to distinguish the case in which all dis
placed workers have low values of the fixed effect, a/, from the case
in which the 8^'s are all negative and large in absolute value. More
formally, if there were no data on displaced workers more than m
quarters prior to their displacement, then for these workers, exactly
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one of the Dkit would always be equal to 1 in each period. Thus if we
had one set of least squares parameters we could always get another
set, implying identical fitted values, by adding any constant to all the
oc/'s corresponding to displaced workers and subtracting the same con
stant from all of the S^'s.10 In this case we would only be able to esti
mate differences between 6fc's. That is, we could determine, for
example, whether a worker suffers a greater drop in earnings 5 quar
ters after displacement or 10 quarters after displacement, but we
would not be able to determine the absolute magnitude of either of
these quantities since we would lack data on a period where we could
assume there had been no effects due to displacement.
As we noted above, we have chosen to let m be 20 quarters or 5
years. This presents us with no problems of identification. Even for
our first cohort of displaced workers, those who separated from their
firms in the first quarter of 1980, we have 6 years of predisplacement
data. We have also estimated versions of (4.7) with m set equal to val
ues of up to 10 years. In no case did we see evidence of an effect of
displacement prior to three or four years before the actual separation.
Thus we feel confident in imposing the assumption that there are no
displacement effects prior to 5 years before separation."
4.3 Potential Biases
This monograph assesses the impact on earnings of a particular
class of events that are beyond workers' control—those that affect
their entire firm and cause them to lose their jobs. Accordingly, we
have identified the losses due to displacement with events that happen
to a worker's firm rather than directly to the worker. The fundamental
source of bias in the estimation of displacement effects is thus confu
sion of the effects of worker-specific events with firmwide events that
lead to displacement. For example, biased estimates may arise when
worker-specific events or characteristics cause some workers both to
be more likely to be (or appear to be) displaced and to have lower
earnings independently of whether they are displaced.
One simple, but important, special case where characteristics of
individuals might be associated with both displacement and direct
effects on earnings arises when the characteristics in question are per
manent but unobserved attributes of the workers. Such attributes,
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which might include years of schooling, innate intelligence, strength,
motivation, and a host of other factors, partially determine an individ
ual's level of regular earnings and quite possibly also influence the
probability that the individual will be displaced. Indeed, if we were to
simply compare the mean earnings of a group of displaced workers a
certain period of time after their separations with those of workers
who were not displaced, the difference in earnings would confound
the effects of displacement with the differences in unobserved regular
earnings levels, thereby yielding overestimates of the effects of dis
placement. 12
It is important to note that the estimators employed below would
not be biased in the situation just described. Indeed, one of the princi
pal goals of our modeling and estimation strategy is eliminating this
source of bias. In particular, the possibility of heterogeneity in perma
nent worker characteristics is allowed for by the inclusion of the fixed
effects (the a/'s). According to model (4.7), the simple difference
between the mean earnings of displaced workers k periods after dis
placement and the mean earnings of a randomly selected group of
nondisplaced workers would have expectation equal to 8^ + D - ND
where D and ND are the means of the a/'s for the displaced and nondisplaced workers respectively.13 If workers with low a/'s are more
likely to be displaced, D < ND. Thus the difference in mean earnings
would be greater in absolute value than the true displacement effect,
&V Intuitively, our estimates based on model (4.7) eliminate this bias
by relying only on temporal variation in earnings. That variation does
not depend on the level of the fixed effect. 14 As is clear from equation
(4.11), in which the fixed effects do not appear, the distribution of the
a/'s is completely irrelevant to the properties of our estimator.
Other forms of correlation of individual characteristics with dis
placement can lead to biases in the estimators that we employ. For
instance, when there is diversity not only in individual workers' level
of regular earnings but also in their trend rates of earnings growth,
and when those individual growth rates are related to the probability
of displacement, our estimates of 8^ will be biased. Such a case may
arise when workers with lower than average rates of earnings growth
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are more likely to be displaced than those with higher rates of growth.
In this case our estimation technique will overstate the effects of dis
placement.
This issue can be analyzed in the context of the following exten
sion of model (4.7):

(4.14) y = a +
Model (4.14) differs from (4.7) in its inclusion of a set of workerspecific time trends, co,-/. As we noted above, estimating (4.7) is equiv
alent to estimating (4.11). Thus, if (4.14) is the correct model, our
estimates will be based on
(4.15)

where the quantity w; (*-/) + (£,-,-£,-) can be thought of as a com
posite error term for the model. If displaced workers tend to have
lower values of co/, then this error term would be negatively corre
lated with the variables /)*, - Di , which would impart a negative bias
to the estimates of the 6^'s. 15
It is possible to eliminate the potential bias just discussed by com
puting least squares estimates of model (4.14). Computationally, this
would amount to estimating a regression model similar to (4.11) in
which all the variables were measured as deviations from a workerspecific time trend rather than simply from a worker-specific mean. 16
In other work, we have computed such estimates and found them to
differ little from those based on the simpler fixed effects specifica
tion. 17 Our estimates of the effects of displacement on earnings sev
eral years prior to separation show why this should be the case. As we
noted above, these estimates tend to be approximately zero four or
more years prior to separation. However, it is clear from (4.15) that
any bias imparted by heterogeneity in the co/'s will affect all of the
&Ys, including those measuring the effects of displacement several
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years prior to separation. The fact that we do not see displacement
effects more than three years prior to separation shows that heteroge
neity in worker-specific trends is not an important source of bias in
the results we present below.
The previous paragraph points up another advantage of the long
time series provided by the Pennsylvania data. Because we have data
on workers' earnings long before their separations, we can estimate
the effects of displacement on their earnings well before separation
occurs. These estimates can be used as a form of specification test. If
a proposed model were misspecified, it is likely that this misspecification would cause all of the estimated displacement effects, including
those more than three years prior to separation, to be nonzero and
thus lead us to reject the specification. This point is expanded upon
below in the discussion of the empirical results.
Another form of misspecification that may lead to biased estimates
arises when firms select for displacement employees whose perfor
mance was unusually poor in the periods immediately prior to separa
tion. In this case workers may be selected for displacement partly on
the basis of the realized value of the error term in our model of earn
ings. To analyze this issue it is convenient to assume that in addition
to the error term, £/,, with the ideal properties assumed in (4.7), there
is another error term, vit, that may be correlated with displacement:
(4.16)

y = a.+YH-*.|3 +

To be concrete, suppose that a given worker can only be displaced
at one particular date, say s, and that the probability of being dis
placed at date s depends only on the value of v^. In this case, the
nature of any biases that would be imparted to the estimates depends
critically on the time series properties of the v,>
At one extreme, vlt might be independent over time. In this case
the only coefficient in (4.7) subject to any bias is 80. To see this, note
that, according to (4.16),
(4.17)

E\yu I /displaced at s]= a. + Y, + JC/,P+ £ D^ + E [vlV I /
k^-m
displaced at 5].
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If we let r\ts = E[vit I i displaced at s], then the assumptions that dis
placement is influenced only by v^ and that the v/, are independent
together imply that r\ts = 0 if t * s and that
(4.18) E [yji' displaced at *]= a. + 7, + *^ + £ Dff
Thus our estimator of the effect of displacement in the quarter in
which it occurs tends toward SQ + r\ss, rather than the true effect, SQ.
The other estimates will, however, be unaffected.
Unfortunately, when the v,-, are correlated over time, bias in the
estimators of the displacement effects is unlikely to be contained to
80. In general, just about any pattern of bias might arise. However, in
the case where the vit are a covariance stationary time series, some
useful conclusions can be drawn. If the v,-, are stationary, r\ts will
depend only on the absolute value of the difference between t and s.
That is, we can write r\ts = r\s.t where r\k = r\.k. Thus when the vit are
a covariance stationary time series,

(4.19)

y = <«.+?+*.()+

where r\k = TJ.* and the e/, are standard uncorrelated error terms. Thus,
if firms displace workers when a stationary time series dips below a
particular level at a certain date, a whole new set of "displacement
effects" is introduced into the model of earnings determination. These
effects are not associated with the true effect of displacement, but
instead reflect the correlation between displacement and other unmea
sured factors that affect earnings. When selection occurs on the basis
of a stationary error term, there will be a form of statistical "bounceback" or "regression to the mean" that will occur after the separation
independent of any true effects of displacement. These spurious dis
placement effects are, in general, nonzero for all k, but are con
strained to be symmetric in the time relative to displacement.18
Most of the parameters in (4.19) are not identified. In particular,
for v < m we can only estimate 8V - 8_v. For v > m we can identify 8V
because we can estimate r\.v from a version of our estimation proce-
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dure that includes dummies for each possible date relative to displace
ment (including those more than m periods before displacement).
Given our assumption that 5* = 0 for k < -m, the coefficient on D^v is
an unbiased estimate of r\.v = 1V On the other hand, the coefficient
on Dvit would be an unbiased estimate of 8V + iv Thus, subtracting
one coefficient from the other would identify 5y.19
We may recast the above discussion as an argument against the
importance of the kind of bias induced by selection on a stationary
error process for our estimates of the long-term effect of displace
ment. When we estimate our model allowing for displacement effects
many periods prior to separation, we find no effects during the period
more than three years before separation. Because the true and spuri
ous effects of displacement are of the same sign, it follows that they
must both be approximately zero. Moreover, when the error term is
stationary, the spurious effects are symmetric about the date of dis
placement. Therefore, it follows that the bias we are discussing (the
spurious effect of displacement) is also approximately zero more than
three years after separation. Thus the biases resulting from displace
ment being related to low realizations of a stationary error term are
unlikely to be important to our estimates of the long-run effects of dis
placement.
A more serious problem for estimating the earnings losses associ
ated with displacement arises when the error in (4.7) is nonstationary.
In this case, when firms discharge recent poor performers there is no
reason to expect the earnings of those workers to recover. Had the dis
charged employees remained with their firms, their productivity or
performance would have continued to be low. Therefore, it is unclear
whether the estimated earnings losses result from the separation or
from the fact that the employee had become a poor worker. We know
of no way to modify our statistical model to resolve this question.
Because we observe what is happening to the employment levels of
the firm from which a worker is exiting, however, we can greatly
diminish this source of bias. If a worker is leaving a firm at a time
when many other workers are also separating, it is much more likely
that the reasons for separation had to do with the impact of structural
change on the firm and not the worker's unusually poor recent perfor-
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mance. Thus, in chapter 6 we focus on workers who were part of a
mass layoff or plant closing. The earnings histories of that group of
workers indicate that the foregoing concerns over selection bias are
important.
4.4 Extensions of the Basic Model

The basic model described in section 4.2 meets one of the goals we
set for our statistical specification—it displays the time pattern of
losses due to displacement in a very flexible manner. However, as we
have so far described it, it does not meet our other goal—that of sum
marizing how the losses associated with displacement vary across
workers. In this section we describe how we have extended the basic
model to achieve this second goal.
We want to be able to understand how the effects of displacement
vary across groups of workers defined by such characteristics as sex,
age, and industry of former employer. If the number of such catego
ries is small, the most straightforward way to accomplish this is to
include an entirely different set of 5^'s for each classification of
worker:
(4.20)

y,., = a. + y,

In (4.20), the various groups of workers are indexed by j and
EJif = 1 if and only if worker i is in group ;. The effect of displace
ment on a worker in the ;"th category k periods after separation is
given by 8^.
Estimating specification (4.20) is a feasible way to examine the dif
ferences in the effects of displacement between, say, men and women.
In this case, the number of displacement parameters is only doubled.
However, we also want to examine the relative size of the losses
across relatively narrowly defined industry groupings and we also
want to explore interactions in the sizes of losses between various fac
tors. Thus the number of categories of workers we want to examine
can become quite large, and basing our analysis on (4.20) would pose
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a computational problem and would require a good deal of effort sim
ply to look at all the coefficients.20
In addition to employing (4.20) where it is feasible, we allow for
variation in the effects of displacement across large numbers of cate
gories of workers in a more parsimonious fashion. Specifically, we
note that there are basically three important characteristics of the time
pattern of displacement effects that differ across workers: (1) the rate
at which earnings dip below their expected levels in the period before
separation, (2) the size of the drop that occurs immediately after sepa
ration, and (3) the rate at which earnings recover. By allowing differ
ent categories of workers to differ on one parameter for each of these
three characteristics of the time pattern, we obtain the relatively parsi
monious specification (4.21):
(4.21)

yit = ex. + y, H- *,.,p + £ D* 8t

In (4.21), Flit andF?r are time trends allowing for, respectively, dif
ferent rates of decline before separation and different rates of recov
ery after separation. F2it is a dummy variable allowing for different
magnitudes of the drop occurring immediately after separation. More
specifically,
F\t = t- (s - 13), if worker is displaced at time s and s - 12 < t < s
and fjr= 0 otherwise.
F2it = 1, if worker is displaced at time s and t > s + I
and F?=
t 0 otherwise.
F?t = t - (s + 6), if worker is displaced at time s and t > s+1
and F?, = 0 otherwise.
In terms of the parameterization of (4.21), the effect of displace
ment on a worker in the/th category, k quarters after separation is

Econometric Issues in the Estimation of Earnings Losses 79

/fc - 6), if k > 7.
Figure 4.2 depicts how the difference between the displacement
effects of two different groups of workers is allowed to vary in (4.21).
Specifically, up until 12 quarters prior to separation, the effects on
earnings of the two groups is forced to be zero. From then until the
actual separation, the two sets of estimates are allowed to diverge by
an amount increasing linearly with time. At the date of actual separa
tion, the two groups are allowed to drop by arbitrary amounts whose
difference is assumed to be constant until six quarters after displace
ment. The effects on the two groups are then allowed to further
diverge, again at a linear rate.
Figure 4.2 Difference Between Two Sets of Displacement Effect
Estimates in Parsimonious Models
Difference in
Estimates

-20

-12
Quarters Since
Separation

Specification (4.21) allows for a flexible but parsimonious form of
variation across workers. It is also easily extended to allow for sepa
rate effects across two or more categories of workers without includ
ing all possible interactions. For instance, suppose that workers are
categorized along a second dimension, indexed by q and represented
with dummy variables, Gj-r We can then allow the displacement
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effect to depend on both categorizations (those indexed by ;' and q) by
employing the following specification:
(4.22)

y;, = a. + y, + jU3+ Y

In (4.22) both categorical variables determine the total effects of
displacement in an additive manner. In chapter 6, we present esti
mates based on a model like (4.22), but with several factors interact
ing with the Flit variables. This allows us to determine, for example,
how the effects of displacement differ between men and women, hold
ing constant differences in industry and other factors.
So far, we have discussed how we can allow the displacement
effects to vary across groups of workers. It is also informative in
some cases to allow the coefficients on the control variables to vary
across workers. For instance, we might want to allow for a different
pattern of time effects for men and women. The means for accom
plishing this goal parallel those for allowing the displacement effects
to vary. If the number of categories is small, for example, we can sim
ply allow for a completely different set of parameters for each cate
gory of workers. If a separate set of displacement effects is also
included, it is then possible to simply estimate model (4.7) separately
for each group. However, it is sometimes informative to allow for
variation in the control coefficients over a large number of different
categories of workers. When this is the case, we simply introduce a
time trend specific to each category of worker, as in the following
specification:
(4.23)

>,-, = a. + Y, + *,.,(» + I47-.,X+ £0*8,

In (4.23), there is a separate time trend, T^X,, for each group of
worker. 7/, might simply be time, or it might be time and time
squared, in which case \j would be a 2-vector of parameters. Specifi-
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cation (4.23) allows the earnings of certain groups of workers to be
declining relative to others even if those workers are not displaced.
The danger in employing specifications such as (4.23) is, as we
argued in section 4.1, that if the categories are defined too narrowly,
we may miss the part of the displacement effect that is absorbed by
all workers in an affected category rather than only by workers who
actually lose their jobs. For instance, if the entire steel industry were
affected by a reduction in import barriers and the effects of this
impact was severely felt even by workers who kept their jobs, and, in
addition, we had included in (4.23) a separate time trend for steel
workers, we might obtain relatively small estimates of the displace
ment effects for this group. The reason would be that all steel workers
were hurt and that the ones who actually lost their jobs were hurt only
a little more. Nevertheless, we do report estimates of specifications
such as (4.23). We do so because the differences between the esti
mates obtained using (4.22) and (4.23) with a large number of catego
ries serve as indirect measures of the sizes of losses due to structural
change that are imposed on workers who do not actually lose their
jobs and because those differences shed some light on the nature of
the earnings losses involved.
The final specification that we discuss goes beyond (4.23) by mea
suring earnings losses of displaced workers relative to the nondisplaced workers in their former firms. In specification (4.24), we
introduce a complete set of interactions between the quarterly time
effects, and indicators for the firms that workers were attached to in
1979 are introduced. If y^ denotes the earnings of worker i in 1979
firm; in quarter r, then
(4.24)

,„-« +Y),+ £ DA + £

If workers who retain their jobs in firms that lay off other workers
also suffer earnings losses, then the fy's for those firms will decline
around the time that layoffs occur and the estimates of the 6^'s will be
closer to zero. The differences between displacement estimates
obtained from (4.24) and (4.7) thus serve to gauge the size of losses
suffered by workers who do not lose their jobs.
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Specification (4.24) can only be estimated for the sample of dis
placed workers whose former firms remained in existence throughout
the sample period. Therefore, estimates of this model necessarily
exclude cases of complete firm closings.21 However, estimation is
straightforward. We simply calculate the mean for each quarter of the
earnings of the workers who remained employed with their 1979
firms and subtract these means from the earnings of the workers who
left the same firms. Displacement effects can then be calculated as in
the second step of our two-step estimation procedure. (See equation
(4.13).)
4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we developed a statistical framework for estimating
the earnings losses of displaced workers. According to that frame
work workers' losses are measured by the difference between their
actual earnings and their predicted earnings based on their own predisplacement earnings histories and the earnings histories of both other
displaced and nondisplaced workers. Our model accounts explicitly
for any fixed characteristics, both observed and unobserved, that
affect earnings. Therefore, differences in the educational attainment,
ethnicity, or innate ability among displaced and nondisplaced workers
cannot account for the substantial earnings losses that we report in
chapters 5 and 6. In addition, our model controls for the effect of time
varying characteristics that are perfectly correlated with age. As a
result, our estimated earnings losses are not caused by differing rates
of earnings growth among workers of different ages.
Perhaps the most practical benefit of our framework is that it can
easily account for how the average temporal pattern of losses varies
with worker characteristics. While other studies have incorporated
some of these features in their statistical frameworks, it has not been
previously possible to implement a framework like ours, because the
available data would not allow it. The reason that our framework can
incorporate these features is because our administrative data enable us
to construct long earnings histories for a large number of workers.
Other longitudinal data sets such as the PSID or the NLS have too
few observations on displacements to make our more comprehensive
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approach viable. Subsequent chapters present evidence of the feasibil
ity of our framework for estimating the costs of worker dislocation.
NOTES
1. Another definition of the loss that might be appropriate in some circulstances is E(yu \ D^
= 1) - EO^). This definition compares displaced worker earnings to their unconditional
expectation. It would presumably be even lower than (4.1) since the alternative to which
displacement at date s is compared does not even rule out the possibility of displacement at
date s.
2. The two quantities (and the measure mentioned in note 1) will be similar if the conditional
probability is small. However, even among experienced, high-tenure workers, displacement was
not a rare event in Pennsylvania in the 1980s. In fact, approximately 35 pecent of the workers in
our sample separate from their firms.
3. As we have noted previously, our data set does not include such standard measures of accu
mulated human capital as years of education. As we explain in the next section, we exploit the
longitudinal nature of the Pennsylvania data to make up for this lack of information on the demo
graphics of the sample. The point here is that we want to allow the expectations in equation (4.5)
to depend on the general characteristics of workers that help determine their earnings.
4. With a substantial amount of additional work, we would be able to condition on the estab
lishment in which the worker was employed.
5. The literature on the costs to workers of structural change is perhaps already overly narrow
in that it focuses only on workers who are actually forced to leave their firms. The use of measures
such as (4.6) to compute the losses of displaced workers compounds this narrowness by focusing
only on the loss associated with the actual separation.
k

I

I

6. When k is negative, D •, = 1 if the worker was displaced | k \ periods after period t.
7. See section 4.3 for a discussion of the consequences of not allowing for a correlation of ai
with D%t .
8. Of course, (4.13) can also be made computationally tractable by taking deviations from
means. Many of the actual computations reported below were made by invoking the ABSORB
statement of PROC GLM in SAS which automates the deviation from means technique.
9. This is not surprising. Most of the information in the data relevant to estimating p and the
Y/s is pretty clearly contained in the data for the nondisplaced workers. It is also worth noting that
(4.7) can be estimated without using any data on nondisplaced workers. In effect, different
cohorts of displaced workers can act as comparison groups for each other. However, doing the
estimation without the nondisplaced workers greatly increases the uncertainty in the estimates of
P and the Y/s and this uncertainty is largely transferred to the 8t's. Adding the data on the nondis
placed workers tightly pins down B and the Y/s and allows the data on the displaced workers to
much more precisely estimate the Ot's.
10. Alternatively,^/)^ = 1 for displaced workers for all t. Similarly, the sum of the
worker-specific dummy variable implicit in (4.7) is also always equal to 1. This equality demon
strates linear dependence among the columns of the design underlying (4.7) and thus lack of iden
tification in the case where we have no data on displaced workers prior to m quarters before their
displacement
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11. Increasing m decreases the precision of our estimates since it effectively reduces the num
ber of worker-quarter observations that go into computing the estimate of normal, predisplacement earnings of displaced workers. This effect is not, however, very pronounced in the range of
m we have used.
12. That is, the effects of displacement would appear more negative than they actually were.
This assumes that workers with low regular earnings are more likely to be displaced. If workers
with high regular earnings were more likely to be displaced, the bias would be in the other direc
tion.
13. We are assuming that the means were all based on data from the same calendar quarter and
that the two groups of workers had the same means for the variables included in x^.
14. Actually, since quarter dummies are also included in the model, pure time series variation
in earnings is also irrelevant to the estimation of the model.
15. That is, the estimates would tend to show the effects of displacement as being bigger in
absolute value than they were in reality.
16. Model (4.14) could also be estimated by computing regressions on various kinds of sec
ond-differenced data just as (4.7) could be estimated by computing regressions on first-differ
enced data.
17. See Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1992).
18. If specific parametric assumptions on the time series of errors, such as that they follow a
low-order moving average or autoregressive process, were adopted, then the dependence of the
T\k on k could be further restricted and, perhaps, be used as the basis for an estimation strategy that
corrects for the effects of selection.
19. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a similar argument in support of the use of a "symmet
ric difference in differences" estimator in the program evaluation context.
20. Admittedly, the computational problems are not terribly severe. This is especially true if
the two-step estimation technique is applied. That is, in the first stage the nondisplaced workers
can be used to estimate (3 and the J,'s. With these subtracted from the earnings data of the dis
placed workers, (4.20) can be estimated separately for each category of worker. The problem of
absorbing the information in all the coefficients remains, however.
21. Actually, we need the slightly stronger criterion that the firm continued to have workers
who were in our sample of nondisplaced workers.

Earnings Losses Associated
With Worker Separations
In the previous chapter, we argued that earnings losses of displaced
workers should be defined as the difference between workers' actual
earnings and the earnings they would have received had the events
that led to their displacements never occurred. According to this defi
nition, the displacement effect is potentially larger than the earnings
change from immediately before their separations. Our framework
allows for the possibility that the events leading to separations cause
earnings to decline even before workers leave their firms. These preseparation losses may result from reductions in overtime hours, real
wage cuts, or temporary layoffs.
In this chapter, we estimate the temporal pattern of these earnings
losses for a sample of prime-age, high-tenure workers who separated
from their firms between 1980 and 1986. As discussed in chapter 3,
we limit our analysis to these workers partly out of a desire to focus
on the losses of high-tenure workers, and partly to mitigate the prob
lems associated with distinguishing among quits, retirements, and lay
offs in administrative data. In addition, our sample includes only
workers who remain attached to Pennsylvania's wage and salary
workforce. As a result, the substantial long-term earnings losses
reported in this chapter do not result from prolonged periods of nonemployment. Indeed, it is reduced hours or reduced real wages on
new jobs that are the primary causes of these losses.
Table 5.1 presents mean 1979 age and earnings for our samples of
separators and nondisplaced workers. As shown in Panel A of the
table, the median age of the separators is 37, and 80 percent are
between the ages of 27 and 47. This mean age and range also charac
terizes the ages of the nondisplaced workers in the sample. As a
result, we describe the sample as being made up largely of prime-age
adults. Further, this characterization of workers' ages holds for sev
eral groups in the sample, namely, male and female workers, workers
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from different geographical regions and industrial sectors, and work
ers separating from firms that may have experienced a mass layoff or
plant closing.
The earnings figures in the bottom panel of table 5.1 indicate that
the median separator earned $22,904 (1987 dollars) in 1979, or about
$2,000 less than the median worker in our sample of nondisplaced
workers. Further, with the exception of the females in the sample, the
other separator groups received approximately the same earnings.
Despite being nearly the same age, the separators earned about 9 per
cent less than nondisplaced workers. That fact indicates that less
skilled workers are more likely to be displaced, and without properly
controlling for this skills disparity, we might overstate the losses asso
ciated with displacement. The statistical framework developed in
chapter 4 addresses this disparity by incorporating individual "fixed
effects" into the model.
Below we present our estimates of the earnings losses connected
with the events that lead to job separations. Following equation (4.7),
we report the estimated parameters associated with separation status
of workers for each quarter beginning with the 20th quarter prior to
their separations and ending with the 27th quarter after their separa
tions. The precision with which we can estimate these parameters var
ies with the time relative to separation. 1 On the one hand, because
every worker in the sample has earnings histories that begin more
than five years before the first workers separate from their firms, data
on all separators' earnings directly contribute to estimating the 20 preseparation parameters. During this period, the standard errors associ
ated with our estimates average $30 per quarter. On the other hand,
we only observe earnings six years after separations if workers left
their former firms during 1980. Thus, it is this group of workers who
largely determine the long-term effects of separation. Because these
long-term estimates are based on a smaller sample of separators, they
are less precise than the preseparation and short-term postseparation
estimates. Accordingly, by the 20th quarter after separations, the stan
dard errors associated with our estimates have risen to $60 per quarter.

Table 5,1

Sample Characteristics

Workers
Panel A: 1979 Age
Separators
All
Males
Females
Nonmanufacturing
Manufacturing
Western Pennsylvania
Eastern Pennsylvania
Nonmass layoffs
Mass layoffs
Stayers

Observations

9,507
7,092
2,415
2,870
6,637
3,804
5,703
3,072
6,435
13,704

Panel B: 1979 Earnings (1987 dollars)
Separators
All
9,507
Males
7,092
Females
2,415
Nonmanufacturing
2,870
Manufacturing
6,637

Mean

Standard
deviation

Median

10th
percentile

90th
percentile

37.0
36.9
37.3
36.9
37.1
36.8
37.1
36.9
37.1
37.7

7.4
7.2
7.8
7.3
7.4
7.4
7.3
7.3
7.4
7.0

37
37
38
37
37
37
37
37
37
38

27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
28

47
47
48
47
47
47
47
47
47
47

$22,904
25,942
14,275
22,363
23,096

$11,525
16,326
7,595
10,029
12,070

$36,798
38,557
22,928
39,358
35,963

$24,196
27,363
14,897
24,648
24,001

$12,287
12,161
6,641
15,547
10,566

Table 5.1

Sample Characteristics

Workers
Western Pennsylvania
Eastern Pennsylvania
Nonmass layoffs
Mass layoffs
Stayers

Observations
3,804
5,703
3,072
6,435
13,704

Mean

Standard
deviation

$25,147
23,561
23,640
24,461
26,322

$12,449
12,138
14,415
11,120
12,980

Median

10th
percentile

90th
percentile

$24,292
22,176
21,665
23,593
24,867

$12,359
11,005
10,585
12,037
13,644

$37,561
36,140
36,726
36,805
38,880

Earnings Losses Associated With Worker Separations 89

5.1 Earnings Losses For Workers Who Separate
From Their Firms

This study indicates that earnings of high-tenure workers decline
substantially when they separate from their firms. As shown by figure
5.1, approximately three years prior to their separations, quarterly
earnings of such workers begin to diverge from their expected levels.
That divergence accelerates as separations approach. In the quarter
immediately prior to separation, earnings depart from their predicted
levels by approximately $750. When workers leave their firms, their
quarterly earnings fall sharply, and one year after their separation,
earnings remain $1,500 below their expected levels. More signifi
cantly, five years after separation, their earnings remain $1,000 per
quarter below their expected levels, an amount equal to 20 percent of
their preseparation earnings.
Figure 5.1 Earnings Losses of High-Attachment Separators
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Figure 5.1 also reveals that after workers separate from their firms,
their earnings recover at a modest rate. Between one and six years fol
lowing their separations, earnings of these workers increase by
approximately $30 per quarter relative to their expected levels.
Should that rate of growth continue, their earnings would equal their
expected earnings approximately 14 years after separation. At a dis-
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count rate of 4 percent, that rate of convergence suggests that job sep
arations cost the typical high-tenure worker approximately $50,000.
The substantial earnings losses observed in figure 5.1 are largely
due to reduced earnings in new jobs rather than simply increased time
spent unemployed. As shown by figure 5.2, the quarterly employment
rates of these workers only depart substantially from their expected
levels during the first year following separation. After this period,
quarterly employment rates of separators are only 3 or 4 percent less
than their predicted levels. This finding is not surprising as our sam
ple excludes workers with extremely long spells without wage and sal
ary earnings. Indeed, one reason we study these particular workers is
that any ensuing earnings losses are largely the result of real wage
cuts or hour reductions on a new job and not of long unemployment
spells.
Figure 5.2 Employment Probability Losses of High-Attachment
Separators

Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval Shown

Our confidence in the findings presented in figure 5.1 is strength
ened by the pattern of preseparation earnings losses. One informal
test of our specification (4.7) is that earnings should equal their
expected earnings several years prior to separation. As seen in figure
5.1, the separation effect is not meaningful until three to four years
before workers leave their jobs. Prior to that time, actual and
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expected earnings nearly coincide. To further explore this point, we
examine the differences between actual and expected preseparation
earnings for workers who left their firms after 1983. This group's pre
separation earnings data cover a 10-year period. Our analysis indi
cates that their earnings equaled their expected earnings for over
seven years before diverging during the three years prior to separa
tion.2 These findings suggest that our econometric framework is not
overly restrictive, and that any systematic differences between trend
rate of earnings growth for separators and stayers are likely to be
small.
In this study, we consistently find that workers experience substan
tial earnings losses prior to actually leaving the firm.3 As noted above,
in the quarter prior to separation, earnings are already $750 below
their expected levels. That figure is slightly less than the estimated
earnings loss six years after separation. One interpretation of this find
ing is that displaced workers suffer only modest long-term losses.
Because their losses prior to leaving their jobs are not much smaller
than their losses after six years, their earnings have, in effect, nearly
returned not only to preseparation levels, but to the levels they would
have expected to receive after six years just prior to leaving their
former jobs.
This interpretation underscores the importance of the distinctions
made in chapter 4 between different definitions of displaced worker
earnings losses. Those definitions depend on when during workers'
earnings histories we calculated their expected earnings. The evi
dence of increased earnings losses during the preseparation period
suggests that workers have reason to expect lower future earnings
even prior to their job losses.
In chapter 3 we discussed why our results might show that earn
ings of displaced workers decline prior to their job losses. One possi
bility was that, because in some cases we may date separations after
they actually occur, what we identify as preseparation losses might
really result from postseparation earnings declines. However, we do
not believe this explanation to be very compelling. First, we probably
do not miss the actual date by more than a few quarters, and the
decline in earnings begins at least three years before separation. Sec
ond, in our analysis below we find that preseparation earnings losses
depend on sex and industry of workers, and on the economic well-
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being of their former firms. Women and nonmanufacturing workers,
as well as workers separating from stable or growing firms, experi
ence substantially smaller predisplacement losses than other groups.
While dating separations may remain a problem, we do not see why it
should be a more difficult problem for men and manufacturing work
ers, or for workers separating from firms that have experienced mass
layoffs.
Rather, we believe that the preseparation earnings losses we
observe are a real phenomenon resulting from decisions of firms to
cut real wages, reduce overtime hours, or temporarily lay off workers
before they permanently lay them off. Unfortunately, because admin
istrative data do not report wages or hours, we cannot determine the
importance of wage cuts or lost overtime. However, we can use our
data to explore the importance of the increased incidence of tempo
rary layoffs. It is already apparent from figure 5.2 that because
employment rates of displaced workers remain high prior to worker
separation, layoffs lasting an entire quarter cannot account for much
of the predisplacement earnings losses. By examining data on receipt
of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits we can examine whether rel
atively short layoffs explain much of the magnitude of these losses.
Temporary layoffs are not uncommon among our samples of dis
placed and nondisplaced workers. Even during the late 1970s, when
workers in both of these samples remained employed with the same
firm, they would occasionally experience spells of insured unemploy
ment. For example, during 1977 through 1979, UI receipts of nondis
placed workers averaged $27 per quarter. However, when displaced
workers approached their separation dates, their UI receipts rose
above these normal levels. As shown by figure 5.3, we find that UI
receipts rise one year prior to job separation and peak one quarter
after separation. Not surprisingly, as shown by figure 5.4, that same
pattern holds for the number of weeks during the quarter that dis
placed workers received UI benefits. The two figures indicate that one
quarter prior to the quarters of separation, unemployment benefits and
weeks of receipts for subsequently displaced workers were $150 and
0.75 weeks, respectively, above their expected levels.
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Figure 5.3 Excess Unemployment Insurance and Trade Adjustment
Assistance Benefits of High-Attachment Separators
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Figure 5.4 Excess Weeks of Unemployment Insurance and Trade
Adjustment Assistance Claims of High-Attachment
Separators
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We may use the findings in figure 5.3 and figure 5.4 to estimate
what the earnings of separators would have been had they not been
laid off. If we assume that the UI replacement rate for these high-ten-
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ure workers is 40 percent, the benefits they receive should constitute
approximately 40 percent of their regular earnings. In light of this
assumption, we estimate that earnings losses would have been $375
less in the quarter prior to their separations had there been no tempo
rary layoffs. These calculations suggest that temporary layoffs may
account for approximately one-half of preseparation quarterly earn
ings losses.4
The data on receipt of UI benefits also helps us to isolate a group
of separators whom we are sure left their jobs because they were laid
off. Because of the long and continuous earnings histories of separa
tors, anyone who was laid off was certainly eligible to receive UI ben
efits. Thus, it is not surprising that whether a worker received UI
benefits after separation is an important predictor of the temporal pat
tern of his or her earnings losses. As shown by figure 5.5, the entire
pattern of losses differs between those who collected and those who
did not collect UI benefits. During the preseparation period, only
those who subsequently collected UI benefits experienced large earn
ings losses. During the postseparation period, those who collected UI
benefits experienced long-term losses amounting to more than $1,500
per quarter. Those separators who did not collect experienced much
smaller losses, but their quarterly earnings remained approximately
$600 below their expected levels throughout most of the postsepara
tion period. These smaller losses for the non-UI collectors are consis
tent with this group being an amalgam of workers who left their
former jobs because they quit, were discharged for cause, were laid
off and immediately found a new job, or were laid off and simply did
not collect.
As Blank and Card (1990) observe, not everyone who appears to
be eligible to receive UI benefits files a claim to receive these bene
fits. Anderson and Meyer (1992) have found as we have, in similar
administrative data that even following mass layoffs, less than 50 per
cent of experienced workers ever collect benefits. One reason may be
that some workers find new jobs soon after their separations. In sup
port of that argument, we could find only a few instances in which
separators who did not collect any UI benefits had a quarter with zero
earnings following their separations. Therefore, one problem with
studying the losses of displaced persons who received UI benefits is
that we are focusing on the group that is having the most difficult
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time adjusting to job loss. As a result, their earnings losses likely over
state the average costs of worker displacement. Nonetheless, the gap
between the earnings losses of UI collectors and noncollectors indi
cates that the estimates presented earlier in figure 5.1 result from the
adverse experiences of displaced workers.
Figure 5.5 Earnings Losses for Unemployment Insurance Benefit
Collectors and Noncollectors
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5.2 Earnings Losses and the Comparison Group

As discussed in chapter 4, earnings loss estimates may depend on
who is chosen to be in the comparison group. The comparison
group's composition is important because earnings growth may differ
across firms or sectors. In the foregoing analysis, the comparison
group consisted of workers hired before 1974 who remained with
their firms through 1986. Their earnings growth identified the impact
of age and macroeconomic factors on earnings. By constructing our
comparison group the way we did, we implicitly compared separators
to the typical nonseparator. In other words, the earnings loss estimates
express how workers' earnings performed relative to their own past
earnings histories and relative to workers who remained at the aver
age firm (when weighted by size).
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Alternatively, it is of interest to know how earnings of separators
performed relative to nonseparators from their own former firms. For
example, the estimated earnings losses based on this estimator should
be smaller if the earnings of those who stay in firms that discharge
large fractions of their workforces are depressed compared with the
earnings of those who stay in firms that discharge few employees.
The difference between these two sets of estimates is indicative of the
losses suffered by nonseparators when fellow employees leave their
firms.
In chapter 4, we showed that using a comparison group made up of
nondisplaced workers from separators' former firms amounts to add
ing to our model (4.7) interactions between the model's time effects
and an indicator of workers' firms. These interactions imply that the
time effects are identified not merely by the impact of macroeconomic conditions on statewide earnings, but by the impact of these
conditions on average earnings of individual firms. One drawback of
this procedure is that we must estimate losses for a different sample
of separators, because firms that close have no corresponding compar
ison group. Therefore, the earnings loss estimates based on the alter
native comparison group are only for separators who leave firms that
remain open throughout the sample period.
For this group of separators, figure 5.6 displays loss estimates
using model (4.7), which is equivalent to using the typical stayer as a
comparison group and using model (4.24), which is equivalent to
using a separate comparison group made up of the stayers in the work
er's own firm for each separator. As the figure shows, changing the
comparison group to include only stayers in the separator's former
firm reduces the estimated earnings losses by about 25 percent. Five
years after their separations, quarterly earnings of workers are $900
below their expected levels after controlling for the time pattern of
earnings growth in their former firms. In contrast, the loss estimates
for the corresponding group without such firm controls are $1,200.
Nonetheless, no matter which comparison group is preferred, the esti
mated earnings losses associated with separations remain substantial.
It is also worth noting that the difference between the two loss esti
mates shown in figure 5.6 can be taken as an estimate of the losses
suffered by workers who keep their jobs in firms in which others sepa
rate, relative to the typical worker who remains with a single firm
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throughout the period. As the figure indicates, even the nondisplaced
workers in separators' former firms experience some modest earnings
declines.
Figure 5.6 Earnings Losses of High-Attachment Separators from
Surviving Firms Relative to All Stayers and Relative to
Stayers in Their Former Firms
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Another important point illustrated by the estimates shown in fig
ure 5.6 for the comparison with stayers in separators' former firms is
that the factors that cause earnings to decline prior to separation do
not equally affect all employees in the firm. That is, because the preseparation earnings loss estimates do not depend significantly on
which comparison group we use, they must result from earnings of
separators falling substantially relative to similar workers from the
same firms. As shown by figure 5.6, three years prior to separation,
earnings nearly coincided with expected earnings based on the experi
ences of other workers in their firms. However, during the year prior
to separation, their earnings diverge significantly from expected lev
els. This implies that the earnings of nondisplaced workers in the firm
are not as adversely affected by the events that eventually lead to sep
arations of others as are the earnings of those who actually separate.
This finding suggests that when firms reduce their workforces, it prob
ably becomes apparent well before workers permanently leave who
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these separators are likely to be. Our findings on the preseparation
receipt of UI benefits suggest that workers on temporary layoff are
those most likely to be permanently laid off at a later date.
5.3 Earnings Losses by Gender, Industrial Sector,
Age, and Region
The same pattern of earnings losses that held for the full sample of
workers also holds within different demographic groups and for work
ers separating from firms in different industrial sectors and regions of
the state. Specifically, earnings losses arise prior to separations and
remain substantial following separations. However, the relative mag
nitudes of these effects do differ somewhat across groups.
For example, as shown by figure 5.7, both women and men experi
ence substantial earnings losses when they separate from their firms.
Six years following separations, quarterly earnings of both men and
women are $1,000 and $1,500, respectively, below their expected lev
els. Because men's preseparation earnings averaged $6,400 per quar
ter, and women's preseparation earnings averaged $3,700 per quarter,
in percentage terms men's losses are actually slightly smaller than
women's losses.
There are, however, two noteworthy differences between the pat
terns of earnings losses of women and men. First, the preseparation
earnings declines for women are smaller than for men. Women's pre
separation earnings only begin to depart significantly from their
expected levels two years before leaving their firms. By comparison,
men's earnings begin $200 below their expected levels, decline more
than three years prior to leaving their jobs, and fall at a faster rate.
Second, women's postseparation earnings decline by much less than
men's but also recover at a much slower rate. In fact, there is little evi
dence that women's earnings are recovering at all beyond two years
following their separations. By contrast, after the second year follow
ing separation, men's earnings approach their expected levels at a rate
of approximately $40 per quarter. At that rate of recovery, men's earn
ings would return to their expected levels 14 years after separation.
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Figure 5.7 Earnings Losses of Male and Female High-Attachment
Separators
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The differences between earnings loss patterns of women and men
partly reflect the industries in which they work. As shown in figure
5.8. workers separating from both the nonmanufacturing and manufac
turing sectors experience substantial earnings losses. But, the losses
in the nonmanufacturing sector, where women are more likely to
work, are substantially smaller prior to separation and diverge signifi
cantly from their expected levels only in the last year before separa
tion. After leaving their firms, the earnings of nonmanufacturing
workers fall less sharply and recover more slowly relative to their
expected levels than do the earnings of manufacturing workers.
Workers' ages at the time of separation also appear to be a modest
determinant of their earnings losses. But more significantly, we find
that high-tenure workers of all ages incur substantial long-term earn
ings losses when they separate from their firms. As shown by figure
5.9. five years after separation, even the quarterly earnings of the
youngest group of workers who were less than 30 years old in 1979
remain $800 below their expected levels. The earnings of these work
ers recover at a modest rate after their separations. Beginning with the
second year following separation, their earnings approach the
expected levels at a rate of $54 per quarter. At that rate of recovery,

100 Earnings Losses Associated With Worker Separations

the earnings of these younger workers would return to their expected
levels within nine years after their separations.
Figure 5.8 Earnings Losses of Manufacturing and Nonmanufacturing
High-Attachment Separators
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Older workers experience somewhat larger losses. More important,
however, we find little evidence that their earnings will ever return to
their expected levels. The quarterly earnings of workers who were
between 40 and 50 years old in 1979 remain nearly $1,500 below
their expected levels. That loss is approximately the same in the fifth
year as it was in the second year following separation. Taken together,
these results for older and younger workers do not necessarily indi
cate that older workers fare worse following displacements than their
younger counterparts. Although, both of these groups include only
high-tenure workers, the older workers probably had more years of
service when they separated from their firms than did the younger
workers. Therefore, the earnings losses we observe for different birth
cohorts are due to the combined effects of tenure and age on earnings
losses.
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Figure 5.9 Earnings Losses of 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s Birth Cohort
High-Attachment Separators
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Finally, the condition of labor markets appears to be a determinant
of earnings losses. Although workers in both the state's eastern and
western halves experienced substantial losses when they separated
from their firms, the losses were larger among workers separating
from firms in the state's western section. As shown by figure 5.10, the
long-term quarterly earnings losses amount to approximately $1,500
in the state's western half, where unemployment rates were high dur
ing the early and mid-1980s. In contrast, those losses were only $800
in the state's eastern half, where by the mid-1980s unemployment
rates in some places had fallen below 6 percent. The patterns of rela
tively small preseparation earnings declines and slower-than-average
postseparation earnings recoveries in the state's eastern half are con
sistent with its smaller share of manufacturing employment. How
ever, we have found that even among workers displaced from
Pennsylvania's manufacturing firms, those from the state's western
section incurred larger losses than those from manufacturing firms in
the eastern section of the state.
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Figure 5.10 Earnings Losses of Eastern and Western Pennsylvania HighAttachment Separators
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5.4 Conclusions

This chapter documents that when high-tenure prime-age workers
separate from their firms they incur substantial long-term earnings
losses. We find that their annual earnings are approximately $4,000,
or roughly 17 percent, below their expected levels even five to six
years after leaving their former firms. In addition, we find that these
earnings losses first appear even before workers leave their firms.
This pattern of losses appears to hold for workers from different
demographic groups, sectors, and regions. Finally, these findings are
only modestly affected by whether we use a comparison group made
up of all nondisplaced workers in the state or only of nondisplaced
workers from the separators' former firms. To be sure, the loss esti
mates are approximately 25 percent smaller when we use nondis
placed workers from their former firms as the comparison group. That
difference suggests that the events leading to separations also
adversely affect those who remain behind. Both sets indicate that
large losses persist, however.
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We find the foregoing pattern of losses even though our sample of
separators may include workers who quit or were discharged for
cause from their former jobs. Because we have a representative sam
ple of prime-age, high-tenure workers during that period, it is clear
that for these workers separations lead, on average, to lower earnings.
What is not so clear is whether this pattern of losses characterizes the
pattern for workers who separate involuntarily from their firms for
economic reasons. We believe our sample's composition with its high
fraction of older, high-tenure workers implies that most separators
are, in fact, leaving their firms because of economic restructuring.
However, because the study has not specifically singled out such
workers, it remains possible that our findings are an amalgamation for
three distinct groups. Persons discharged for cause may also experi
ence earnings losses. But for that group the losses do not reflect
events adversely affecting the firm. Instead, they reflect poor
employee performance.5 Finally, employees who quit would not nec
essarily experience earnings losses. Those who quit presumably are
moving into better and more highly paid jobs. In the next chapter we
show how our findings hold up when we distinguish more precisely
among these groups of separators.
NOTES
1. It is useful to include data on workers separating in the latter years in our sample period,
even if our only interest were in the long-term effect of separations. Clearly, the postseparation
experiences of the workers who separate in the early 1980s directly contribute to our understand
ing of long-term losses, but those experiences also determine our estimates of the relative size of
short- and long-term losses. Thus, the information contributed by workers displaced in the mid1980s, which directly helps estimate short-term losses, when combined with information on the
relative severity of short- and long-term losses, helps estimate the long-term losses.
2. Because our earnings histories begin in 1974, only those separating during or after 1984
have preseparation earnings covering a 10-year period.
3. Two recent studies report preseparation wage losses among displaced workers in both the
DWS and in the PSID. Di la Rica (1992) using an estimation strategy similar to that used by
Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989) as described in chapter 2. She reports that displaced workers in the
1986 DWS incurred preparations earnings losses that amounted to 11 percent of their wages.
Ruhm (1991a), using a differencing framework and a comparison group, reports that displaced
workers in the PSID incurred preseparations earnings losses of 6 to 10 percent of their wages.
4. Ruhm (1991a, pp. 171-72) reports a similar result using the PSID. From the second to the
first year prior to their displacements, workers report that their time spent unemployed increases
by approximately 1.5 weeks.
5. This situation is captured by the model developed in chapter 4, when the errors follow a
random walk. In that instance, a decline in employee productivity would be permanent.

Earnings Losses
and Mass Layoffs
The previous chapter examined the earnings losses that arise when
high-tenure workers separate from their firms. That examination did
not distinguish, however, among the circumstances that lead to
employee separations. By restricting our sample to high-tenure work
ers born after 1930, we tried to reduce the interpretive difficulties
associated with the possibility that some separations result from quits
and retirements. In spite of that effort, some separators in the sample
may have left their jobs for those reasons or may have been dis
charged for cause. These distinctions are potentially important as sub
sequent labor market performance of workers may depend on the
circumstances under which they left their former firms. For example,
the postseparation earnings of those who quit their former jobs may
differ from those who were laid off because of demand shifts or tech
nology changes. In the former instance, earnings are likely to rise,
while in the latter instance earnings are likely to decline. These con
siderations suggest that the previous chapter's estimated earnings
losses may provide a misleading picture of the temporal pattern of
earnings losses associated with worker dislocation.
In this chapter, we analyze how the circumstances surrounding
worker separations relate to the pattern of their losses by examining
the relationship between their earnings losses and the economic
health of their firms at the time of separation. We measure the eco
nomic health of firms by the change in their employment. We define
distressed firms as those whose employment declined by more than
30 percent from their late-1970s peak. This category includes firms
that closed as well as those that experienced mass layoffs. Presum
ably, most separators from this mass layoff subsample left involun
tarily and for reasons unrelated to their performance. 1 Alternatively,
our nonmass layoff subsample consists of workers from growing
firms as well as those from firms whose employment fell by less than
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30 percent. This subsample probably includes a larger share of work
ers who quit their jobs or were dismissed for cause.
In the next section, we examine directly the relationship between
earnings losses of workers and the economic health of their firm. In
section 6.2, we examine the relationship between those earnings
losses and our choice of a comparison group. One concern in that sec
tion is whether nondisplaced workers in distressed firms also experi
ence earnings losses. In section 6.3, we examine how the temporal
pattern of earnings losses varies among workers in several broadly
defined industries. In section 6.4, we implement a more parsimonious
version of our model to examine how the pattern of losses varies
among industries defined by their 1- or 2-digit SIC codes. In sections
6.5 and 6.6 we show how earnings losses vary according to gender
and age of workers and their local labor market conditions. Finally, in
section 6.7, we examine how those losses depend on whether dis
placed workers from distressed firms find new jobs that are similar to
their old jobs.
6.1 Relation Between Worker and Firm Fortunes

Our definition of a distressed firm isolates employees associated
with firms that experienced mass layoffs or plant closings during the
early and mid-1980s. Although some employees from that sample
may have quit their jobs for financial or personal reasons or were dis
charged for cause, the vast majority probably involuntarily separated
from their firms for economic reasons. Further, because fewer work
ers discharged during mass layoffs are likely to be marginal employ
ees, this subsample of separators may include workers for whom the
employment relationship was especially valuable.
Figure 6.1 shows how earnings losses vary with the level of
employment change of separators' firms. The estimates are based on
specification (4.20), in which a completely different set of displace
ment effects is estimated for each of four firm classes. In each case,
however, the losses are relative to expected earnings based on the
experiences of all nonseparators. As the figure shows, workers dis
placed as a part of large reductions in their firms' workforces experi
ence substantially larger earnings losses than other employees who
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separate from their firms. As indicated by the two lower lines in the
figure, quarterly earnings of such employees decline by $1,000 rela
tive to their expected earnings prior to their displacements. That
decline is substantially larger than the decline experienced by other
discharged employees.2 After their displacements, the earnings of
employees from distressed firms fall by another $2,000 below their
expected levels. After recovering rapidly during the first postdisplacement year, quarterly earnings remain between $1,000 and $2,000
below their predicted levels. These long-term losses equal approxi
mately 25 percent of predisplacement earnings.
Figure 6.1 Earnings Losses by Difference Between Employment Level
of Firm at Time of Separation and 1974-1979 Maximum
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In contrast to employees who separate from distressed firms, those
separating from stable firms experience substantially smaller earn
ings losses. As shown by the second highest line in figure 6.1, this
group's earnings prior to separation were only $250 below their
expected levels. Following separation, earnings fell $1,500 below
their expected levels. That earnings gap declines with time, but after
six years, it remains at $500 per quarter. This finding of a permanent
loss for workers separating from stable firms suggests that most
workers in this subsample probably did not separate from their firms
because they quit their jobs. If most of these separators had quit their
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jobs, it would be odd that, on average, those quits led to lower earn
ings.
It is possible that many separators in stable firms probably neither
quit nor were laid off for economic reasons, but were discharged for
poor performance. The findings in figure 6.1 suggest that such dis
charges are associated with long-term losses. Indeed, it is not surpris
ing that job losses resulting from common reasons for dismissal such
as productivity declines, excessive absenteeism, or substance abuse
would lead to substantial earnings losses. Moreover, these causes for
discharge would be associated with small preseparation earnings
losses as long as employees' quarterly earnings did not generally
reflect variations in their own quarterly productivity. As that relation
ship is not likely to be particularly strong for this sample of workers,
it is not surprising that the preseparation earnings losses would be
small.3 Of course, because we cannot distinguish with much confi
dence among the reasons for worker separations, these findings are
merely suggestive of the potential losses associated with discharges
for cause.
Further evidence that earnings losses depend on the circumstances
under which employees separate from their firms is seen in the losses
experienced by workers who leave firms experiencing modest employ
ment declines. Firms might prefer to first lay off workers who in the
future would be less costly to replace, and such workers are more
likely to be marginal employees than workers separating from dis
tressed firms. As a result, we expect small earnings losses when firms
lay off only a few workers. Indeed, as shown by figure 6.1, prior to
their separations, earnings losses of those workers are the same as of
employees leaving stable firms. After their separations, their earnings
approach expected levels within one year and recover within five
years. For this group there appears to be no long-term earnings loss
associated with their separations.
6.2 Earnings Losses and the Comparison Group

We observed in section 5.2 that estimates of earnings losses experi
enced by separators were smaller when we compared their earnings to
those of the nonseparators from their former firms. We show below
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that those lower loss estimates result from differences between the
earnings growth of nondisplaced workers in distressed and nondistressed firms. To arrive at this result we analyze the losses of workers
leaving distressed firms separately from those of workers leaving sta
ble or modestly declining firms. Figure 6.2 shows loss estimates
obtained using both comparison groups for workers from distressed
firms. The figure indicates that the long-term earnings losses for work
ers separating from distressed firms decline from approximately
$1,500 per quarter to approximately $1,200 per quarter when we
change from using all stayers to only stayers from workers' former
firms as the comparison group. Alternatively, the difference between
the two earnings loss measures indicates that the earnings of nondis
placed workers in distressed firms declined permanently by approxi
mately $300 per quarter relative to the average nondisplaced worker.
The foregoing findings show that structural change adversely
affects both displaced and nondisplaced workers. The adverse effects
on those who keep their jobs are only one-fifth as large as on those
who lose them. Nevertheless, estimated losses based on the earnings
of former co-workers who remain employed clearly understate the
full loss to displaced workers associated with the events that bring
about their job losses. Such estimates only measure the impact of job
loss per se and do not take into account the simultaneous earnings
declines for the nondisplaced workers in their former firms. Because
we are most interested in the question of the importance to the for
tunes of workers of the events that lead to displacement, in what fol
lows we emphasize estimated losses based on a comparison group of
all nondisplaced workers.
Our interpretation of the difference between the earnings loss mea
sures depicted in figure 6.2 is supported by the similarity between
these measures shown in figure 6.3 for workers separating from grow
ing or modestly declining firms. The earnings loss estimates for these
separators are unaffected by our choice of a comparison group. As
shown by figure 6.3, no matter which comparison group is used, earn
ings losses of these workers are small prior to their separations, large
during the first year after their separations, but recover in the long
term. Not surprisingly, these findings indicate that when only a few
employees separate from their firms, those separations are not associ
ated with losses for workers who remain at the old firm.

110

Figure 6.2 Earnings Losses Relative to Typical Nondisplaced Worker
(Model (4.7)) and Relative to Workers in Displaced Workers'
Former Firms (Model (4.24)): Workers in Distressed but
Surviving Firms
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Figure 6.3 Earnings Losses Relative to Typical Nondisplaced Worker
(Model (4.7)) and Relative to Workers in Displaced Workers'
Former Firms (Model (4.24)): Workers in Growing or
Modestly Declining Firms
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6.3 The Pattern of Earnings Losses by Industry
The findings in the two previous sections showed large earnings
losses for workers separating from distressed firms, but smaller losses
for other separators. One potential explanation for that difference is
that distressed firms tend to be in the manufacturing sector, where
workers earn substantial wage premiums as a result of unionization or
rent sharing. Consequently, the sensitivity of earnings losses to the
economic well-being of the firm might result from differences in
industrial composition and not simply the firm's economic condition.
To explore this possibility, we limited our comparison of the losses
suffered by manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers to workers
separating from distressed firms within those sectors. Figure 6.4 dis
plays loss estimates corresponding to a version of specification (4.20)
in which separate sets of displacement effects are estimated for manu
facturing and nonmanufacturing workers and in which only mass lay
off separators are included. For both groups the losses are relative to
the earnings path that would have been expected based on the experi
ences of all nonseparators. As the figure shows, when analysis is lim
ited to employees displaced from distressed firms, the earnings losses
of nonmanufacturing and manufacturing workers are nearly the same.
Therefore, the smaller earnings losses observed in chapter 5 for nonmanufacturing workers reflected differences between the shares of
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers separating from dis
tressed firms.4
To further explore the foregoing result, we examine the earnings
losses for employees displaced from distressed firms in several broad
sectors: nonmetals durable manufacturing firms, nondurable manufac
turing firms, primary and fabricated metals firms, and firms in the
trades, and the financial and services industries.5 The main finding
from these more disaggregated analyses is that the pattern of earnings
losses is similar across broadly defined sectors of the economy. As
shown by figure 6.5 and figure 6.6, we find similar earnings losses for
workers displaced from distressed nondurable and nonmetals durable
goods firms. Prior to separation, quarterly earnings of those workers
decline modestly below their expected levels. Among the nonmetals
durable goods workers that decline is not apparent until less than two
years prior to displacement After separation, earnings in both sectors
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fall sharply and remain $1,200 below their expected levels for most
years after their discharges.
Figure 6.4 Earnings Losses for Manufacturing and Nonmanufacturing
Workers: Workers Separating During Mass Layoffs
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Figure 6.5 Earnings Losses in Nonmetals Durable Goods Industries:
Workers Separating During Mass Layoffs
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Figure 6.6 Earnings Losses in Nondurable Goods Industries: Workers
Separating During Mass Layoffs
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Workers displaced from distressed firms in the trade, financial, and
services sectors also experience substantial albeit smaller earnings
losses. As shown by figure 6.7, prior to separation, those employees
experience the smallest earnings losses, but after separation their earn
ings remain $1,000 below their expected levels. However, because
these workers earned less than other workers before separation, their
long-term losses are also approximately 25 percent of their predisplacement earnings. Therefore, except for some evidence of recovery
after six years, workers displaced from distressed trades, and the
financial and services firms experience losses similar to those experi
enced by displaced manufacturing workers.
The pattern of losses observed for workers displaced from the met
als industries offers the most striking difference of any industry from
the pattern observed in the previous figures. Displaced metals work
ers experienced earnings losses nearly double those of other displaced
workers. As shown by figure 6.8, such workers experienced severe
losses prior to their displacement,6 even sharper losses immediately
after separation, and four years later earn $2,500 less than their
expected quarterly earnings. These losses represent approximately 35
percent of the predisplacement earnings of metal workers. Our analy
sis below shows that when we further disaggregate this sector, the
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losses for workers displaced from the primary metals industry sub
stantially exceed the levels shown in the figure.
Figure 6.7 Earnings Losses in Trade and Services Industries: Workers
Separating During Mass Layoffs
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Figure 6.8 Earnings Losses in Metals Industries: Workers Separating
During Mass Layoffs
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In order to further disaggregate our earnings loss estimates by
industry, we must place some additional restrictions on the model
(4.20). The difficulty we face in estimating such losses at, say, the 2digit SIC industry level is that the numbers of displaced workers
becomes too small relative to the number of parameters in the model.
For example, if we wanted to estimate the pattern of losses for 20 sep
arate industries, we would estimate 960 displacement effects corre
sponding to the 48 displacement coefficients for each industry. An
even more practical problem associated with this approach is that the
results are difficult to absorb even in a series of figures.
As discussed in chapter 4, we found that a more parsimonious ver
sion of the model given by (4.21) adequately summarizes the pattern
of losses for each industry. According to this specification, rather than
estimating a separate set of 48 displacement coefficients for each
industry, we use three parameters to summarize how the pattern of
losses for workers in a particular industry diverges from the pattern
for the average displaced worker. These three components capture dif
ferences among groups' predisplacement earnings "dip," earnings
"drop" after separation, and postdisplacement earnings "recovery."
The "dip" parameter measures how much faster (or slower) a group's
quarterly earnings declined during the 12 quarters before their job
loss compared with the rate for the average displaced worker. The
"drop" parameter measures a group's average postseparation earnings
decline compared with the decline for the average displaced worker.
Finally, the "recovery" parameter measures how much faster or
slower a group's postdisplacement earnings recover after the sixth
quarter following separation compared with the rate for the average
displaced worker.
To illustrate that the foregoing restrictions on the model do not sub
stantially alter our findings, we compared the pattern of losses for dis
placed manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers given by the
unrestricted model with those given by the more parsimonious specifi
cation. As shown by figure 6.9 and figure 6.10, both models generate
nearly the same estimated earnings losses for both displaced manufac
turing and nonmanufacturing workers.7 Because the restricted model
performs well, we use it to estimate differences in the pattern of
losses for workers displaced from different industries.
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Figure 6.9 Unrestricted Specification of Earnings Losses by Industrial
Sector
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Figure 6.10 Parsimonious Specification of Earnings Losses by Industrial
Sector: Workers in Surviving Firms
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In the more highly disaggregated comparisons of earnings losses
among industries presented below, we hold constant the effect of
other worker characteristics on losses. For example, in the compari-
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sons between earnings losses of displaced primary metals workers
and financial workers, both groups, in effect, have the same distribu
tion of sex, age, industry, regional characteristics, and local labor mar
ket conditions at the date of displacement. Therefore, the differences
in losses between the two groups do not result from differences in the
percentages of men and women in these industries. In the following
two sections of this chapter, we show how the pattern of losses varies
according to gender and age of workers, and labor market conditions
at the time of their separations.
Loss estimates based on our parsimonious specification are shown
in table 6.1.8 Estimates in the column labeled "dip" show how a partic
ular group's rate of quarterly earnings decline in the 13-quarter period
immediately preceding separation differs from the average for all
workers ($83 per quarter). Estimates in the column labeled "drop"
show how a group's earnings losses in the period one to six quarters
after displacement differs from that of the average worker ($2,179).
Estimates in the column labeled "recovery" show how a group's rate
of earnings recovery in the period seven or more quarters after dis
placement differs from that of the average worker ($15 per quarter).
The column labeled "fifth-year loss dif' summarizes the effects of the
drop and recovery coefficients for the size of the total loss in the fifthyear following displacement Specifically, it gives the difference
between a group's fifth-year loss and that of the average worker
($6,611). The last column, labeled "fifth-year loss," simply adds back
the average loss to get the estimate of a group's total earnings losses
during the fifth year after displacement.9
The results shown in table 6.1 indicate that although differences
emerge in the earnings loss patterns for workers from different indus
tries, generally displacement is associated with substantial long-term
earnings losses. As shown by the last column of table 6.1, during the
fifth year after displacement, losses exceed $4,500 for workers dis
placed from all but the financial and services sectors. To underscore
the point that large earnings losses are experienced by workers out
side the trade-sensitive, highly unionized durable goods industries, it
is worth observing that the pattern of earnings losses for workers dis
placed from the wholesale and retail trade sector is more similar than
any other to the pattern observed for the average displaced worker
(summarized in the first row of the table). As shown by the first three

Table 6.1 Earnings Losses by Worker Characteristics: Parsimonious Specification

Group

Number

Overall

6,435

Dip
-83.3
(2.2)

Sex
Male
Female
Decade of birth
1930s

4,972
1,463

2,599

1940s

2,584

1950s

1,252

Industry
Mining & construction

247

Nondurable manufacturing

1,206

Primary metals

1,354

Drop

Recovery

Fifth-year
lossdif.

2,179

Fifth-year
loss

(16)

15.4
(4.4)

—

-6,611
(150)

-3.4
(0.7)
11.6
(2.3)

-103
(7)
350
(25)

4.7
(0.9)
-16.0
(3.2)

-177
(43)
602
(145)

-6,788
(157)
-6,009
(207)

-0.3
(1.4)
3.6
(1.4)
-6.9
(2.4)

55
(16)
-28
(15)
-58
(25)

-10.1
(2.1)
5.6
(2.0)
9.4
(3.2)

-284
(94)
171
(88)
238
(145)

-6,896
(182)
-6,440
(172)
-6,374
(203)

9.5
(5.8)
18.3
(2.6)
-104.5
(2.7)

-387
(59)
338
(28)
-1,476
(30)

-0.1
(7.8)
-7.7
(3.7)
40.5
(4.4)

-1,549
(339)
967
(160)
-3,878
(191)

-8,160
(369)
-5,644
(224)
-10,489
(241)

Nonelectrical machinery

632

Electrical machinery

421

Transportation equipment

419

Other durable manufacturing

441

Transportation, communication, and public
utilities
Wholesale and retail trade

348

Finance.insurance, and real estate

183

Professional, business and entertainment
services
Finn size
50-500

545

203

1,704

501-2,000

1,497

2,001-5,000

1,381

Greater than 5,000

1,853

35.0
(3.5)
49.5
(4.3)
14.1
(4.4)
18.9
(4.2)
5.5
(4.8)
20.0
(3.8)
115.7
(6.7)
93.1
(6.4)

797
(39)
494
(47)
215
(48)
338
(43)
66
(50)
126
(38)
947
(72)
1,270
(64)

-27.4
(5-9)
-2.7
(6.4)
-15.5
6.6)
9.1
(5.7)
-63.6
(7.1)
4.8
(4.9)
24.3
(8.3)
-26.2
(8.7)

1,817
(257)
1,842
(282)
85
(282)
1,807
(242)
-2,916
(301)
745
(211)
5,004
(358)
3,769
(369)

^1,794
(306)
-4,769
(322)
-6,526
(324)
^,804
(282)
-9,527
(333)
-5,866
(251)
-1,608
(387)
-2,843
(394)

-16.1
(2.1)
13.9
(2.2)
27.2
(2.3)
-16.7
(2.3)

-37
(22)
214
(23)
480
(24)
^97
(25)

13.0
(2.9)
-4.7
(3.1)
-23.8
(3.5)
9.6
(3.6)

501
(124)
625
(135)
730
(149)
-1,510
(154)

-6,110
(193)
-5,986
(246)
-5,881
(203)
-8,121
(224)

Group
Local labor market
Employment trend
Employment deviation
Unemployment rate

Number

Dip

Drop

Recovery

Fifth-year
lossdif.

38.8
(7.9)
517.7
(64.4)
11.9
(90.0)

743
(87)
3762
(645)
-5,545
(976)

18.1
11.7)
-40.9
94.1)
13.1
145.9)

2,069
(520)
-540
(408)
-2,153
(643)

Fifth-year
loss

to

o
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columns of table 6.1, losses for these workers depart modestly from
the average pattern only in the predisplacement period, when their
earnings decline at a slower rate than average. Nevertheless, during
the fifth year following their job losses, losses for trades workers
exceeded $5,800.
To be sure, job losses from heavily unionized industries are also
associated with substantial earnings losses. We found the largest longterm losses for workers displaced from mining and construction, from
primary metals, and from transportation, communications, and public
utilities industries. These industries all have among the highest rates
of unionization in the economy. Indeed, the pattern of losses for dis
placed workers in primary metals diverge substantially from the pat
tern depicted in figure 6.1. Prior to displacement, this group's
earnings fall $104 per quarter faster than the average rate, and drop
by $1,476 per quarter more than the average decline following separa
tion. During the recovery period, however, their earnings grow $41
per quarter faster than the average rate of growth. However, despite
that growth, during the fifth year after separation, earnings of these
workers remain more than $10,000 below their expected levels. That
loss exceeds 40 percent of their predisplacement wages.
The long-term losses are nearly as large for those displaced from
the mining and construction and from the transportation, communica
tions, and public utilities sectors. However, earnings loss patterns of
these groups differ substantially from that observed for primary met
als workers. During the predisplacement period, their earnings "dip"
is similar to that of the average displaced worker, falling at rates only
$9.5 and $5.5 per quarter slower than average. In the postseparation
period, losses are much smaller for these groups than for primary met
als workers. For example, the postseparation losses for displaced min
ing workers are $1,089 (-387 minus -1,476) less per quarter than
those for primary metals workers. However, long-term losses remain
large for mining and construction workers and for transportation, com
munications, and public utilities workers because their earnings grow
more slowly during the recovery period than do those of displaced pri
mary metals workers. As a result of this slow rate of growth, their
earnings remain more than $8,000 below their expected levels in the
fifth year following separation.
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At the other extreme, workers displaced from the nonunion finan
cial services sector experience much smaller losses than other groups.
As indicated by table 6.1, earnings of financial services workers fall
by $116 per quarter less than the average decline during the predisplacement period. This estimate implies that their preseparation earn
ings did not decline below expected levels. After they are displaced,
earnings of these workers fall by $947 per quarter less than the aver
age decline, and subsequently recover at a modestly faster rate than
the rate for the average displaced worker. As a result, during the fifth
year following their separations, earnings of displaced financial work
ers are only $1,600 below their expected levels. Although this esti
mate is relatively small, even in this strong industry, worker
displacement is associated with modest long-term losses.
Another point apparent from table 6.1 is that workers generally
recover very slowly from their earnings losses. Beginning with the
seventh quarter following displacement, the average displaced work
er's earnings loss recovers at a rate of only $15 per quarter. Only
among displaced primary metals and financial sector workers is the
rate of recovery substantially greater. At these rates of earnings recov
ery, only for younger workers would earnings converge with expected
levels during their working lifetimes.
To further examine the pattern of earnings recovery among indus
tries, we used our unrestricted model to compute the earnings losses
for workers in each industry during the first, third, and fifth year fol
lowing displacement As shown by the first three columns of table
6.2, between the first and third years following job loss, earnings rise
substantially relative to their expected levels. This rise results because
workers are increasingly likely to be employed. However, beyond the
third year, there is little evidence that earnings continue to recover. In
only 11 of the 25 industries studied do the earnings loss estimates
decline between the third and fifth year following separation.
The parsimonious version of the model also indicates that workers
displaced from distressed financial services firms incur relatively
small long-term losses. Their fifth-year losses amount to approxi
mately 5 percent of their predisplacement earnings. One possible rea
son for these smaller losses is that displaced financial workers were
able to find similar jobs because they had been displaced from a rela
tively strong industry. We observed in section 6.2 that the earnings of
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nondisplaced workers in distressed firms declined relative to other
nondisplaced workers. That decline likely results because of the
effects of adverse economic conditions on the firm. Likewise, there
may be economic factors that similarly affect all nondisplaced work
ers within a given industry. For example, the displaced financial ser
vices workers may fare relatively well because earnings are growing
more rapidly in their industry. If this is the case, their estimated earn
ings losses should increase if we use earnings histories of only nondis
placed financial services workers to compute their expected earnings.
We explore the importance of this possibility by estimating earnings
losses of displaced workers when using nondisplaced workers from
the same industry as the comparison group. 10
As shown by columns 4-6 of table 6.2, the magnitudes of our earn
ings loss estimates in several of the industries studied depend on
which comparison group we use. As expected, long-term losses of dis
placed financial services workers rise significantly to nearly $7,000
per year. For most industries , however, estimates of long-term losses
are either similar or smaller when using this alternative measure.
Moreover, in three industries—apparel, leather, and primary metals—
the estimated losses are substantially smaller than the estimated
losses based on the comparison group of all nondisplaced workers. In
the primary metals industry the long-term loss estimates decline by
nearly one-half. The estimated losses are smaller in these industries
because nondisplaced workers experience significantly slower earn
ings growth than nondisplaced workers elsewhere in the state. More
generally, the modest gap between the two sets of estimates in table
6.2 indicates that the earnings growth between the groups of nondis
placed workers varies systematically among industries.
As we argued above, we prefer the set of estimates based on a com
parison group corresponding to all nondisplaced workers, because
these workers may be adversely affected by structural and policy
changes. When we compare the earnings of displaced workers to
those of their counterparts who remained employed in their former
industries, we more than likely understate the losses associated with
adverse structural changes. When assessing the effects of changes in
public policy, however, we should consider the adverse consequences
on displaced as well as nondisplaced workers. Nevertheless, the fig
ures in table 6.2 make clear that, no matter which set of estimates one
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prefers, the disaggregated industry results indicate that when high-ten
ure workers leave distressed firms, their subsequent earnings usually
remain substantially below their expected levels.
6.4 Earnings Losses by Demographic Characteristics
The foregoing finding also is consistent with our findings on how
losses vary according to demographic characteristics of workers and
labor market conditions at the time of their job loss. In this section,
we employ the same parsimonious specification described above to
show how, after controlling for the distribution of worker characteris
tics, earnings losses vary only slightly according to gender and age.
As shown by table 6.1, we find similar earnings loss patterns
among male and female displaced workers. However, modest differ
ences do exist, as men's earnings fall by more prior to displacement
and are lower in the period immediately after their job losses. Further,
during the recovery period, men's earnings grow at a faster rate than
do women's earnings. Despite these differences between men's and
women's earnings loss patterns, both groups experience substantial
long-term earnings losses. In the fifth year following job loss, men's
earnings are $6,560 below their expected levels, whereas women's
losses are nearly as large at $5,997. Moreover, because women's predisplacement earnings were only 60 percent those of men, the percent
age earnings losses are actually larger for women. Indeed, because of
the differences in their respective rates of recovery, in subsequent
years the absolute difference between men's and women's long-term
losses is likely to narrow while the percentage difference is likely to
widen.
The earnings loss pattern also is similar among displaced workers
from different age groups. Although younger workers experience
larger earnings declines both prior to and at the time of separation and
experience faster recovery rates, their earnings losses are nearly the
same as they are for older workers during the fifth year following sep
aration. However, the "recovery" coefficients suggest that the gap
between the losses of younger and older workers should grow mod
estly at a rate of $19 per quarter. That difference suggests that
younger workers are acquiring somewhat more human capital in their
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new careers than are their older counterparts. For this reason, if the
difference in recovery rates persists, the sum of the discounted quar
terly earnings losses during these workers' lifetimes will be larger for
older workers, even though for the period covered by our sample, the
discounted losses do not depend much on age. However, overall our
findings indicate that displacement is extremely costly, even for hightenure younger workers.
6.5 Earnings Losses and Local Labor Market Conditions
We find more substantial differences in earnings loss patterns when
we compare displaced workers in different regions of Pennsylvania.
Workers separating from distressed firms in the state's western sec
tion experience the largest losses, both as a result of larger predisplacement earnings declines and larger earnings drops in the period
immediately following separation. By contrast, workers in the state's
eastern section have much smaller predisplacement earnings declines,
and their earnings drop by less after separation. However, because of
slower postseparation rates of recovery, there were only modest differ
ences in the losses incurred by workers in the long term in most parts
of the state.
Displaced workers from southeastern Pennsylvania, especially
those displaced from distressed firms in the Philadelphia SMSA, do
fare substantially better than their counterparts, elsewhere in the state.
Their earnings decline by less prior to displacement, drop by less
when they lose their jobs, and rise more rapidly during the recovery
period than the earnings of displaced workers in other regions of the
state. In the fifth year following separation, their earnings losses are
more than $2,900 less than those of their counterparts in the region
encompassing the state's other large metropolitan area—Pittsburgh.
Because the foregoing results take into account differences in the
distribution of industries among regions, differences in industrial com
position cannot account for the smaller losses observed in Philadel
phia. A more compelling explanation for the differences in earnings
losses is the widely differing labor market conditions that prevailed in
Pennsylvania during the 1980s. The economic conditions in western
Pennsylvania are substantially worse than those in the eastern part of
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the state. Although Pittsburgh, in the state's western section, and Phil
adelphia, in the state's eastern section, experience similar unemploy
ment rates during the late 1970s, their rates during the 1980s diverge
dramatically. Only in the second half of the decade do the rates
approach each other. Movements of employment levels in these areas
also indicate substantial differences in their labor market conditions.
During the 1980s, employment levels in Pittsburgh remained 5 per
cent below their late 1970s average, while those in Philadelphia grew.
The reason for the two regions' sharply different rates of employment
growth is the much larger decline in manufacturing employment in
Pittsburgh than in Philadelphia.
One reason why these regional labor market conditions differ is
that the 1982 recession hit harder in some regions than in others.
Because the severity of the recession varied among regions, the earn
ings loss pattern varied as well. Another reason has less to do with
cyclical conditions and more to do with long-term economic condi
tions in the region. Some areas, such as Johnstown, have been
depressed for many years, while at the same time other areas, such as
Lancaster, have been prosperous. This view suggests that we should
think of the effects of local labor market conditions on earnings losses
as having two components. First, the cyclical component measures
the effects of having been displaced during a strong or weak phase of
the business cycle. And second, the secular component measures the
effects of long-term conditions in the region. In our framework, the
secular component is captured by the rate of growth in nonagricultural employment between 1976 and 1987. The cyclical component is
captured by local unemployment rates and the deviations of local
employment from its trend.
To make our results easier to interpret, the estimates in the last
three rows of table 6.1 present the differences in earnings losses corre
sponding roughly to the best and worst economic conditions observed
in Pennsylvania. The range of employment growth rates is approxi
mately 1 percent per quarter; and the range of the unemployment
rates and employment deviations from trend is approximately 10 per
centage points. For example, the 5,545 figure in table 6.1 correspond
ing to the "drop" coefficient for the local unemployment rate suggests
that being displaced in a locale where the unemployment rate is 10
percentage points above the "natural" rate raises the loss after separa-
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tion by an enormous 5,545 per quarter more than the average loss. If
the local unemployment rate were only 1 percentage point above its
"natural" level, the loss per quarter would be $554 larger than aver
age. As other studies have found, this result indicates that cyclical
conditions have a substantial effect on short-term earnings losses of
displaced workers.
In the long term, the results in table 6.1 indicate that cyclical con
ditions at the time of worker displacement continue to have a signifi
cant, although smaller, effect on earnings losses. The estimates for
unemployment rates and employment deviations from trend indicate
that the former variable captures the effect of cyclical conditions on
the magnitude of the earnings "drop" at the time of worker displace
ment, but how these conditions affect the pattern of losses leading
up to separation and the recovery afterwards is better captured by
the latter variable. Together, the two variables indicate that being dis
placed during the worst as opposed to the best cyclical conditions
raises losses during the fifth year following separation by -$1,613
(or -$2,153 minus -$540). Although this estimate is large, it also cor
responds to unusually poor cyclical conditions. A more common
event than the one depicted in the table would be for a worker to be
displaced during a period when the unemployment rate was, say, 4
percentage points above the "natural" rate. In this instance, our
results suggest that during the fifth year after separation, the losses
of these workers were only $645 (0.4 times $1,613) larger than aver
age. Therefore, we conclude that cyclical conditions at the time of
job loss have long-lasting effects on earnings, but the effects are
small compared to overall losses.
A region's secular economic conditions also have long-lasting and
relatively modest effects on earnings losses. During the quarter prior
to their job loss, workers displaced in the weakest local economies
have earnings losses $500 (13 times 38.8) larger than those displaced
in the strongest local economies. This gap widens to approximately
$750 per quarter after displacement. Although there are faster rates
of recovery in weaker labor markets, the gap remains at approxi
mately $500 per quarter or $2,000 annually during the fifth year fol
lowing job loss. Although these effects of local labor conditions are
significant, it is important to recognize that according to our find-

Table 6.2 Annual Earnings Losses by Years Since Displacement for Workers Separating from Firms in
Manufacturing
Separations During Mass Layoffs
3 years
5 years
lyear
Panel A: 2-Digit Manufacturing Industries
Food products
Tobacco
Textile null
Apparel
Wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and pulp
Printing and publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber
Leather
Stone, glass, clay, concrete
Primary metals
Fabricated metals
Nonelectrical machinery
Electrical machinery
Transportation equipment
Professional equipment

$-8,545
-5,236
-6,428
-6,660
-8,686
-4,199
-,5516
-9,305
-.4995
-6,075
-8,285
-7,929
-8,261
-17,365
-7,194
-5,714
-8,555
-7,991
-7,824

$-5,709
-3,418
-3,989
-4,931
^,586
-1,941
-,3409
-6,539
-2,527
-1,451
-5,520
-5,875
-5,771
-13,695
^,717
-3,716
-5,759
-5,819
-5,312

$-5,285
^,803
-4,770
-6,474
-1,914
-2,546
^,283
-6,240
-2,756
-2,154
-5,223
-6,844
-5,964
-11,790
^,932
-4,781
-5,407
-6,576
-5,465

K>
00

Comparisons from Separators'
Industries
5 years
3 years
lyear

$-8,245
^,002
-4,914

-4,441
-6,757
-3,430
-6,590
-9,368
-6,399
-9,882
-8,245
^,542
-8,283
-14,133
-6,357
-4,003
-10,235
-7,758
-7,852

$-5,353
-2,028
-2,227
-2,303
-2,464
-1,038
-4,679
-6,866
-4,116
-5,808
-5,538
-1,817
-5,770
-9,498
-3,762
-1,748
-6,277
-5,027
-4,780

$-5,003
-3,310
-2,244
-3,285
373
-1,578
-6,075
-7,210
-4,850
-3,359
-5,518
-1,765
-6,095
-6,050
-3,946
-2,532
-6,129
-6,145
-4,120

Panel B: 1-Digit Nonmanufacturing Industries
Other goods
Transportation, communications, public utilities
Wholesale, retail trade
Financial, insurance, real estate
Business and personal services
Professional services

11,553
-9,078
-8,827
-4,606
-5,783
^,696

-8,931
-7,559
-6,106
-1,693
-3,090
-2,640

-8,889
-9,478
-5,888
-1,133
-2,919
-3,602

-9,998
-10,493
-7,872
-7,830
-5,515
-3,600

-7,045
-9,263
-4,948
-5,799
-2,883
-1,223

-6,586
-11,870
-4,541
-6,981
-2,998
-1,789

NOTE: Earnings losses are given for 1,3, and 5 years following workers separation.
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ings, job loss is associated with substantial earnings losses even in
the strongest of labor markets.
Besides their direct effect on the magnitude of displaced worker
earnings losses, local labor market conditions also affect incentives
for workers to move to areas where they face better prospects. The
varying economic conditions among regions suggests that workers do
face such incentives. Indeed, one concern raised in chapter 3 when we
described our data was that our estimates may overstate losses
because the more successful displaced workers moved out of state in
pursuit of better prospects. Although our data do not permit us to
directly explore that possibility, we can examine how losses vary
depending on whether workers' new firms were located in different
regions within Pennsylvania.
Our data indicate that by 1986, approximately one-third of the dis
placed workers in our mass layoff sample were employed in firms
located in SMSAs (or in a different county for persons previously
employed in firms located outside SMSAs) that were different from
the SMSA of their 1979 employer. This measure exaggerates the
amount of migration, because larger firms may have plants located in
several regions, but in our data firm location does not vary by plant.
Despite this shortcoming associated with our measure of mobility, it
does behave like more conventional measures in that younger work
ers and men are more likely to have moved.
With this caveat in mind, we find that, on average, movers suffer
long-term losses $400 per quarter larger than those who stayed in
their regions. These findings suggest that workers likely to incur
larger losses are more likely to move. But moving does not reduce
their losses even to the level of otherwise similar persons who stayed
in their area. In addition, these findings suggest that if we had data on
persons who moved out-of-state, the overall earnings loss estimates
might be larger, not smaller, than those reported in this chapter.
6.6 Earnings Losses and Industry of New Job

In previous sections, we showed that regardless of their former
firms' industry, their demographic characteristics, or the labor market
conditions at the time of their separation, high-tenure workers usually
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incur substantial earnings losses when they are displaced from dis
tressed firms. Another potential determinant of displaced worker earn
ings losses is the industry of their new jobs. For example, workers
displaced from distressed manufacturing firms may fare better if they
find new jobs in the manufacturing as opposed to the nonmanufacturing sector. One reason for such a relationship is that some worker
skills may be specific to a particular sector, industry, or firm. When
displaced workers find new jobs that are similar to their old jobs, they
are able to continue to use those specialized skills. As a result, their
earnings losses should be relatively small. In contrast, if the new jobs
of displaced workers are sufficiently different from their old jobs,
those specialized skills will go unused, with larger earnings losses the
likely result.
In keeping with this study's interest in the long-term impacts of dis
placement, we want to assess the relationship between earnings losses
and the industry of workers' new jobs several years following their
separations. For workers displaced in 1985 and 1986 such an assess
ment is impossible because we have only a few quarters of postseparation data. Accordingly, we examined the relationship between
earnings losses and industry of the new job for workers displaced
from distressed firms between 1980 and 1983. The industry of the
new job was the workers' primary employer in 1986.
As shown by figure 6.11, earnings losses of manufacturing workers
depend crucially on whether their new jobs were in the same sector as
their old jobs. When displaced manufacturing workers found new
jobs in the manufacturing sector, their earnings losses five years after
separation averaged approximately $1,000 per quarter. That loss repre
sents about 20 percent of their expected earnings. In contrast, when
their new jobs were in the nonmanufacturing sector, their quarterly
earnings losses rose to approximately $2,000 per quarter. That loss
represents nearly 40 percent of their expected earnings. These find
ings underscore the importance to displaced manufacturing workers
of finding new jobs in their old sector.
Turning to displaced workers from the nonmanufacturing sector,
we find in figure 6.12 that these workers also incurred substantial
losses no matter in which sector they end up. For those workers who
remained in the nonmanufacturing sector, their earnings losses were
similar to the losses for manufacturing workers who remained in their
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old sector. Once again, the earnings losses are smaller when displaced
workers' new jobs were in the same sector as their old jobs. On aver
age, those displaced nonmanufacturing workers who switched sectors
experienced larger earnings losses. But there are two reasons that the
evidence on this relationship is less conclusive for nonmanufacturing
workers: First, relatively few displaced nonmanufacturing workers
found jobs in the manufacturing sector. That fact accounts, in part, for
larger variability in the earnings loss estimates for workers who
switched sectors. Second, in some years the earnings losses of the sec
tor stayers and sector switchers were similar.
Figure 6.11 Manufacturing Workers' Earnings Losses by Sector of
Postdisplacement Job
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The evidence presented in figure 6.11 and figure 6.12 indicates that
the earnings losses of displaced workers, would be reduced if they
found new jobs in their old sectors. To pursue this point further, we
examined the earnings losses among two groups of workers whose
new jobs were in their old sectors. The first group found a new job in
the same 4-digit SIC industry as their old job. The second group
found a new job in the same sector but in a different 4-digit industry.
Underlying this characterization of the new jobs is the assumption
that when they are in the same 4-digit SIC industry as the old jobs
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they are more likely to require skills similar to those used in the
former positions. Accordingly, the earnings losses for those workers
should, on average, be less than for workers whose new jobs are in
different industries from their former jobs.
Figure 6.12 Nonmanufacturing Workers' Earnings Losses by Sector of
Postdisplacement Job
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Surprisingly, we find that even when the new jobs are in the same
4-digit SIC industry as the old jobs, earnings losses of displaced work
ers are substantial. As shown in Panel A of table 6.3,24 quarters after
their separations, earnings of displaced manufacturing workers are 20
percent below expected levels when their new jobs are in the same 4digit industry as their old jobs. Further, those losses are similar to
those experienced by workers who find less similar jobs in the manu
facturing sector. That percentage loss is 18 percent for workers who
remain in the manufacturing sector but are employed in a different 4digit SIC industry. By comparison, the losses jump to 38 percent for
workers whose new jobs are in the nonmanufacturing sector.
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Table 63 Earnings Losses by Sector of New Jobs
Quarters
New job in same sector
Different 4-digit
since
Same 4-digit
SIC
separation
SIC
Panel A: Displaced Manufacturing Workers
-8
$-379
$-117
(82)
(67)
[-7]
[-2]
-1,044
-1,117
(82)
(67)
[-19]
[-21]
-1,103
24
-958
(197)
(137)
[-20]
[-18]
Panel B: Displaced Nonmanufacturing Workers
-8
$-229
$-26
(132)
(128)
[-18]
[0]
-1,129
12
-1,305
(132)
(128)
[-18]
[-23]
-1,103
-1,276
24
(315)
(241)
[-18]
[-22]
12

New job
in other sector
$-237
(73)
[-4]
-2,616
(73)
[-44]
-2,221
(150)
[-38]
$-151
(231)
[-3]
-1,498
(231)
[-26]
-1,949
(476)
[-33]

The findings for displaced nonmanufacturing workers are similar
to those for their manufacturing counterparts. When displaced nonmanufacturing workers find new jobs in the same 4-digit industry,
their long-term earnings losses amount to 18 percent. That percentage
rises to 22 percent when their new jobs are in a new 4-digit industry
but still in the nonmanufacturing sector. By comparison, losses rise to
34 percent for those who find new jobs in the manufacturing sector.
But, because so few displaced nonmanufacturing workers move to the
manufacturing sector, this rise in losses is not statistically significant.
However, we find no evidence that displaced nonmanufacturing work
ers have smaller losses if they find new jobs in the manufacturing sec
tor.
Most notably, the two sets of results in table 6.3 for manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing workers indicate that even when displaced
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Most notably, the two sets of results in table 6.3 for manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing workers indicate that even when displaced
workers find new jobs in their former industry, they still incur longterm losses of between 15 and 20 percent. In light of our earlier find
ing that displaced workers in most industries suffer substantial earn
ings losses, these findings suggest that much of their earnings losses
result from factors specific to their old firms. These specific factors
might include specific human capital, the value of the employer and
employee "match," or the workings of internal labor markets.
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter emphasized the link between earnings losses of dis
placed workers and the economic health of their former firms. In gen
eral, when high-tenure workers separated from their firms between
1980 and 1986, their earnings declined significantly. For those sepa
rating from distressed firms, however, the declines were substantial
and persisted at least for six years. For other separators, the earnings
losses were smaller, and indeed the earnings of groups actually
returned to their expected levels after several years.
Among workers separating from distressed firms, the following
points are clear. First, about one-fifth of their earnings loss would
have occurred even had they not been displaced. In distressed firms,
the earnings of nondisplaced workers decline relative to other nondisplaced workers. Second, high-tenure workers are vulnerable to dis
placement no matter which sector they work in, and regardless of
their gender or age and of the prevailing local labor market conditions
at the time of their displacements. Finally, the evidence on the rela
tionship between earnings losses of displaced workers and the indus
try of their new jobs indicates that a substantial portion of those
losses results from the loss of some attribute of the employment rela
tionship. In the next chapter we will consider some of the policy
implications of these findings.
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NOTES
1. For convenience, we sometimes refer to workers from such distressed firms as "mass lay
off' workers even though the category includes workers whose firms shut down completely.
2. If the preseparation earnings losses result from errors in dating those separations, the find
ings in figure 6.1 suggests that those dating errors are more likely when employees separate from
firms experiencing large workforce reductions. Because we do not know of any a priori reason for
why this result should be the case, we believe that figure 6.1 provides additional evidence against
the dating hypothesis described in chapter 3.
3. For example, we have no evidence that many workers in our sample receive piece rates.
Earnings of such workers would decline as a result of declining productivity.
4. In results not shown here we find that losses of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing work
ers were also nearly the same (and much smaller than shown in figure 6.4) when the analysis is
limited to nonmass layoff separators.
5. Again, the estimates shown in figures 6.5 through 6.8 are of the 6* parameters in model
(4.20). In particular, these estimates allow for common estimates of the quarter (time) and age
effects.
6. As in note 1 above, the large predisplacement earnings for displaced metals workers
appears to work against the dating hypothesis described in chapter 3. According to this hypothe
sis, the extremely large preseparation losses depicted in figure 6.8 suggest that dating errors occur
more often for workers displaced from metals firms than for workers displaced from other manu
facturing firms.
7. The estimates shown in figure 6.9 and figure 6.10 were obtained using the full sample of
high attachment separators who in 1979 were in firms that survived to the end of the sample
period. This change in samples explains the differences between these figures and figure 6.4,
which was obtained using all workers in the mass layoff sample including workers separating
from firms that closed.
8. In this section we discuss only the results in the industry panel of table 6.1. The other results
in the table are discussed in sections 6.4 and 6.5.
9. See chapter 4 for discussion of the parsimonious specification.
10. Operationally, as in equation (4.23), we computed the estimates for the last three columns
of table 6.1 by adding industry-specific time trends to the econometric model.

7
Conclusions and
Policy Considerations
The central finding of this study is that high-tenure workers suffer
large losses when they are displaced as part of plant closings or mass
layoffs. When these workers separate from distressed firms, their earn
ings fall dramatically below the levels that we otherwise would
expect. During the year following their separations, their losses are
especially great. For the period covered by this study, 1980 to 1986,
these losses averaged about $9,000 or 40 percent of predisplacement
earnings. Although these losses decline somewhat with time, they did
not disappear. Even during the fifth year after job separation, their
losses averaged approximately $6,500 or 25 percent of former earn
ings. As a result, the average present discounted value of earnings
losses during the period from three years before to six years after sep
aration amounts to approximately $50,000. If, as seems likely, earn
ings losses remained at about $6,000 per year until retirement (at age
65), the present value of losses rose to approximately $80,000.
Clearly, displacement is a major setback for experienced workers.
We also find that displacement affects a great many experienced
workers. The 6,435 workers in our 5 percent sample suggest that
135,000 high-tenure workers left distressed firms in Pennsylvania
between 1980 and 1986. Moreover, if the experience of Pennsylvania
is representative of the nation as a whole, then during this period
approximately 2.6 million such U.S. workers were displaced from dis
tressed firms. In fact, our tabulations of the Displaced Workers Sur
veys covering the years 1979 to 1985 also suggest that 2.6 million
prime-age American workers with six or more years of tenure were
displaced during that nearly identical seven-year period. These figures
demonstrate that even among experienced workers, job loss is a sig
nificant threat.
Together, these two findings—that displacement is a major finan
cial setback and that it threatens many high-tenure workers—substan-
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tiate workers' concerns about the possibility and consequences of job
loss. Indeed, our findings imply that the economic well-being of their
firms is an important determinant of workers' own labor market suc
cess. TWo equally talented and hard-working individuals will not nec
essarily do equally well in the labor market if one of them works for a
firm that is unsuccessful. Rather, if the unsuccessful firm is forced to
lay off one of these workers, our findings suggest that he or she is
likely to earn significantly less than the other worker for many years.
The importance of job loss explains the concerns of labor unions and
sympathetic policymakers about policies such as trade liberalization
or environmental protection that may lead to increased displacement.
Our results explain why workers should be concerned about dis
placement. They do not, however, necessarily imply that policymak
ers should attempt to allay those concerns by providing displaced
workers with assistance generous enough to fully compensate for
their losses. The extent to which policymakers should create pro
grams to assist displaced workers or compensate them for their losses
is fundamentally a political question that depends on judgments
beyond the scope of this monograph. Nevertheless, our study has sev
eral implications about the efficacy of existing and alternative pro
grams. To facilitate that discussion, we briefly recount the reasons
policymakers and others have given for assisting displaced workers.
These reasons fall into four categories: (1) it is simply the fair thing to
do; (2) it is desirable on income distribution grounds; (3) it corrects a
market failure that occurs because of a missing insurance market; and
(4) it promotes efficiency by facilitating change that would otherwise
be politically impossible. We briefly comment on each of these views
below.
Perhaps the most commonly cited reason for assisting displaced
workers is simple fairness. Some policymakers take the view that
workers who have maintained stable employment relationships over a
number of years have "played by the rules" and therefore are entitled
to a secure economic future. Accordingly, they argue it is simply
unfair to allow workers to suffer large losses when events beyond
their control put them out of work. This unfairness seems especially
great to many because these same events (for example, technological
progress, freer trade, or a healthier, more attractive environment) usu
ally benefit the rest of society. Because it is based on a notion of fair-
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ness, there is little we can say analytically about this argument
beyond that it seems most compelling when the displacement is
caused by a change in government policy. For example, when the gov
ernment acts to protect an endangered species and thereby causes
workers to lose valuable employment relationships, the government
has, in a sense, seized the workers' property and thus owes them com
pensation.
Those concerned about the increasing extent of income inequality
and the "erosion of the middle class" also have advocated compensa
tion for displaced workers. Given such concerns, the appeal of assist
ing displaced workers is easy to understand. Before their job losses,
the workers we studied were solidly middle class, with average
incomes somewhat above the median, while after their setbacks many
had incomes low enough to threaten their middle-class status. On
average, providing compensation to displaced workers probably does
contribute to greater income equality. However, as a tool for achiev
ing this end, it is a very blunt instrument Workers who have held a
job for more than a decade are not likely to be among society's needi
est even after being displaced. Indeed, we find, as have other studies,
that many displaced workers have earnings above the median even
after their displacements (Kosters 1986).
Compensating displaced workers also might be justified as the
response to a market failure caused by the inability of workers to
insure fully against the risk of displacement. For a number of reasons
private insurers probably cannot profitably provide such insurance.
For instance, workers are likely to know much more than any insurer
about the likelihood that a mass layoff or plant closing will lead to job
loss. Thus private insurers would attract mostly high-risk workers and
likely find such a business unprofitable. Unfortunately, without the
ability to insure against displacement, workers will, to an extent
greater than socially desirable, avoid jobs with above-average layoff
risk. Of course, firms may attempt to lure workers into such jobs by
paying them higher wages (as a form of compensating differential).
But, the necessity of paying higher wages because of the unavailabil
ity of insurance will also cause firms to hire fewer workers than is
socially desirable. Therefore, these wage premiums only partially alle
viate the inefficiency caused by this missing market. We know of no
empirical evidence on the magnitude of this efficiency loss, but, in
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principle, governmentally provided insurance in the form of a guaran
tee of compensation in the event of displacement could enhance effi
ciency by allowing workers to take jobs with less certain outcomes
without at the same time unduly increasing labor costs of firms.
A final argument for assisting displaced workers is that unless they
provide this assistance, policymakers may be unable to enact benefi
cial public policies. History suggests that workers who would be
adversely affected by a proposed policy change may successfully
lobby against that change even if, on net, it would benefit society.
Likewise, groups adversely affected by technological progress or
taste shifts may seek governmental regulations that block those
changes. Of course, when a change brings society net benefits, then
those who gain could, in principle, compensate those who lose and
still be better off themselves. This observation underlies economists'
support for trade liberalization and many other "free market" policies.
However, in the absence of a mechanism for actually carrying out
such compensation, this reasoning is less compelling. Moreover,
regardless of the merits of economists' arguments, policies with the
greatest net benefit to society might not be adopted if the minority
who would lose have more political might than the majority who
would gain. The actual alternative to providing generous assistance to
those adversely affected by technological or policy changes may be
accepting trade restrictions, subsidization of inefficient firms, and a
less healthy environment.
In the past these rationales have motivated policymakers to design
several programs to assist displaced workers. Some of these programs
also are aimed at the general population of unemployed persons.
Other programs are aimed specifically at displaced workers. The
unemployment insurance (UI) system provides the most basic form of
assistance to a broad class of unemployed job losers. The Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program extends the duration of UI
payments (and provides retraining vouchers) to a narrower population
of unemployed persons whose job loss the Secretary of Labor has cer
tified resulted from import competition.
In addition, policymakers have supplemented these income replace
ment programs with programs that provide employment and training
services. At the broadest level of targeting, each state operates an
Employment Service (ES) as a labor exchange to help the unem-
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ployed find work. A much more comprehensive set of services is
available to workers covered by the Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA). These services include
more extensive job search assistance, counseling, and formal training.
In addition, until recently, financial assistance for postsecondary edu
cation was also available to displaced workers under a special provi
sion of the Pell Grant program. Finally, the requirement that
employers give advance notice before laying off large numbers of
workers also is designed to facilitate the job search of those who sub
sequently are displaced. These programs, discussed at greater length
below, are evidence of policymakers' desire to provide assistance to
displaced workers.
Unfortunately, our results on the magnitude and temporal pattern
of displaced worker earnings losses imply that the existing array of
programs does not, and probably cannot, eliminate more than a small
fraction of such losses. This conclusion stems from our finding that
workers suffer the majority of their losses in the form of reduced earn
ings after they find new jobs. The implication of this finding is that
programs such as UI and TAA, which provide cash payments to work
ers only while they are unemployed, can compensate them only for a
small portion of their losses. In addition, previous research on the
impacts of job search assistance and retraining programs provides lit
tle cause for optimism that such programs can go very far towards
reducing the sizable losses found in this study.
In what follows, we suggest some changes to the existing set of
programs, but the failure of existing programs to substantially reduce
earnings losses largely reflects real difficulties inherent in their
design. No matter how committed policymakers are to assisting those
who bear the costs of change, they may simply be unable to do so
within the framework of existing programs. Compensating displaced
workers for a substantially larger fraction of their losses likely
requires an alternative, and more costly, approach in which income
support extends beyond the period workers are unemployed.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 7.1
we present a more detailed summary of our results, along with some
general implications for policies designed to assist displaced workers.
In section 7.2 we discuss in greater detail the relevance of our find
ings for the existing array of government programs in this area. In sec-
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tion 7.3 we offer some more speculative thoughts on how a wage
subsidy program might be designed to more fully compensate dis
placed workers. Finally, section 7.4 contains some brief conclusions.
7.1 Summary of Findings
This section summarizes our monograph's most important empiri
cal findings and notes their general implications for public policy. We
begin by decomposing the average worker's earnings losses into sev
eral distinct components. This decomposition serves a number of pur
poses. First, it shows that the existing array of programs cannot begin
to compensate displaced workers for their full losses. Second, it illus
trates the complications that would necessarily entail a hypothetical
program designed to provide full or nearly full compensation to dis
placed workers. Finally, it makes clear the virtues of our data and the
analysis they allow relative to other research designs. After discussing
this decomposition, we go on to briefly indicate how the effects of dis
placement vary among workers. These results show which earnings
losses might merit the special attention of policymakers. They also
provide some hints about the importance of the different theoretical
rationales discussed in chapter 1 for why earnings losses might occur.
Figure 7.1, which is a modified version of figure 4.1, illustrates the
decomposition of the average displaced worker's losses that we find
useful for discussing policies towards the displaced. The bottom line
in the figure depicts the earnings path of that worker while the top
line depicts the earnings path of an otherwise identical nondisplaced
worker. The figure indicates two dates: (1) the date when the worker
separates from his or her old employer, and (2) the date when that
worker establishes a stable employment relationship with a new
employer. Also indicated in the figure are the worker's earnings on
the separation date. The displaced worker's losses for any particular
quarter are given by the vertical distance between the two earnings
paths. Several figures in chapters 5 and 6 plot estimates of these
losses for various categories of workers. For workers separating
amidst mass layoffs or plant closings, those figures revealed signifi
cant losses as early as three years prior to separation. Losses gradu
ally rose to about $1,100 per quarter at the date of separation, before
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increasing sharply to nearly $3,000 per quarter immediately after sep
aration. Subsequently, earnings losses declined steadily for about six
quarters and then declined only gradually to a level around $1,500 per
quarter six years after displacement. Our estimate of the cumulative
loss corresponds to the (properly discounted) area between the lines
in figure 7.1.
The decomposition depicted in figure 7.1 helps us to better under
stand the importance of the following issues: (1) the relative impor
tance of earnings losses due to unemployment following job
separation and losses due to lower earnings after reemployment; (2)
the importance of accounting for the dip in earnings that precedes
final job separation; (3) the loss resulting from lost earnings growth;
and (4) the portion of the loss due to our choice of a comparison
group of nondisplaced workers.
Figure 7.1 Stylized Earnings Histories of Displaced Worker and Similar
Nondisplaced Worker
Earnings
Nondisplaced Worker

Displaced Worker

Time
Displacement

Reemployment

It is sometimes assumed that the costs of displacement are synony
mous with earnings losses due to unemployment. 1 Our results show
that this is far from the case. While the workers whose job losses we
studied varied greatly in the speed with which they found new work,
almost all of them had found stable employment by six quarters after

144 Conclusions and Policy Considerations

their separations. Average earnings losses during this transition
period, which correspond to the sum of areas A and D in figure 7.1,
were nearly $13,000. Only a portion of these losses (area D) is attrib
utable to unemployment. But, even if unemployment was responsible
for all of the losses during this period, it would still only account for
about 16 percent of workers' cumulative earnings losses.
An obvious but important implication of this finding is that pro
grams such as UI and TAA that provide income to workers only while
they are unemployed cannot in their present forms come close to com
pensating displaced workers for their full losses. Of course, if the
amount of UI payments and their maximum duration were signifi
cantly increased, workers would likely stay unemployed longer,
increasing compensation from these programs. But, because it would
delay reemployment, such a policy could be costly to the economy
and might not increase the fraction of earnings losses covered.
Our results show that permanently lower quarterly earnings after
reemployment account for the vast majority of earnings losses. Our
estimate of the present discounted value of the losses occurring seven
or more quarters after separation, which corresponds to the sum of
areas B and E in figure 7.1, is approximately $58,000 or 72 percent of
the cumulative losses. The fact that most of the earnings losses occur
after the displaced return to work implies that if policymakers want to
compensate for more of earnings losses, they need to design programs
that raise workers' incomes after they find new employment. In princi
ple, policymakers could achieve this objective by funding training
programs that upgrade skills or job search assistance programs that
better match workers' existing skills with the needs of employers.
However, in the next section we note that the previous research on the
impact of these programs provides little reason for optimism about
the ability of policymakers to compensate for the sizable losses
reported in this monograph. Later in this chapter, we outline a pro
gram that would raise the post-reemployment income of displaced
workers by providing them with earnings or income subsidies.
Our finding that workers begin to experience earnings losses up to
three years before separating from their employers has important
implications for the measurement of overall earnings losses. First, the
present value of the losses that occur before separation, correspond
ing to area C in figure 7.1, is far from negligible, amounting to
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approximately $9,000 or 12 percent of cumulative losses. Our results
on the receipt of UI payments attribute about half of these losses to
lost earnings while on temporary layoff. Thus, in contrast to the
losses incurred after workers secure new employment, a significant
fraction of the losses suffered before separation are offset by conven
tional UI benefits.2
Recognizing the importance of the preseparation earnings dip also
allows us to avoid substantially underestimating earnings losses dur
ing the period after separation. As we noted in chapter 2, researchers
using the Displaced Workers Surveys, which report only one presepa
ration observation on wages, may have done just that. If we used the
earnings levels immediately prior to separation as a basis for calculat
ing quarterly losses, our estimate of the total losses during the transi
tion period following job loss (region A in figure 7.1) would decline
to $7,000 and our estimate of the losses following reemployment
(region B in figure 7.1) would decline to $12,000. Combined, these
losses amount to $19,000 or less than 25 percent of what we report as
the true losses. Therefore, failure to recognize the existence of the pre
separation earnings dip could potentially lead to a very substantial
underestimate of the total losses. One practical implication of these
preseparation earnings losses is that programs designed to compen
sate workers for a substantial fraction of their losses may need to
make assistance levels dependent on worker earnings during a period
beginning several years prior to displacement.
The upper boundaries of regions C, D, and E in figure 7.1 depend
on the rate of earnings growth in the absence of displacement. In
other words, our measure of losses recognizes that lost earnings
growth is just as injurious to displaced workers as actual earnings
declines. Thus research designs that fail to consider the expected path
of earnings in the absence of displacement underestimate losses if, in
the absence of displacement, earnings would have grown. Again, we
note in chapter 2 that studies using the Displaced Workers Surveys,
which lack a comparison group of nondisplaced workers, suffer from
this shortcoming. Although the period we studied was not one of par
ticularly rapid, economywide earnings growth, our results in chapter
3 suggest that had we not taken lost earnings growth into consider
ation, our average loss estimates would be about 20 percent less.
Moreover, earnings growth rates vary substantially by age, being
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most rapid for younger workers. As a result, accounting for lost earn
ings growth substantially raised our estimates of the relative losses of
younger workers.
The importance of lost earnings growth to our estimates of total
losses implies that a hypothetical program providing full compensa
tion to displaced workers would have to be quite complex. Payments
would need to depend on a worker's age and sex (raising legal issues
of discrimination). They would also need to depend on an index of
economywide earnings growth. Thus, such a scheme would necessar
ily be at least as complicated and require at least as much overhead as
the current Social Security system, which determines payments based
on a beneficiary's age, past earnings, and current labor market earn
ings, as well as the Consumer Price Index.
The final issue relating to our decomposition of average losses is
the choice of comparison group used to estimate lost earnings growth
and thus the upper boundaries of regions C, D, and E in figure 7.1.
Our preferred loss estimates rely on the average experience of all nondisplaced workers to compute lost earnings growth of displaced work
ers. We also showed in chapters 5 and 6 that basing lost earnings
growth estimates only on the experiences of nondisplaced workers
from the same firms lowers our estimates by approximately 20 per
cent.3 Basing estimates of earnings growth on nondisplaced workers
in the same industry implies a somewhat smaller drop in our loss esti
mates. As we argued in chapter 4, however, nondisplaced workers in
firms or industries that experience mass layoffs and plant closing may
themselves have experienced some earnings losses as the result of the
same events that led to job losses. Thus, we feel that our preferred
measure best captures the importance of the events that lead to dis
placement.
We recognize, however, that a hypothetical program fully compen
sating workers for lost earnings growth would raise some vexing
issues if that lost earnings growth was estimated using the experi
ences of the general workforce. In particular, if a hypothetical assis
tance program were to provide full compensation to displaced
workers but not to their former colleagues who retained their jobs,
then workers in firms or industries adversely affected by structural or
policy changes would actually prefer to lose their jobs. Alternatively,
the perverse incentives entailed by full compensation could be elimi-
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nated by also compensating those who keep jobs in distressed firms
or industries. However, such a program would be extremely difficult
to administer and would probably enjoy little political support.
As we noted, however, loss estimates are 80 percent as large as our
preferred estimates when they are based on the experiences of job
keepers in affected firms or industries. Because current programs com
pensate displaced workers for much less than 80 percent of their
losses, compensation can be made substantially more generous with
out generating the kinds of disincentives mentioned above. Put differ
ently, our results indicate that workers who actually lose their jobs
suffer losses several times those of workers who retain their jobs in
distressed firms and industries. Given resource levels that are likely to
be available for assisting displaced workers, policymakers need not
fear overcompensating workers or giving them incentives to become
displaced.
In addition to detailing the magnitude and persistence of the aver
age worker's losses, the results in this monograph show how those
losses vary across workers. One important finding concerns workers
who separate from firms that have had stable employment levels.
These workers experience substantial short-term losses. But, in con
trast to workers leaving distressed firms, in the long term their earn
ings return to their expected levels. We believe that this recovery
results in large part because some of these workers voluntarily sepa
rated from their former firms. For this reason we have chosen to
emphasize our results for workers who separate amidst mass layoffs
and plant closings. We can be confident that nearly all of these work
ers are displaced for reasons unrelated to their performance on the job.
Consistent with the literature summarized in chapter 2, we find that
earnings losses of displaced workers are similar in percentage terms
for men and women. Losses vary somewhat more by industry and
age. Young workers and those displaced from the primary metals
industries had larger preseparation earnings losses. Postdisplacement
losses were larger for older workers and for displaced mining and con
struction, primary metals, and transportation workers. Depending on
the comparison group used, estimated losses for financial and services
workers were smaller than those of other displaced workers. We also
find that losses are greater for workers displaced in already depressed
local labor markets. This latter result suggests that it may be espe-
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cially useful to concentrate resources in localities where unemploy
ment is high.
We also confirm the common finding that displaced workers who
are forced to change major industries experience larger losses. For
instance, workers whose previous jobs were in the manufacturing sec
tor but whose new jobs were outside that sector experienced losses
equal to nearly 40 percent of their previous earnings. By contrast,
those who found reemployment in manufacturing experienced losses
of only about 20 percent. This finding suggests that job search assis
tance programs could have significant value when they help workers
find jobs in similar industries. However, our study also shows that
even workers who find new jobs in the same narrowly defined (4digit SIC) industry experience large and persistent losses. Because
job search assistance is not likely to do better than to return workers
to their old industry, this result suggests that, though it can be valu
able, it cannot possibly eliminate their losses.
Overall, we are struck more by the similarities than by the differ
ences in the pattern of losses across groups of workers. Large losses
were not limited to older workers or workers from trade-sensitive
durable goods industries. Younger workers and workers from the
wholesale and retail trade sectors also experienced substantial postdisplacement earnings losses. The pervasiveness of losses implies that
the special assistance received by certain classes of workers, such as
those deemed to have lost their jobs because of import competition, is
not justified by any special difficulties of adjustment. If a concern for
fairness motivates policymakers to aid displaced workers, policies
should be more broadly targeted and not be restricted to those
adversely affected by import competition. Of course, if their motiva
tion for assisting displaced workers is smoothing the way for freer
trade, their special concern for trade-impacted workers makes sense.
The pervasiveness of losses also suggests they are not simply the
result of the loss of union wage premiums or efficiency wages in par
ticular industries. Instead, because displaced workers from so many
demographic groups, industries, and geographic regions experience
large earnings losses, our findings suggest that whenever high-tenure
workers are displaced, some highly firm-specific attribute of their
former employment relationship is lost. The best evidence for this
contention is the result mentioned above that even workers who find
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jobs in the same narrowly defined industry experience substantial
earnings losses. If it is workers' skills that are lost, these skills must
be firm-specific as opposed to merely industry-specific. Alternatively,
earnings losses may result from the workings of internal labor mar
kets. In either case, subsidized training programs cannot directly
replace the lost resource and must greatly raise workers' general
skills in order to compensate them for their losses.
Finally, our findings also demonstrate the advantages of basing
research on long earnings histories for large samples of displaced and
nondisplaced workers. From such data, we document: (1) substantial
losses even before workers leave their firms, (2) slow earnings recov
ery, and (3) faster earnings growth among nondisplaced workers in
prosperous versus distressed firms. Our results using these administra
tive data also indicate that previous studies have probably underesti
mated the earnings losses associated with worker displacement.
7.2 Implications for Traditional Programs

In this section we offer more detailed observations about our
study's implications for existing programs that assist displaced work
ers. As we have noted, such assistance comes in several forms. First,
income replacement is available to displaced workers while they are
unemployed. This is provided to the general population of job losers
by the UI system, while the TAA program provides more extensive
benefits to selected displaced workers. Second, workers receive assis
tance in finding new work. In particular, state ES offices act as a labor
exchange for all unemployed workers, while EDWAA provides more
extensive services to displaced workers. These services include coun
seling and formal job search assistance. Third, subsidized training is
available to some displaced workers through EDWAA and until
recently through the Pell Grant program. Finally, policymakers have
endeavored to help displaced workers by mandating advance notice
before layoffs and establishing programs to help communities deal
with and perhaps forestall large layoffs. We discuss each of these pro
grams below.
The income replacement that the UI system provides to unem
ployed job losers is the largest component of the safety net that pro-
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tects workers from the direst consequences of job loss. Each state has
considerable discretion in structuring its own UI system, but weekly
benefits are usually a little less than 50 percent of a worker's previous
weekly earnings up to a maximum benefit that varies among states.
Regular UI lasts six months, but its duration may be increased consid
erably in periods of high unemployment. When the insured unemploy
ment rate (IUR) rises above 6 percent, the Extended Benefit (EB)
program provides federal funds to increase the duration of UI pay
ments for an additional 13 weeks. Recently, because of the substantial
decline in the ratio between the IUR and the unemployment rate, Con
gress established a series of temporary Emergency Unemployment
Benefit (EUB) programs to provide extended benefits to qualified
unemployed workers.
The decline in the ratio of insured to total unemployment reflects
an increase in the number of unemployed workers who do not file
claims for UI. Indeed, in our sample of high-tenure workers separat
ing from distressed firms, a surprisingly high 40 percent did not
receive any UI benefits. The large number of unemployed workers
not receiving UI benefits has caused some policymakers to be con
cerned that eligibility standards have become overly restrictive. How
ever, in our sample only a handful of the 40 percent of workers who
did not claim benefits had as much as one quarter without any earn
ings. This suggests that many displaced workers do not file for bene
fits simply because they do not have a difficult time finding new jobs.
Of course, our results imply that they do have a difficult time finding
new jobs that pay as much as their old ones.
Another trend that has concerned policymakers has been the
increase in the fraction of workers collecting UI benefits who subse
quently exhaust those benefits. Indeed, in our sample of displaced
workers this fraction is approximately 56 percent. Thus, many dis
placed workers appear to have difficult transitions to new employ
ment. This high fraction of workers exhausting benefits has been
argued by many to imply a need to extend the normal length of bene
fits. However, as we have noted, extending the duration of benefits
may significantly delay reemployment and thus may be costly to the
economy. More effective means of aiding the unemployed or speed
ing their returns to work would clearly be valuable.

Conclusions and Policy Considerations

151

TAA is another form of extended UI that provides workers with up
to 52 weeks of additional benefits. To receive TAA, however, a peti
tion must be filed with the Department of Labor demonstrating that
job loss resulted from import competition. This requirement greatly
limits the number of workers eligible for help. As we noted above,
these special benefits are not, in general, justified by any special diffi
culties trade-impacted workers face because of their job losses.
Rather, our results indicate that large losses are the rule for all hightenure displaced workers. An additional feature of TAA is that receipt
of benefits for the maximum duration is tied to the use of a voucher,
worth up to $10,000, to pay for training services. As we argue below,
this probably does not lead to an efficient use of resources.
An important implication of our results is that because only a small
portion of earnings losses accrue while workers are unemployed, the
benefits UI and TAA provide are small compared to the magnitude of
losses. We can demonstrate this directly by recomputing workers'
losses on the basis of their incomes, including their receipt of UI and
TAA. Figure 7.2 displays this recomputation of losses for the mass
layoff sample of chapter 6. Also shown are the losses we previously
computed strictly on the basis of wage and salary earnings. As can be
seen in the figure, UI and TAA reduce earnings losses by only a rela
tively small amount and only in the quarters surrounding job separa
tions. This finding reflects the requirement that workers must be
unemployed to receive UI and TAA, that these programs replace less
than 50 percent of predisplacement wages, and that payments usually
last less than six months. Clearly, income replacement programs ease
the transition to lower earnings by reducing the large losses in the
year after separation, but in the long run they have no impact on liv
ing standards of displaced workers.4
Despite the fact that they compensate for only a small portion of
losses, UI and TAA may significantly decrease incentives to return to
work. Although the UI system usually replaces no more than 50 per
cent of previous earnings, our results indicate that it often replaces a
much larger fraction of earnings on subsequent jobs. For example, in
states with high UI benefits, displaced workers who previously earned
$16 per hour, would qualify for benefits paying the equivalent of
$7.50 per hour for a 40-hour week. Our results suggest that the aver
age displaced worker would be hard pressed to find a new job with

152 Conclusions and Policy Considerations

starting pay much above $10 per hour. Because the UI and TAA bene
fits represent such a large fraction of what they could earn by work
ing, some displaced workers will prefer to remain unemployed and
receive benefits rather than return to work. In addition, EB, HUB, and
TAA programs that extend the duration of benefits are likely to fur
ther increase durations of unemployment.
Figure 7.2 Losses of Earnings and Losses of Income (Earnings Plus UI
and TAA Payments) of Mass Layoff Separators
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These results may shed some light on the findings of other studies
that one of the most important reasons for the significant rise in unem
ployment rates since the 1960s has been a rise in unemployment dura
tions, particularly for prime-age men (Murphy and Topel 1987). Hightenure, prime-age workers appear to be more likely to lose their jobs
than in the past, and such workers have longer durations of unemploy
ment than other workers. Moreover, the interaction between the size
of these workers' earnings losses and the parameters of the UI system
likely further increases the length of their average unemployment
spells.
Because programs that offer weekly cash payments to unemployed
workers retard adjustment, several states have experimented with
offering reemployment bonuses to encourage UI recipients' rapid
return to work. In these state demonstrations, workers received lump-
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sum payments if they found jobs within a specified period following
job loss. In effect, these payments allowed unemployed workers to
receive some compensation even after they returned to work. Evalua
tions of these experimental programs indicate that bonuses modestly
reduce time unemployed without increasing the costs of state UI pro
grams or lowering subsequent wages.5 In the context of the present UI
system, however, it is clear that the more rapid reemployment they
encourage would have scant impact on the losses incurred by dis
placed workers. However, if displaced workers were to be offered UI
benefits of substantially greater potential duration, the value of reem
ployment bonus programs might be greatly increased.
Policymakers also have taken steps to help displaced workers find
new employment. First, each state administers a federally funded
Employment Service that acts as a labor exchange matching unem
ployed workers to employer job vacancies. As a condition for receiv
ing their benefits, UI recipients are required to register with their state
ES. Thus the ES comes into contact with a great many workers mak
ing difficult transitions to new employment The effectiveness of the
ES has been questioned, however, because states place only about 6
percent of their registrants, and most of those workers are placed in
low-wage jobs. Nevertheless, two studies (Johnson et al. 1986; and
Katz 1990) suggest that although its cost is low, the ES is a useful
resource for those who fail to find jobs through friends and relatives,
direct applications at work sites, or other channels. As a result, the ES
cost effectively reduces the time these registrants spend unemployed.
The modest achievements of the ES may simply reflect the modest
resources devoted to it. Unfortunately, federal funds for the ES sys
tem are currently less than 75 percent of the per registrant levels of
1980. This has caused state ESs to largely terminate counseling and
testing services that were once widely available. As a result many
states have begun to use their own funds to enhance job search assis
tance. Further, as we discuss below, several states have combined ES
funds with those provided by other federal programs and used their
ES as the lead agency in a combined program. Greater funding for
this modest but cost-effective program seems to us to be a good
investment.
In addition to the services of the ES, which are available to all
unemployed workers, policymakers have provided special readjust-
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ment assistance to displaced workers. The primary federal legislation
authorizing the provision of such services is the Economic Disloca
tion and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act. This legislation amended
Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Under this act,
the JTPA programs targeted toward the economically disadvantaged
as well as the services targeted toward displaced workers are run
locally by Private Industry Councils. Despite its name, eligibility for
EDWAA services is not limited to recently displaced workers, but
also extends to the long-term unemployed. Thus eligibility for
EDWAA services theoretically extends to perhaps millions of work
ers per year. In reality, however, funding constraints have limited par
ticipation to about 120,000 workers annually.6
EDWAA provides its clients with a diverse set of services. On aver
age, their participation lasts 14 weeks. During this time, displaced
workers receive job search assistance and possibly on-the-job or class
room training. In addition, EDWAA provides for a rapid response ser
vice, usually run at the state level. This service is designed to counsel
recently laid-off workers about alternative programs and to help them
develop realistic adjustment plans. Policymakers intend that these ser
vices will prevent participants from becoming discouraged or from
developing overly optimistic expectations about wages at available
jobs.
Previous research has found job search assistance of the kind pro
vided by EDWAA to be highly cost effective. In the past, these rela
tively inexpensive programs have quickened displaced workers'
return to work and raised at least their short-term earnings. Though it
is highly cost effective, it should be emphasized that previous
research also shows that job search assistance can only alleviate a
small portion of earnings losses of the magnitude that we document.
The limited effectiveness of job search assistance programs should
not be surprising, because the results in this monograph indicate that
a significant portion of the earnings losses of displaced workers result
from the loss of some firm-specific attribute of the former employ
ment relationship. No matter how good job search programs are at
placing displaced workers in new jobs, our results indicate that longterm earnings losses will still average 15 to 20 percent. However, our
findings suggest that the cost effectiveness of job search assistance
might be enhanced if it concentrated on placing manufacturing work-
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ers who would have wound up in the nonmanufacturing sector back
into the manufacturing sector. Counseling and relocation assistance
also might enhance the effectiveness of these programs.
The inability of public sector-supported job search to substantially
reduce displaced worker earnings has induced policymakers to
increase their emphasis on retraining programs. Such programs are
designed to raise the long-term earnings of displaced workers by
enhancing their marketable skills. In fact, approximately one-third of
EDWAA enrollees receive such classroom instruction, usually lasting
approximately 30 weeks. This retraining is provided in special classes
run almost exclusively by local community colleges and vocationaltechnical schools. Classes are more intensive than ordinary commu
nity college classes, and students usually receive significantly more
support services. These services include matching courses both to
local job opportunities and to the workers' aptitudes and interests, as
well as enhanced placement services.
Unfortunately, the program evaluation literature provides little rea
son for optimism about the ability of federally sponsored training pro
grams to substantially reduce long-term losses. For instance, in a
survey of training programs for the displaced, Leigh (1990) con
cluded that 'there is no clear evidence that either classroom training
or on-the-job training has a significant impact on employment or earn
ings." Indeed, the existing evidence suggests that it is rare for a train
ing program to raise even short-term earnings by $1,000 per year.
Such a gain would amount to about one-sixth of displaced workers'
annual long-term losses. Moreover, the scant evidence on long-term
gains from training programs gives little hope that these short-term
gains rise significantly over time.
In determining the mix of services to provide under a program
such as EDWAA with its nearly unlimited numbers of potential cli
ents but very limited funding, policymakers face an inevitable choice
between breadth and depth. In practice, this amounts to choosing
between providing relatively basic and inexpensive job search assis
tance to large numbers of workers or providing much more expensive
job training to a smaller number of workers. This choice ought to
depend on the relative rates of return job search assistance and train
ing provide in the form of increased earnings on subsequent jobs, as
well as on what would contribute to greater equity among workers.
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Our reading of the available evidence strongly suggests that job
search assistance has a much higher rate of return than training. In
fact, earnings gains from job search assistance are usually as large as
those received from training, but the cost of job search assistance is
only a fraction of that of training. Moreover, concentration on job
search assistance would allow more workers to be served and hence
seems more equitable as well. Thus, we regard as unfortunate the stip
ulation in EDWAA's enabling legislation that half of all funds be
spent on classroom training.
The recent New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment
Demonstration (Corson et al. 1989) is especially informative about
the relative merits of training and job search assistance. This demon
stration used an experimental design to study the incentives of the
unemployment insurance system and whether mandatory job search
assistance and referrals to JTPA for retraining reduced unemployment
durations and raised participants' earnings. The demonstration tar
geted UI claimants more than 25 years old, who had at least three
years' tenure with their former employer and who had been laid off
without a recall date for more than four weeks. The demonstration
required a random sample of this group to participate in a two-week
job search assistance workshop. Afterwards, random sample of these
participants was referred to JTPA.
The evaluation indicated that job search assistance raised partici
pants' earnings by $450 during the year after participating in the
workshops. However, the opportunity to participate in training appar
ently did not improve participants' labor market prospects. The earn
ings gains for those who received both job search assistance and
retraining referrals were actually smaller than for those who received
only job search assistance. To make the case for retraining even
worse, job search assistance cost only a few hundred dollars per par
ticipant, whereas the classroom instruction cost $3,100 (1990 dollars)
per participant and the on-the-job training cost $2,300 per participant.
The evidence indicates that existing training programs do not sig
nificantly reduce the earnings losses of displaced workers. Neverthe
less, it is instructive to ask how much might it cost for a hypothetical
retraining program to eliminate their $6,000 annual long-term earn
ings losses. Suppose that a training program is able to generate a 12
percent rate of return on its investment That return would be high
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compared to investments in other forms of human capital, such as
schooling. However, such a retraining program could generate a per
manent earnings gain of $6,000 per year only at a cost of $50,000.
This figure would correspond to a program that required participants
to spend two years out of the labor force, thereby foregoing $15,000 $19,000 per year in lost earnings in a full-time retraining program
with direct costs of $6,000 - $10,000 per year. Such a program would
be equivalent to paying the tuition, books, and other expenses so that
a displaced worker could go back to school full time to acquire an
Associates degree. Notice that this program, like the existing
EDWAA program, does not include any stipend to cover living
expenses.
Until recently, the Pell Grant program also provided assistance to
large numbers of displaced workers seeking retraining. A special pro
vision of that program waived the normal limit on students' prior year
income for displaced workers, allowing them to receive grants for
full-time postsecondary education.7 During the 1990-91 academic
year, over 75,000 displaced workers received Pell Grants, 5 percent
more than attended classroom training under EDWAA. We know of
no research formally evaluating the ability of the Pell Grant program
to raise the earnings of displaced workers, but its approach seems to
us to have had some advantages over the provision of training under
EDWAA. One advantage of the Pell Grant approach is that workers
had a wider choice of educational programs. For example, approxi
mately 30 percent of displaced workers receiving Pell Grants attended
proprietary schools and another 10 percent attended four-year col
leges where instruction is usually more intensive than at the commu
nity colleges where EDWAA training is provided. It is also likely that
Pell grantees, who usually paid a substantial portion of schooling
costs themselves, were more motivated learners than workers whose
attendance at training programs is required as a condition for contin
ued receipt of TAA payments. Thus, it was probably unfortunate that
the special provision for displaced workers was eliminated when the
Higher Education Act was reauthorized in 1992.
Another source of support for displaced workers is the federally
mandated requirement that firms with 100 or more employees give
workers 60 days advance notice of a plant closing or any layoff
involving more than one-third of their workforce. This mandate is
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intended to give workers time to develop adjustment strategies and,
perhaps more important, to give local governments time to ready
appropriate services. Our results demonstrate that high-tenure work
ers covered by the law are still likely to experience long-term earn
ings losses resulting from their job losses.
While a consensus on the effectiveness of this mandate has yet to
develop, some studies suggest that early notification helps reduce the
time spent unemployed following job loss (Ruhm 1992). However,
given the large and long-lasting losses of these workers after they find
new jobs, it is hard to imagine how 60 days or even six months
advance notice would have any appreciable impact on reducing earn
ings losses. Moreover, because such a large fraction of earnings loss
is related to the loss of some attribute of the employment relationship,
even if, as some studies argue, advance notice eases the transition to
new jobs requiring similar skills, substantial losses would remain. In
addition, our findings showing substantial preseparation earnings
losses indicate that even without formal notice, workers have informa
tion indicating that hard times lie ahead. These considerations indi
cate that, although early notification laws single out workers likely to
experience substantial losses, the notification itself is probably of lit
tle practical value in reducing the long-term earnings losses of hightenure workers.
There are at least three further steps that can be taken at the federal
level to improve the functioning of programs to aid displaced work
ers. The first step is to concentrate resources so states can effectively
coordinate programs. Currently, there are 125 separate programs pro
viding retraining to various groups of workers.8 Coordinating these
programs at the state level is very difficult because each program
imposes different requirements for receiving aid, enrolling partici
pants, tracking progress, and reporting results. Because the thrusts of
the programs are similar, it often would require relatively little
change to institute a common set of requirements and avoid needless
duplication.
A second step that could be taken at the federal level would be to
foster federal-state cooperation in tracking program participation and
performance. This cooperation probably could best be achieved by
establishing a common set of criteria for collecting relevant data.
Such a system would provide information on participants, services
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provided, and outcomes 13 weeks following job loss. Longer term fol
low-up also would be possible by linking participant records with the
same state UI earnings and firm records used for this analysis. Such a
data collection system for displaced workers could be modeled on the
U.S. Department of Labor's new data collection system for tracking
economically disadvantaged workers in JTPA Title IIA programs.
This system has established a common set of tracking forms across
the more than 600 Service Delivery Areas and has the resulting data
electronically transmitted to a central depository in each state and
then to a federal data center.
Finally, federal and state governments should continue to explore
the feasibility and effectiveness of programs that help firms and
employees develop plans that either forestall mass layoffs or ease the
transition of displaced workers to new employment. In Canada, the
Industrial Assistance Service performs this function by helping inter
ested parties establish management-labor committees and providing
them with technical assistance and "honest brokers." One component
of these services assists the committees in addressing problems associ
ated with plant closings. In the U.S., this component of the Canadian
program has recently been tested in a demonstration run jointly by the
Department of Labor and the National Governors Association.
A related model for dealing with plant closings comes from the
Community Adjustment Program established by the U.S. Department
of Defense. Because military facilities closures impose large costs on
affected communities, this program turns closed facilities over to the
community for a minimal charge and develops an economic plan for
the facility's civilian use. Examples of such conversions are the com
mercial airport in Bangor, Maine and the Fort Custer Industrial Park
in Battle Creek, Michigan. Although little is known about the benefits
of these industrial assistance programs, two advantages in their favor
are that they are relatively inexpensive and that they do not provide
substantial government subsidies to inefficient firms.
In conclusion, the existing array of programs designed to aid dis
placed workers provides modest short-term relief but does little to
reduce long-term losses. No existing program provides the costly,
long-lasting assistance that could conceivably come close to fully off
setting these losses. Moreover, though we believe that current pro
grams could be improved through reorganization and in some cases
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additional funding, it is doubtful whether they ever could fully restore
the lost earnings potential of displaced workers.
7.3 Implications for a Wage Subsidy Program

In this section we offer some more speculative thoughts on alterna
tive programs that would provide greater levels of compensation to
displaced workers by continuing to supplement their incomes beyond
the period of their unemployment. In contrast to traditional employ
ment and training programs, the programs we discuss in this section
would make no pretense of increasing worker productivity. Instead,
they would simply transfer income from the beneficiaries of techno
logical or policy changes to those harmed by these events. We have
already discussed the varied rationales for such a policy and observed
that existing programs under UI and EDWAA only compensate the
displaced for a small fraction of their losses. Our purpose here is to
discuss the implications of our findings for the design of programs
that would more fully compensate displaced workers.
Recall that this study contains several findings that are particularly
relevant to the design of programs intended to reduce earnings losses.
First, because quarterly losses persist, workers' cumulative losses are
extremely large. Second, the bulk of these losses accrue after workers
are reemployed and not during prolonged or frequent periods of unem
ployment following their displacements. Third, because the UI sys
tem replaces roughly 40 to 50 percent of predisplacement earnings
and because displacement substantially lowers earnings prospects, UI
benefits are likely to be a relatively large percentage of earnings from
postdisplacement jobs. Finally, workers who remained employed in
distressed firms also experience modest losses.
The severity of displaced worker losses implies that the annual
costs of a program that fully compensated them would be substantial
even if participation in such a program were limited to experienced
workers like those studied in this monograph. Our estimate that 2.6
million such workers were displaced nationwide during the sevenyear period studied suggests an annual average of 350,000 such dis
placements. At a loss of $80,000 per worker, the cost of making them
"whole" would amount to approximately $26 billion annually. Alter-

Conclusions and Policy Considerations

161

natively, if policymakers were to bring the incomes of displaced work
ers only up to the level of the nondisplaced workers in their former
firms, the estimated budget cost falls by 20 percent to $20 billion.
Even this latter figure is several times larger than current expenditures
on displaced workers. Thus, given the current political climate, it
seems very unlikely that policymakers would implement a program
that came close to making displaced workers whole.
Still, the gap between earnings losses and current levels of assis
tance is so large that policymakers may be inclined to design alterna
tive programs that provide substantially more generous assistance to
the displaced. If such programs are to avoid unnecessary inefficien
cies, they will need to pay attention to two sometimes conflicting
goals: First, they will want to target the assistance they provide
toward those who have suffered the greatest losses. Second, they will
want to insure that workers have incentives to find new and betterpaying jobs.
The conflict that sometimes emerges between these two goals can
be seen in the alternative designs proposed for the basic UI system.
The current system pays weekly benefits as long as workers remain
unemployed up to some maximum duration. This design makes sense
from the point of view of targeting the most assistance toward work
ers who have the most difficult transitions, since workers who are
unemployed longer tend to both have more difficult transitions and to
receive the most assistance from UI. However, the current system
reduces the incentives of the unemployed to find jobs because they
stop receiving benefits once they are reemployed. As we have noted,
the UI system creates especially strong disincentives for displaced
workers of the kind studied to return to work. On average, regular UI
benefits might be as much as 75 percent of what such workers could
expect to earn on their next job, and for some workers, UI benefits
may exceed the wages they could earn in the labor market.
Because regular weekly UI benefits embody incentives that delay
the return to work, an alternative design has been proposed in which a
single "lump-sum" payment is given to workers when they lose their
jobs. Such a payment could directly compensate displaced workers
for a portion of their expected losses, much the way a "back pay"
award compensates a plaintiff in a wrongful discharge case. The pri
mary advantage of providing permanently dislocated workers with a
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single lump-sum payment is that this compensation does not depend
on whether they find work. As a result they have no incentive to
remain unemployed. An additional advantage of this design is that it
does not require administrators to follow displaced workers over an
extended period of time.
A program in which all displaced workers received a single lumpsum payment does not, however, satisfy the objective of targeting the
most assistance toward those who have the most need. The problem is
that such a program not only compensates dislocated workers who
have difficulty adjusting to their job losses, but also those who adjust
relatively easily to their displacements. For example, under this
scheme a worker who found a new job immediately after his layoff
would receive just as much compensation as a worker who took an
entire year to find new employment. If a significant percentage of all
displaced workers do not experience difficult transitions, the cost of a
program based on single lump-sum payments would be greater than
necessary to achieve the objective of providing reasonable compensa
tion for earnings losses.
The reemployment bonus experiments discussed in the previous
section can be viewed as a compromise between a lump-sum scheme
and a traditional UI system that attempts to meet both objectives—tar
geting resources on those most in need and providing incentives to
return to work—reasonably well. Recall that in these designs, when
unemployed workers find new jobs by a certain date, they are entitled
to a cash payment. This cash payment or bonus provides workers
with a clear incentive to return to work by the specified date. As an
addition to the present UI system, these bonuses have been shown to
modestly reduce unemployment spell lengths without reducing wages
on subsequent jobs.
The increased incentives that bonus programs provide for the
unemployed to return to work might be an especially useful compo
nent of a program that attempted to more generously assist displaced
workers by extending the duration of their UI benefits, as is presently
done with TAA. Without reemployment bonuses, such an extension
would increase compensation to the displaced, but at the cost of wors
ening their reemployment incentives. Incorporating bonuses into a
program with longer maximum benefit durations might have a bigger
impact on incentives for the displaced to find new work. Indeed,
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some evidence exists from the Illinois reemployment bonus experi
ment that these payments were more effective when claimants were
eligible for 38 rather than 26 weeks of benefits (Decker, O'Leary, and
Woodbury 1993).
While bonus programs provide workers with better incentives to
return to work than the standard UI system, they also target assistance
toward those most in need better than a pure lump-sum system. The
bonus is, of course, a kind of lump-sum payment received even by
workers who have little difficulty finding new jobs. However, it is
smaller than the lump sums that would be paid under a pure lumpsum scheme. Moreover, while under a pure lump-sum scheme all dis
placed workers receive compensation, under a bonus scheme workers
must file a claim for UI and, depending on the program, perhaps
remain unemployed a few weeks, before receiving a bonus. This extra
hurdle imposed by the bonus scheme keeps some workers who do not
face difficult transitions from collecting benefits. Of course, its impor
tance would depend on the size of the bonus, with higher bonuses
inducing more workers who don't expect difficulty in finding new
work to participate in the program. However, as long as bonuses
remain smaller than pure lump-sum payments, bonus schemes will
have more success targeting workers most in need of help.
The reason the lump-sum and the UI reemployment bonus schemes
increase incentives to return to work is that these programs allow
workers to receive compensation without remaining unemployed.
This also could be accomplished by offering workers cash payments
or tax credits in the form of income or earnings subsidies after they
return to work (Lerman 1982). lying the level of assistance to
incomes or earnings levels on subsequent jobs would also allow policymakers to better target assistance toward those who suffer the great
est losses. If earnings always returned to their predisplacement levels,
then the number of weeks workers spent unemployed would be a reli
able indicator of the severity of their losses. But, our results show that
the biggest portion of their losses actually occur in the form of lower
earnings after they return to work. Thus, the number of weeks work
ers spend unemployed may be only loosely related to the ultimate
size of their losses. In contrast, an earnings subsidy that is larger for
workers with larger earnings declines would allow assistance to be
matched much more closely to losses. This suggests that an earnings
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subsidy program may work well by the criteria of both incentives and
targeting.
The most ambitious form of an income or earnings subsidy pro
gram would be one designed to make workers whole by paying them
the difference between their actual earnings and their expected earn
ings had the events that caused their displacements not occurred. In
order to make workers truly whole, these payments would have to
begin while workers were unemployed and their actual earnings were
zero. Moreover, workers would need to receive a one-time payment
for the portion of their losses that occurred before actual separation.
Unfortunately, as we observed earlier, such a program would be pro
hibitively costly. Another problem with this design is that it would be
difficult to administer because, as this study demonstrated, it is diffi
cult to compute "expected" earnings. In particular, such a computa
tion would require subsidy payments to depend on workers' age, sex,
and earnings histories, as well as an aggregate index of economywide
earnings growth.
More important, this highly ambitious earnings subsidy program
would fail at providing workers with incentives to find new and
higher-paying jobs. Under this hypothetical program, workers whose
earnings would have been expected to grow would receive more than
100 percent of their previous earnings while unemployed. Because
we found that, on average, their earnings on subsequent jobs were 25
percent lower, this would correspond to approximately 125 percent of
what they could expect to earn by taking a job. Moreover, even if
they were to take a new job, the program would not provide them
with the proper incentives to work more hours or find better jobs. As
long as they remained below the earnings levels expected prior to
their displacements, they would receive no benefit from higher earn
ings. Rather, each dollar of higher earnings would be offset by a dol
lar less of earnings subsidy. The severe work disincentives generated
by such a program would undoubtedly greatly lower displaced work
ers' earnings and increase costs even more than the estimates pre
sented above.
Though an earnings subsidy that makes workers whole would
clearly be bad policy, a modified version might be worth consider
ation. First, in order to make the program less administratively bur
densome, subsidy levels could be based on predisplacement earnings
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levels rather than postdisplacement levels expected before displace
ment occurred. Earnings up to three years prior to separation could be
used to calculate a reasonable predisplacement earnings level which
could then be indexed to the Consumer Price Index to prevent infla
tion from shrinking the size of the benefit Second, in order to give
workers the incentive to return to work, the subsidy could be
restricted to employed workers. Finally, in order to give workers the
incentive to earn more by working longer hours and finding better
jobs, the subsidy could be reduced in such a way as to eliminate the
implicit 100 percent tax rate. For example, the wage subsidy program
could (1) pay a subsidy equal to 40 percent of earnings to a worker
who earned 30 percent or less of predislocation wages, and (2) reduce
this subsidy by four-sevenths of a dollar for each dollar of earnings
above 30 percent. According to this design, the subsidy would decline
from 40 percent to 0 percent of predisplacement earnings as postdis
placement wages rose from 30 percent to 100 percent of their predis
placement levels. Each of these changes also would reduce the
subsidy's cost.
Table 7.1 shows the subsidy levels that a worker whose predis
placement earnings were $24,000 would receive under such a pro
gram for various postdisplacement earnings levels. For example, if
earnings on a new job were $7,200, or 30 percent of predisplacement
earnings, the third column of the table shows that the worker would
receive an earnings subsidy of $9,600, or 40 percent of predisplace
ment earnings. As the fourth column shows, this would bring total
income to $16,800. The last column of the table shows that the work
er's income would still be $7,200 per year less than predisplacement
earnings. If the postdisplacement earnings were less than 30 percent
of predisplacement earnings, the worker would still receive the same
$9,600 subsidy, but if earnings exceeded $7,200, the subsidy would
be decreased. For example, if postdisplacement earnings were to
increase to $12,000, or 50 percent of predisplacement earnings, the
subsidy would decline to $6,857. But, in contrast to the case of the
hypothetical subsidy that makes workers whole, his or her total
income would increase to $18,857. This pattern of decreasing subsi
dies and increasing total income would continue until the worker's
earnings matched the predisplacement level of $24,000. At that point
the worker would stop receiving subsidies.

Table 7.1 Income Support in a Hypothetical Earnings Subsidy Scheme When Predisplacement Earnings Were
$24,000

Postdisplacement
earnings
$4,800
7,200
9,600
12,000
14,400
16,800
19,200
21,600
24,000
26,400

Percentage of
predisplacement
earnings
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110

Annual subsidy
$9,600
9,600
8,229
6,857
5,486
4,114
2,743
1,371
0
0

Total annual income
$14,400
16,800
17,829
18,857
19,886
20,914
21,943
22,971
24,000
26,400

Uncompensated
annual earnings
decline
$9,600
7,200
6,171
5,143
4,114
3,086
2,057
1,029
-
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The modified version of the earnings subsidy described above pro
vides substantial incentives for displaced workers to find new jobs
and once reemployed to continue to increase their earnings. For exam
ple, if the hypothetical worker whose predisplacement earnings were
$24,000 was receiving UI benefits, he or she would have an income
on an annual basis of approximately $12,000. Table 7.1 shows that
even if the worker took a job paying half of his or her old earnings
level, the total annual income would be almost $19,000. Moreover, if,
as would be reasonably likely, the worker found a job paying 80 per
cent of the old level, total annual income would be nearly $22,500, or
$10,500 above what would be obtained by collecting UI. These
income increases over the levels provided by UI should induce dis
placed workers to find new work. Under the modified earnings sub
sidy, each $1,000 increase in earnings would increase income by at
least $430, so workers would also have reasonable incentives to work
harder and earn more.
Though it provides strong work incentives, the modified earnings
subsidy program would still target those in need better than the cur
rent UI system. On the one hand, workers able to quickly find new
jobs paying wages comparable to those of their old jobs would have
no strong incentive to claim UI benefits and would receive little or no
assistance from the earnings subsidy program. On the other hand,
workers who quickly find new jobs but experience large earnings
declines would receive a greater share of the available resources than
under the current UI system. Since our results suggest that such work
ers experience a large share of the cumulative losses, this program
would improve targeting.
To arrive at some crude estimates of the likely costs of such an
earnings subsidy, consider the figures in table 7.1. A worker whose
postdisplacement earnings were $19,200 or 80 percent of predisplace
ment earnings would receive a subsidy of approximately $2,700 per
year. By contrast, a worker displaced into a job paying near the mini
mum wage would receive a subsidy exceeding $9,000 annually.
Because the former case is more typical of the experiences of hightenure workers, it is reasonable to use the $2,700 figure as the basis
for estimating the likely costs of the wage subsidy program. If these
subsidies were paid to displaced workers for the rest of their working
lives, such a program would cost approximately $9 billion annually.
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(This amount assumes that each year under the existing UI system
there will be 350,000 new displaced eligible persons who receive an
average of $2,700 over the rest of their working lives.) Of course,
these costs could be lowered if policymakers chose to limit the num
ber of years that displaced workers were eligible to receive the sub
sidy. For example, if the subsidy lasted only two years beyond the
date of displaced workers' UI claims, the annual costs would fall to
less than $2 billion.
The foregoing cost estimates of a wage subsidy are meant to be
illustrative. Actual program estimates will depend on more factors
than addressed here. For example, depending on how they are
designed, earnings subsidies will affect the costs of the UI system by
altering participation rates and the duration of benefits. In addition,
other cost considerations include the movement of real wages and the
age of displaced workers. When real wages are growing, a wage sub
sidy like that described above is less costly because postdisplacement
wages are more likely to exceed predisplacement wages. Likewise,
younger workers are less costly to serve than their older counterparts
because their wage growth is usually faster. Unfortunately, real wages
have been declining for two decades and the workforce is aging.
These trends serve to raise the cost of a wage subsidy. Nevertheless,
the crude estimates presented in this section suggest that there are fea
sible alternatives to existing policies that would provide increased
support for those most adversely affected by displacement, while pre
serving strong work incentives.
To be sure, our cost estimates for an earnings subsidy program are
substantial compared to current outlays, even when the subsidy only
lasts two years. However, compared to the likely gains received by
the rest of society from many technology or policy changes, these
costs are small. For example, some studies indicate that ratification of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would raise
U.S. GDP by approximately 1 percent or $60 billion per year. In this
light, a program that annually transfers $2 to $3 billion to displaced
workers in industries adversely affected by NAFTA would appear to
be a reasonable concession to those fearing the treaty's adverse conse
quences. Indeed, if NAFTA's advocates believe that the treaty will
greatly benefit the U.S. economy, they should endorse such a subsidy
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simply because it would substantially raise the likelihood of the trea
ty's passage.
7.4 Summary

Our finding that displaced workers from a wide array of industries
and demographic groups incur large and persistent losses demon
strates the substantial value of the employment relationship to experi
enced workers. For such workers, job loss is equivalent in financial
terms to losing an $80,000 home in a natural disaster such as a hurri
cane or flood. Put this way, it is easy to understand why policymakers
often fail to enact policies such as trade liberalization that bring soci
ety net benefits even though they threaten worker displacement. The
problem is that while the benefits of such policies are divided among
the many who enjoy lower prices for the goods they buy, the costs are
borne mainly by the relatively few who lose their jobs. This unequal
division of the costs and benefits of productive change strikes many
as unfair. Even those immune to appeals to fairness should, however,
be concerned about the plight of the displaced, because in our politi
cal system a minority for whom an issue is particularly salient can
often prevail over a majority for whom an issue is a lesser priority.
Trade liberalization and similar policies may be good for society as a
whole, but enacting them is likely to be politically impossible if too
many workers fear displacement.
Our results also show that the existing programs designed to assist
job losers do little to reduce fear of displacement because they do lit
tle to reduce the associated losses. Unemployment insurance, the
major form of assistance received by displaced workers, only replaces
a portion of their earnings and only for the relatively short period they
are unemployed. It does nothing to eliminate the majority of their
loss, which our results show accumulates in the form of lower earn
ings on subsequent jobs. Other programs also have limited abilities to
help displaced workers. For instance, while low-cost job search assis
tance programs have been shown to be highly cost effective, the best
they probably can do is help workers find similar jobs. Our results,
however, show that even workers finding jobs in the same narrowly
defined industry experience large losses, implying definite limits to
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the potential effectiveness of job search. The prospects for eliminat
ing losses through worker retraining programs are even bleaker, since
research has shown that training displaced workers often generates
low returns. Moreover, even if the returns to retraining were compara
ble to those of other investments in human capital, significantly reduc
ing a displaced worker's losses would require about the equivalent of
two years of college education. So far, however, policymakers have
been willing to provide only about the equivalent of a few months of
summer school.
We have noted a number of steps that could be taken to increase
the effectiveness of current assistance efforts. For instance, though UI
does relatively little to lessen displacement's impact, it probably
serves to delay reemployment, since many workers must ultimately
accept jobs that pay little more than their weekly benefit levels. A pro
gram of reemployment bonuses is likely to be especially effective for
such workers. A thorough reorganization that eliminated duplication
and instituted common eligibility requirements for the more than 125
separate assistance efforts would lower costs as well as make getting
help less frustrating for displaced workers. Such a reorganization
should probably include a coordinating role and more funding for
state ES offices. The effectiveness of these agencies has been chal
lenged without compelling evidence. Most important, the resources
EDWAA currently devotes to providing classroom training to a rela
tively small number of workers could almost certainly be better
employed providing low-cost job search assistance to all who could
benefit. This would generate greater aggregate earnings improve
ments as well as increase equity. If these steps were taken, the burden
placed on displaced workers could be lessened with relatively little
cost Even with these steps, however, it is clear that displacement will
continue to be a major financial setback for workers, one whose pros
pect will fiercely be resisted.
If policymakers were to act to provide displaced workers with sub
stantially more generous assistance, we have argued that an earnings
or income subsidy may be a good way to deliver it. Under such a
plan, earnings on new jobs would be supplemented with payments
that would depend on how much earnings had declined from previous
levels. Such a program could provide generous help to those suffering
large losses without at the same time transferring large sums to work-
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ers who do not experience major losses. Moreover, such a subsidy
could be designed to give the displaced strong incentives to return to
work and, once reemployed, to continue to increase their earnings.
Ultimately, the decision to adopt an earnings subsidy or some other
more generous assistance program will depend on the largely norma
tive and political rationales discussed above. Providing greater com
pensation to displaced workers may be attractive on grounds of
fairness and equity. It may also be a prerequisite to productive change.
NOTES
1. This* is most common in macroeconomic discussions of the "trade-off" between inflation
and unemployment. If the unemployment in question consists entirely of temporary layoffs, this
focus on the unemployment rate may be appropriate. But if the unemployment which is traded for
lower inflation consists in part of permanent job losses, then our results imply that the unemploy
ment rate is far from an adequate summary of the costs of more stable prices.
2. Including the preparation losses in the total of losses due to unemployment does not sig
nificantly change our conclusion that losses due to unemployment are a small fraction of total
losses.
3. This estimate can only be made for workers whose former firms remained in existence.
4. Sources of income not included in figure 7.2 are supplemental unemployment benefits
(SUB) and early retirement pensions. SUB were prevalent in the steel industry and may have sub
stantially reduced short-term losses. Pensions had little effect on our analysis because we exam
ined prime-age workers, who usually were not eligible for such benefits.
5. See Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987); Corson et al. (1989); and Davidson and Woodbury
(1993).
6. A recent Congressional Budget Office study (1993) notes that funding levels have recently
risen to levels consistent with participation of around 200,000 workers per year.
7. Pell Grants are generally available to full-time postsecondary students whose prior year
income was below a certain limit. For displaced workers the limit was until recently based on cur
rent year income.
8. "Labor Issues," United States General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller Gen
eral, Report No. GAO/OCG-93-19TR, December 1992.

References
Addison, John, and Pedro Portugal. 1989. "Job Displacement, Relative Wage
Changes, and Duration of Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics 7,
3: 281-302.
Akerlof, George. 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 100,3:543-569.
Akerlof, George, and Janet Yellen. 1985. "Unemployment Through the Filter
of Memory," Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 3: 747-53.
Anderson, Patricia, and Bruce D. Meyer. 1992. Unpublished mimeo, North
western University.
Ashenfelter, Orley. 1978. "Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on
Earnings," Review of Economics and Statistics 60 (February): 47-57.
Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Card. 1985, "Using the Longitudinal Structure
of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs," Review of Eco
nomics and Statistics 67,4 (November): 648-660.
Bassi, Laurie. 1984. "Estimating the Effects of Training Programs with Nonrandom Selection," Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (February): 3643.
Beaudry, Paul, and John DiNardo. 1989. "Long-Term Contracts and Equilib
rium Models of the Labor Market: Some Favorable Evidence." Working
Paper No. 252, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, May.
_____. 1991. "The Effects of Implicit Contracts on the Movements of
Wages Over the Business Cycle: Evidence From Micro Data," Journal of
Political Economy 99,4: 665-688.
Becker, Gary. 1975. Human Capital, 2nd ed. New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Blanchflower, David. 1991. "Fear, Unemployment, and Pay Flexibility," Eco
nomic Journal 101 (May): 483-96.
Blank, Rebecca, and David Card. 1990. "Recent Trends in Insured and Unin
sured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?" Quarterly Journal of
Economics 106,4 (November): 1157-89.
Blau, Francine D., and Marianne A. Ferber. 1987. "Discrimination: Empirical
Evidence From the United States," American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings 77,2 (May): 316-320.
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence Kahn. 1981. "Causes and Consequences of
Layoffs," Economic Inquiry 19 (April): 209-96.
Bound, John, and Alan Krueger. 1991. "The Extent of Measurement Error in
Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do Two Wrongs Make a Right?" Journal of
Labor Economics 9,1: 1-24.

173

174

Card, David, and Daniel Sullivan. 1988. "Measuring the Effects of CETA Par
ticipation on Movements In and Out of Employment," Econometrica 56,3:
497-530.
Congressional Budget Office. 1993. "Displaced Workers: Trends in the 1980s
and Implications for the Future," February.
Cordes, Joseph, and Burton Weisbrod. 1979. "Governmental Behavior in
Response to Compensation Requirements," Journal of Public Economics
11:47-58
Corson, Walter, Shari Dunstan, Paul Decker, and Anne Gordon. 1989. "New
Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project."
Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 89-3, U.S. Department of
Labor.
Corson, Walter, and Walter Nicholson. 1981. "Trade Adjustment Assistance
for Workers: Results of a Survey of Recipients Under the Trade Act of
1974." In Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 4, Ronald Ehrenberg, ed.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 417-469.
Davidson, Carl, and Stephen A. Woodbury. 1992. "The Displacement Effect
of Reemployment Bonus Programs." Mimeo, Michigan State University.
Decker, Paul, Christopher O'Leary, and Stephen Woodbury. Forthcoming.
"Impacts on Receipt of Unemployment." In Incentives for Reemployment:
Results of Three Field Experiments in Unemployment Insurance, Robert
Spiegelman and Orley Ashenfelter, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn
Institute.
Di la Rica, Sara. 1992. "Displaced Workers in Mass Layoffs: Pre-Displacement Earnings Losses and Unions Effect." Working Paper No. 303, Indus
trial Relations Section, Princeton University.
Economic Commentary. 1992. Federal Bank of Cleveland, October 15.
Economic Report of the President. 1991. Washington, DC: Government Print
ing Office.
Flaim, Paul, and Ellen Seghal. 1985 "Displaced Workers of 1979 -83: How
Well Have They Fared?" Bulletin 2240, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
Gordus, Jeanne Prial, Paul Jarley, and Louis A. Ferman. 1981. Plant Closings
and Economic Dislocation. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1987. "The Costs of Worker Displacement," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 52,1: 51-75.
_____. 1989. "What Do We Know About Worker Displacement in the
U.S.?" Industrial Relations 28 (Winter): 51-59.
Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1985. Bulletin 2217, U.S. Department of Labor,
June.

175

Heckman, James, and Joseph V. Hotz. 1989. "Choosing Among Alternative
Nonexperimental Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs:
The Case of Manpower Training," Journal of the American Statistical
Association
Heckman, James, and Richard Robb. 1985. "Alternative Methods for Evaluat
ing the Impact of Interventions." In Longitudinal Analysis of the Labor
Market Data, J.J. Heckman and B. Singer, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hirsch, Barry, and John Addison. 1986. The Economic Analysis of Unions:
New Approaches and Evidence. Boston: Alien and Unwin.
Holen, Arlene, Christopher Jehn, and Robert Trost. 1981. "Earnings Losses of
Workers Displaced by Plant Closings." CRC 423, Public Research Insti
tute, Center for Naval Analysis.
Jacobson, Louis. 1977. "Earnings Loss and Job Loss Due to Employment
Reductions in the Steel Industry." Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univer
sity.
_____. 1978. "Earnings Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufactur
ing Industries." In The Impact of International Trade and Investment on
Employment, William G. Dewald, ed. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Labor, 87-98.
_____. 1984. "A Tale of Employment Decline in Two Cities: How Bad
Was the Worst of Times?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37: 55769.
____. 1988. "Structural Change in the Pennsylvania Economy." Report,
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
____. 1991. "The Dynamics of the Pittsburgh Labor Market." Report,
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
Jacobson, Louis, Robert LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan. 1992. "Earnings
Losses of Displaced Workers." Working Paper, W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
Johnson, Terry, et al. 1986. "An Evaluation of the Impact of ES Referrals on
Applicant Earnings," Journal of Human Resources 20,1 (Winter): 117-87.
Jovanovic, Boyan. 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Jour
nal of Political Economy 87,5: 972-90.
Katz, Arnold. 1990. "Length of Joblessness and the Employment Service:
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh Workers Receiving Unemployment Benefits
1979-87" Unpublished mimeo, Department of Economics, University of
Pittsburgh, February.
Kletzer, Lori. 1989. "Returns to Seniority After a Permanent Job Loss,"
American Economic Review 79,3: 536-41.

176

_____. 1991. "Earnings After Job Displacement Job Tenure, Industry, and
Occupation." In Job Displacement: Consequences and Implications for
Policy, John T. Addison, ed. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Kosters, Marvin. 1986. "Job Changes and Displaced Workers: An Examina
tion of Employment Adjustment Experience." In Essays in Contemporary
Economics Problems: The Impact of the Reagan Program, Phillip Cagan,
ed. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
LaLonde, Robert 1986. "Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training
Programs with Experimental Data," American Economic Review 76, 4:
604-620.
Lazear, Edward. 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours
Restrictions," American Economic Review 71,4: 606-20.
Leigh, Duane E. 1990. Does Training Work For Displaced Workers?: A Sur
vey of Existing Evidence. Kalamazoo, MI: WE. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Lerman, Robert I. 1982. "A Comparison of Employer and Worker Wage Sub
sidies." In Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers: The Economics of Employ
ment Subsidies, Robert Haveman and John L. Palmer, eds. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution.
Lewis, H. Gregg. 1986. Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press.
Madden, Janice F. 1988. "The Distribution of Economic Losses among Dis
placed Workers: Measurement Methods Matter," Journal of Human
Resources 23,1: 93-107.
McLaughlin, K. 1991. "A Theory of Quits and Layoffs With Efficient Turn
over," Journal of Political Economy 99,1 (February): 1-20.
Meyer, Bruce D. 1992. "Policy Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insur
ance Experiments." NBER Working Paper 4197.
Mincer, Jacob, and Boyan Jovanovic. 1981. "Labor Mobility and Wages." In
Studies in Labor Markets, Sherwin Rosen, ed. Chicago: University of Chi
cago Press.
Murphy, Kevin M., and Robert H. Topel. 1987. "The Evolution of Unemploy
ment in the United States: 1968-1985." In NBER Macroeconomic Annual
1987, Stanley Fisher, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neumann, George. 1978a. "The Direct Labor-Market Effects of the Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program." In The Impact of International Trade
and Investment on Employment, William Dewald, ed. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Labor, No. 87-98.
_____. 1978b. "The Labor Market Adjustments of Trade Displaced Work
ers: The Evidence From the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program." In
Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 2, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, ed. Green
wich, CT: JAI: 353-81,

177

Owen, Bruce, and Ronald Braeutigam. 1978. The Regulation Game. Cam
bridge MA: Ballinger.
Podgursky, Michael and Paul Swaim. 1987. "Job Displacement and Earnings
Loss: Evidence From the Displaced Worker Survey," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 41: 17-29.
President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy. 1962. Benefits
and Problems Incident to Automation and Other Technical Advances.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Ruhm, Christopher. 199la. "Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Dis
placements?" American Economic Review 81,1: 319-323.
_____. 199 Ib. "The Tune Profile of Displacement-Induced Changes in
Unemployment and Earnings." In Job Displacement: Consequences and
Implications for Policy, John T. Addison, ed. Detroit, MI: Wayne State Uni
versity Press.
Seitchik, Adam, and Jeffrey Zornitsky. 1989. From One Job to the Next:
Worker Adjustment in a Changing Labor Market. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute For Employment Research.
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1984. "Unemployment as a Worker Disci
pline Device," American Economic Review 74: 433-44.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 1974. "Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and
Unemployment in LDCs: The Labor Turnover Model," Quarterly Journal
of Economics 88: 194-227.
Swaim, Paul, and Michael Podgursky. 1991. "The Distribution of Economic
Losses Among Displaced Workers: A Replication," Journal of Human
Resources 26,4: 742-755.
Tannery, Frederick J. 1991. "Labor Market Adjustments to Structural Change:
Comparisons Between Allegheny County and the Rest of Pennsylvania
1979-87." Unpublished Working Paper, Economic Policy Institute, Univer
sity of Pittsburgh.
Topel, Robert 1990. "Specific Capital and Unemployment: Measuring the
Costs and Consequences of Worker Displacement." Carnegie-Rochester
Series on Public Policy, No. 33: 181-214.
_____. 1991. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with
Job Seniority," Journal of Political Economy 99,1: 145-176.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Robert G. Spiegelman. 1987. "Bonuses to Work
ers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illi
nois," American Economic Review 77,4 (September): 513-30.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1988. Current Population Survey, January 1986:
Displaced Workers. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Politi
cal and Social Research.
U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 1991. Budget of the United States
Government, fiscal year 1991.

Index
displacement effect defined by, 77-82
effect of differences in, 51
in estimation of earnings loss, 63-67,
82
observed and unobserved, 24-25
worker-specific, 71-74
Communications workers, 121
Community Adjustment Program, 159
Compensation programs
costs of proposed displaced worker,
160-61
for earnings loss, 7-8
Construction workers, 121
Corson, Walter, 14,19,156
CPS. See Current Population Survey
(CPS)
Current Population Survey (CPS)
displaced and nondisplaced worker
wage analysis, 25-26
earnings loss analysis using, 23-24

Addison, John, 3,27
Administrative data set, 5-8, 38-39,4244,56, 82
See also Data; Data sources
Advance notice of layoff, 141,157-58
Age groups
earnings losses of displaced workers,
124-25
pre- and postseparation earnings loss
by, 99-100
variation in losses by, 147-48
Anderson, Patricia, 94
Area Redevelopment Act (1959), 2
Decker, Gary S., 4
Bias
potential in earnings loss model, 7176
in survey cross-sectional data, 31, 34
with unmeasured worker
characteristics, 51
Blank, Rebecca, 94
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
(ILAB), 11-14

Data
advantages and disadvantages of
administrative, 5-8,42^44, 149
characteristics of, 65, 74, 82
construction of longitudinal, 38-39
for preseparation earnings, 91
proposed collection system, 158-59
sampling, 44-50, 149
state UI tax records and ES reports,
38-39
use of cross-sectional and
longitudinal, 30-33
See also Administrative data set;
Bias; Characteristics; Earnings
histories
Data sources
for administrative earnings analysis,
16
for construction of administrative
data longitudinal sample, 38-39

Canadian Industrial Assistance Service,
159
Card, David, 94
Characteristics
in data, 42-44, 65, 74, 82
earnings losses by, 117-23
firm, 64-65
of time pattern of displacement
effects, 78
Characteristics, worker
in administrative, DWS, and CPS
data, 47-50
ages of displaced and nondisplaced,
85-86
in data sources, 42
of displaced workers, 49

179

180
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), 30-33
for displacement cost analysis, 14
for earnings loss analysis, 5-7
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), 30-33
state UI tax records, 37-38
Decker, Paul, 163
Di la Rica, Sara, 25
Displaced worker programs
existing assistance, 2,7-8, 140-41,
144,149, 151-52,155-57
proposed federal level actions, 15861
See also Income replacement
programs
Displaced workers
defined, 1
earnings by age characteristic, 85-88
earnings comparison with
nondisplaced workers, 95-98, ISO35
earnings pre-, at, and postseparation,
59-60, 63, 90,163
effects of displacement, 77
estimated costs of displacement, 2627
expected future earnings, 63
in firms with mass and nonmass

layoffs, 105-6

job search assistance for, 154-55
losses of high-tenure, 137
losses when changing industry, 148
recovery from earnings losses, 122
regional differences in earnings
losses, 125-27,130
spending for (1991), 3
See also Age groups; Earnings losses;
Gender, High-tenure workers;
Nondisplaced workers
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS)
studies, 11, 19-25, 30-33,145
Displacement effect
costs, 26-27
in estimation of earnings losses, 65

on skilled and less-skilled workers,
86
Distressed firms
defined, 105, 106
earnings losses for workers
separated from, 106-24
losses of high-tenure displaced
workers in, 137-38
nondisplaced worker earnings losses
in, 122-23
DWS. See Displaced Worker Survey
(DWS)
Earnings
actual and expected preseparation, 91
associated with tenure, 27
of displaced worker in new job, 90,
163
of high- and low-tenure workers, 27
of postseparation high-tenure
workers, 89-95
pre-, during, and postseparation, 5960,63
Earnings growth
losses among nondisplaced workers,
145-46
losses in predisplacement years, 5356,61-63
Earnings histories
displaced and nondisplaced workers,
59-60
research based on long, 149
of workers in mass layoff or plant
closings, 77
of workers in statistical sample, 86
Earnings losses
after reemployment, 144
computation of, 26-27
decomposition of displaced worker,
142^3
definitions for analysis, 60-65, 68, 85
differences in men and women, 98
from distressed and nondistressed
firms, 106-24

181
effect of UI and TAA on, 151
estimating, 50-56, 65-82
factors in estimation of, 65-66
with firm's level of employment, 1067
of high-tenure, separated workers,
89-95
of nondisplaced workers, 64
pervasiveness of, 148^49
pre- and postseparation period, 7, 85,
90-92,94,98,144-45
regional differences in, 125-27,130
of separators and nonseparators, 9697
temporal pattern of, 65-66, 78-82
variation across workers, 147
Earnings loss model, 65-71
Earnings premiums, 3-5
Earnings recovery
after separation, 89-90
differences by gender, 98
pattern of, 117-22
Earnings subsidies
estimated costs of, 167-68
proposed modified payment plan,
164-67
proposed one-time payment plan, 164
recommendation for, 8,170-71
EB. See Extended Benefit (EB)
Economic Dislocation and Worker
Adjustment Assistance Act
(EDWAA), 3, 141, 149,154-55
Economic Report of the President, 2
Emergency Unemployment Benefit
(EUB) program, 150,152
Employer Identification Number (EIN),
39-41
Employment Service (ES), state level,
140-41, 149, 153-54
Employment services programs, 140141
Expected future earnings
divergence of to-be-displaced
workers, 7
estimation of, 63,164

Extended Benefit (EB) program, 150,
152
Fairness concept, 2,138-39, 148
Ferman, Louis A., 12
Financial services sector, 122-23
Firms
characteristics of, 64-65
with mass or nonmass layoffs, 105-6
unionized, 121
unionized and nonunionized, 3-4,
111, 121
See also Distressed firms;
Manufacturing sector;
Nondistressed firms;
Nonmanufacturing sector;
Structural adjustment
Flaim, Paul, 19, 20, 21-22t, 49
Gender
differences in earnings losses by, 98
as factor in preseparation earnings
loss, 91
as predictor of earnings loss, 33
See also Men; Women
Gordus, Jeanne Prial, 12
Hamermesh, Daniel, 26
High-tenure workers
displaced, 49-50
earnings loss of displaced, 44-46,99103,130-31, 137-38
focus of analysis on, 85
Hirsch, Barry, 3
Holen, Arlene, 16,17t
Human capital
of displaced workers, 65-66
of younger workers, 124-25
Human capital theory, 26-27
ILAB. See Bureau of International Labor
Affairs (ILAB); U. S. Department of
Labor

182
Incentives
in current unemployment insurance,
161-62
with earnings premiums, 4
with lump-sum payment system, 163
with policy of full compensation of
loss, 146-47
in proposed earnings subsidy
program, 164,171
in proposed modified payment plan,
165-67
under reemployment bonus scheme,
162-63
for worker mobility, 130
Income replacement programs, 140-41,
149,151-52
See also Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Act (EDWAA);
Employment Service (ES); Pell
Grant program; Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA); Unemployment
insurance (UI)
Industry type
as factor in pre- and postseparation
earnings loss, 91-92, 99, 111
long-term earnings losses by, 121
variation in losses by, 147-48
See also Distressed firms; Financial
services sector, Manufacturing
sector; Nonmanufacturing sector
Jacobson, Louis, 14,15, 17t, 18
Jarley, Paul, 12
Jehn, Christopher, 16,17t
Job changes
change in industry sector, 148
determinant of industry sector on
earnings with, 130-35
identification in administrative data,
39-40
variation of earnings loss with, 106
Job search assistance
costs of, 156-57
under EDWAA, 154
effectiveness, 148,154-56

evaluation in New Jersey program,
156
See also Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act
(EDWAA); Employment Service
(ES)
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 3,
154,156, 159
Johnson, Terry, 153
Jovanovic, Boyan, 4, 6
Katz, Arnold, 153
Kletzer, Lori, 28,29t, 30
Kosters, Marvin, 20, 23,139
Labor markets
barriers in, 4-5
as determinant of earnings losses,
101
earnings losses in local, 125-27, 130
earnings premiums in, 4
effect of depressed conditions in
local, 33
Layoffs. See Advance notice of layoff;
Mass layoffs; Nonmass layoffs;
Temporary layoffs
Lazear, Edward, 5
Leigh, Duane E., 2,3, 155
Lerman, Robert I., 163
Lewis, H. Gregg, 3
Longitudinal Employer/Employee Data
(LEED), 14-16,18-19, 34
Lump-sum payment system, 162-63
McLaughlin, K., 42
Madden, J. F., 25
Manpower Development and Training
Act (1962), 2
Manufacturing sector
earnings losses of workers in, 99100,111-17,131
incidence of distressed firms in, 111
pre- and postseparation earnings loss,
99
public policy with job losses in, 2-3

183
Mass layoffs
firms with, 105
high-tenure worker losses with, 137
required advance notice, 141, 157-58
See also Nonmass layoffs
Men
earnings losses of displaced, 98, 11820t,124
earnings recovery of, 98
predisplacement tenure effect on
earnings, 28-30
Metals workers, 113-14,121
Meyer, Bruce, 94
Mincer, Jacob, 6
Mining workers, 121
Misspecification, 74
Murphy, Kevin M., 2,152
Neumann, George, 13,19,20
New Jersey Unemployment Insurance
Reemployment Demonstration, 156
Nicholson, Walter, 14,19
Nondisplaced workers
earnings by age characteristic, 85-88
earnings comparison with displaced
workers, 95-98,130-35
earnings losses in distressed firms,
109,122-24
earnings losses of, 64
earnings of, 53-54, 59-60
losses of earnings growth, 146
See also Earnings losses
Nondistressed firms, 106-24
Nonmanufacturing sector, 92,99-100,
111-17
Nonmass layoffs, 105-6
See also Mass layoffs
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 168-69
O'Leary, Christopher, 163
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), 27

Pell Grant program, 141,149,157
Plant closings, 137
Podgursky, Michael, 23,25
Portugal, Pedro, 27
PSID. See Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID)
Public policy
effect on worker dislocation, 1-2
proposed, 152-53, 158,160-61, 164
67,171
rationale for displaced workers, 138
worker characteristics in decisions
for, 66
See also Displaced worker
programs; Earnings subsidies;
Fairness concept; Income
replacement programs
Public utilities workers, 121
Reemployment bonus, experimental,
152-53, 162-63
Ruhm, Christopher, 32, 33,158
Seghal, Ellen, 19, 20, 21-22t, 49
Seitchik, Adam, 23,51
Separation
conditions for involuntary, 106
dating worker, 41
Sex. See Gender
Social Security Administration (SSA)
Longitudinal Employer/Employee
Data (LEED), 14
Specifications
of basic earnings loss model, 77
in earnings loss model, 61, 67-71,90
of extended earnings loss model, 7782
Specification test, 74, 90
Structural adjustment
causes and effects of, 1-5
effect on displaced and nondisplaced
workers, 109
See also Distressed firms;
Nondistressed firms

184
Swaim, Paul, 23, 25
TAA. See Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA)
Temporary layoffs, 7,92-94
Tenure
pre- and postseparation earnings loss
with, 100
as predictor of earnings loss, 28-29
returns to, 26-30
See also High-tenure workers
Topel, Robert H., 2, 24, 27, 30, 31-32,
33,152
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
as income replacement program, 14041,144,151-52
under Trade Act (1974), 2,3,12-14
under Trade Expansion Act (1962),
13
Trade competition impact, 2, 12-18
Training and retraining programs
Area Redevelopment Act (1959), 2
costs of, 156
duplication of, 158
under EDWAA, 155
effectiveness, 170
evaluation, 155-56
under Pell Grant, 157
Training services programs, 140^41
Transportation workers, 121
Trost, Robert, 16, 17t
UI. See Unemployment insurance (UI)
Unemployment insurance (UI)
to assist displaced workers, 140-41,
144

collection rates by workers
approaching separation, 92, 94, 98
current system, 161, 169
earnings losses of noncollectors, 94
income replacement, 149
proposed alternatives, 161
See also Emergency Unemployment
Benefit (EUB) program;
Employment Service (ES);
Extended Benefit (EB) program;
Reemployment bonus
U. S. Department of Defense,
Community Adjustment Program,
159
U. S. Department of Labor
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
(ILAB) studies, 11-19
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 19
U. S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), 3
Wage subsidy program, 160-69
See also Earnings subsidies
Women
earnings comparison with men, 98-99
pre- and postdisplacement earnings
loss, 92,98,118-20U24
predisplacement tenure effect on
earnings, 28-30
Woodbury, Stephen, 163
Worker dislocation. See Displaced
workers; Earnings losses
Worker earnings alternative models, SI56
Zornitsky, Jeffrey, 23,51

About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. It is an
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn,
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of
publications. Activities of the Institute are comprised of the following
elements: (1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional
social scientists; (2) a competitive grant program, which expands and
complements the internal research program by providing financial support to
researchers outside the Institute; (3) a publications program, which provides
the major vehicle for the dissemination of research by staff and grantees, as
well as other selected work in the field; and (4) an Employment Management
Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment
and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication
programs are to: (1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of
public and private employment and unemployment policy; and (2) make
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their
pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include: causes,
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional
economic development and local labor markets.

185

